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ABSTRACT 
 
 A study of Renaissance literature’s engagement with temporality, my project is a 
critical evaluation of the concept of early modern futurity, of which I propose three 
categories: “Material futurity”; “Biological futurity”; and “Political futurity.” In the 
moments that I identify in texts composed during the Tudor and early Stuart reigns in 
England, I demonstrate that the future—as an idea—structures individuals’ actions and 
ruptures social formations. Futurity, which I define as a play of multiple desires that exist 
simultaneously within our present beings, is a volatile agent of imagination in early 
modern literature. Futurity collides with the cultural sites of memory and pulls characters 
in different directions, destabilizing the organized spaces defined by their bodies, 
kingdoms, and locations. While the characters in these texts may return to regulated 
forms of thought and being, it is in their moments of flux, I argue, that they present the 
most complex engagement with futurity.  
In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, for example, Helena initiates a material futurity 
when she chases down the scornful Demetrius in the woods outside Athens and promises 
him that she will write a “story” that “shall” change the future of female lovers (2.1.230). 
It is precisely because Helena resists material conditions—the silence and immobility 
imposed upon Athenian women, who “cannot” act and “fight for love as men may do”—
that she strives to transform the future of female subjectivity and citizenship (2.1.241). 
The Changeling’s Beatrice-Joanna, on the other hand, appropriates a futurity that is 
xii 
biological, when she plans carefully to avoid the virginity and pregnancy tests designed 
for her by her new husband Alsemero. Having lost to De Flores her virginity, that “loved 
and loathed” passage to the site for the generation of patriarchal futures (1.1.125), 
Beatrice-Joanna sabotages her own marriage bed as well as others’ bodies, thereby 
avoiding her fundamental sexual responsibility to patriarchs—her husband and her 
father—of legitimate biological propagation. In my third example, Paulina in The 
Winter’s Tale relies on political futurity to topple Leontes’ absolutist monarchy. As she 
orders the king to “[c]are not for issue” but follow the example of the “Great Alexander,” 
who died and left his kingdom to no particular heir (5.1.46-47), Paulina instigates in 
Sicilia such a politics of unpredictability as will culminate in the succession of a new 
kind of political leadership.  
Through these and other examples, I establish the various means by which 
characters in Renaissance literature operate within one or more categories of futurity, and 
I argue that the future in these works is a persistent if problematic source of inspiration 
and agency.  Futurity, that condition of our present experience in which we want, need, 
wish, hope, and plan for diverse objects and states to be realized in our future, initiates in 
characters such as Helena, Beatrice-Joanna, and Paulina a contradictory desire that often 
leads to their perverting (making monstrous) the social apparatuses of their past and 
present. Through such manipulations, characters in early modern literature not only 
imagine the future as a controllable component of time, but also amend the seemingly 
concrete elements of temporality—their historical past and present—in order to propel 
change.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: TEMPORALITY, DELEUZE, AND EARLY MODERN 
FUTURITY 
The topic of my study is Renaissance futurity. An interplay of multiple desires 
that exist simultaneously within our present beings, futurity is a volatile agent of 
imagination in early modern literature. In the moments that I identify in texts composed 
during the Tudor and early Stuart reigns in England, I demonstrate that the future—as an 
idea—structures individuals‟ actions and ruptures social formations. Futurity, that 
condition of our present experience in which we want, need, wish, hope, and plan for 
diverse objects and states to be realized in our future, initiates in characters a 
contradictory desire that often leads to their perverting and making monstrous the social 
apparatuses of their past and present. Simply put, futurity is an unstable condition and it 
disturbs the institutions within which we function as beings organized by linear 
temporality. Our experiences of the past and present apply force to our construction of 
our ideas of the future; these forces pull in unpredictable ways, often in opposing 
directions, thereby destabilizing the basis of linear temporality and organization, of 
progress. Futurity, moreover, collides with the cultural sites of memory and pulls 
characters in different directions, destabilizing the organized spaces defined by their 
bodies, kingdoms, and locations. While the characters in early modern texts may return to 
regulated forms of thought and being, it is in their moments of flux that they present the 
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most complex engagement with futurity. Through such engagement, these characters not 
only imagine the future as a controllable component of time, but also amend the 
seemingly concrete elements of temporality—their historical past and present—in order 
to propel change.  
Within the early modern context, the experiences of futurity fall into one or more 
of three prominent categories: material futurity; biological futurity; and/or political 
futurity. Material futurity is informed by characters‟ acute consciousness of the 
limitations posed on their identity by the present material conditions within which they 
must operate. Biological futurity, which is rampant in early modern thought, typically 
concerns itself with the matter of the proper and improper reproduction of bodies. 
Political futurity emerges from characters‟ desire to dismantle political infrastructures 
and create atmospheres that might enable alternative forms of political organization. Most 
often early modern experiences of futurity are interwoven and overlapping, with the 
material, biological, and political investments overlapping, colliding, and/or coinciding in 
characters‟ constructions and enabling of the future. The future that the characters 
envision, in other words, is a concept through which they re-imagine and reconfigure 
simultaneously the boundaries of institutions, such as marriage, maternity, and monarchy, 
within which they must operate as material, biological, and political agents.  
Any critical discussion of futurity must take into account diverse theories of 
temporality that inform our understanding of the experience of time. Key movements in 
twentieth century socio-political, literary-cultural, and historical-philosophical studies 
have asserted the complexity of the human experience of time, noting specifically 
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peoples‟ erratic or non-linear constructions of time. My study of early modern futurity 
engages with the theoretical investments of various cultural materialists, feminists, and 
political philosophers. Particularly relevant to my analysis are the theories of Gilles 
Deleuze. In works such as The Logic of Sense, Difference and Repetition, and A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze establishes his theories of temporality, of which I draw 
chiefly on “becoming” and “deterritorialization.” The concepts of becoming (which 
encompasses “the infinite identity of both directions or senses at the same time”) and 
deterritorialization (which releases “the creative potential” of a structured body or system 
by freeing up “the fixed relations that contain” it) may effectively be employed to 
understand the fluidity and multiplicity of the futures envisioned by characters in 
Renaissance literature. Whereas other theories of temporality are rooted in either the 
absolute nature of the past (Bergson‟s “pure memory,” which I discuss in Chapter Five in 
the context of political futurity in The Winter‟s Tale and The Tempest) or the terminal 
condition of the future (Derrida‟s “gift of death,” which I address briefly in Chapter Six 
in the context of everyday performances of futurity in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream and 
A Chaste Maid in Cheapside), Deleuze‟s philosophy of time offers becoming and 
deterritorialization as unstable and indefinite elements that enable individuals 
simultaneously to participate in their past, present, and future, and thereby to intensify 
their experiences. His theories are immersed in collaborative analysis, and combine 
provocatively a vast array of aesthetic, material, philosophical, political, and 
psychoanalytical methods of evaluating human experience.     
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Using Deleuze‟s theories of temporality in conjunction with established 
historicist methods of analysis, my project offers throughout close readings of 
Renaissance futurity as it is constructed within the literature of the period. This chapter 
presents readings of scenes from Othello (1602-03), As You Like It (1600), and Macbeth 
(1606) to exemplify the relationship between early modern representations of temporality 
and the socio-historical context in which the concept of the future—as materially, 
biologically, and politically malleable (pervertible) and narratable—is constructed in the 
literature. Here I also identify the processes through which Deleuzean terminology and 
theories (such as “becoming,” “deterritorialization,” and “lines of flight,”) may 
effectively be employed, in collaboration with historicist analysis, to engage Renaissance 
conceptions of time. I draw out specifically those moments in early modern literature that 
represent the temporal flux created by characters breaking away from the seemingly fixed 
limits of their experience. Such flux results from these characters‟ Deleuzean 
recognitions of the interpenetration of the past, present, and future. The flux, moreover, 
arises when they embrace the future as being virtual and fluid, a component of time that 
they continually may mold or create. Through their experimentations with futurity, then, 
characters in early modern literature transcend the imposed limits of their identity and, by 
deterritorializing from their prescribed states of being, express the innovative potential of 
the future that they imagine and implement for themselves and others. By disrupting 
contemporary systems of organization, characters in Renaissance literature construct the 
future as a time of opportunity and change. 
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Prologue 
My discussion of futurity in three of Shakespeare‟s plays opens with a seeming 
digression into a reading of a poem by a Renaissance woman:  
 
The Doubt of Future Foes 
 
The doubt of future foes 
Exiles my present joy 
And wit me warns to shun such snares 
As threatens mine annoy. 
 
For falsehood now doth flow 
And subjects‟ faith doth ebb, 
Which should not be if reason ruled 
Or wisdom weaved the web. 
 
But clouds of joys untried 
Do cloak aspiring minds 
Which turns to rage of late repent  
By changèd course of winds. 
 
The top of hope supposed 
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The root of rue shall be 
And fruitless all their grafted guile, 
As shortly you shall see.  
 
Their dazzled eyes with pride, 
Which great ambition blinds, 
Shall be unsealed by worthy wights 
Whose foresight falsehood finds. 
 
The daughter of debate  
That discord aye doth sow 
Shall reap no gain where former rule 
Still peace hath taught to know. 
 
No foreign banished wight 
Shall anchor in this port: 
Our realm brooks no seditious sects— 
Let them elsewhere resort. 
 
My rusty sword through rest 
Shall first his edge employ  
To pull their tops who seek such change 
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Or gape for future joy. 
  Vivat Regina 
Written by Queen Elizabeth in 1571, this poem is remarkable for having been included 
by George Puttenham in 1589 in his Art of English Poesie as an exemplary “gorgious,” a 
style that he identifies in his work as the “last and principal figure of our poetical 
ornament.” The style, Puttenham explains, is notable for its “copious and pleasant 
amplifications and much variety of sentences all running upon one point and to one 
intent.” Semantically, the poem is remarkable because its “one point” or “intent,” which, 
as Puttenham notes, is indeed made using “copious … amplifications” and a “variety of 
sentences,” is the Queen‟s investment in futurity. Elizabeth captures what is essential to 
futurity: an acute consciousness of continual if also unpredictable temporal movements 
that are capable of causing social and political disruptions. Falsities, the Queen notes in 
her poem, are flowing in her realm, just as her “subjects‟ faith” in the political system is 
ebbing. The precise direction of the “flow” is notably left uncertain in the lines. The 
erratic movement of narrative (of “falsehood”) and subjectivity (“faith”) that Elizabeth 
wishes to regulate through her judicious exercise of “reason” remains the focus of her 
poetic discourse, and the corrected state of affairs is deferred to a future close at hand, 
one that she can already envision and that her subjects (readers) shall “shortly … see.”  
The poet is quick to note that her own sense of futurity clashes with that of other, 
less observant political agents, who, being “dazzled” by the ambitious visions of their 
futures, are blind to the watchful eyes of the Queen‟s “worthy” and loyal counselors, who 
will soon unravel or unseal the traitors‟ subversive plans. Elizabeth is similarly 
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dismissive of the political threat posed by Mary, the “daughter of debate,” and other 
“foreign” figures whose agendas of usurpation, she believes, will prove “fruitless” on 
English soil. While for most of the poem‟s duration Elizabeth refrains from direct action, 
trusting instead her subjects‟ sense of loyalty and their sound judgment on matters of 
stately security, she finally articulates the physical act that she would be willing to 
perform in order to ensure the future joy of her people and her realm. Her “sword,” 
though “rusty” from scant use in the past, is fully capable of stopping short the actions of 
those that seek change against her royal will. Upon such a categorical announcement 
Elizabeth not only signs her royal name but also promises to live long into a future whose 
direction she has already begun to pave.  
As Elizabeth makes clear in the poem that the uncertainties regarding her future 
(England‟s future) impose upon her “present joy” or contentment, she prompts the 
interplay of multiple kinds of “doubt” that troubled the men and women of early modern 
England and Europe. Considered by many as unfit to rule owing to her dubious birth and 
religion, Elizabeth‟s body and her politics no doubt filled her subjects with anxiety. Fully 
alert to the public concern, her addresses to the people of England exemplify the Queen‟s 
willful desire to appropriate contemporary conventions of matrimony and lineage, and to 
develop instead an environment that she could inhabit on terms that guaranteed both her 
absolute power (as the sole, unjointed monarch of the State) and her subjects‟ desire for a 
cleansed (virginal) polity. Her first speech before Parliament on February 10, 1559 makes 
her point clearly:   
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… [A]lbeit it might please almighty God to continue me still in this mind to live 
out of the state of marriage, yet it is not to be feared but He will so work in my 
heart and in your wisdoms as good provision by His help may be made in 
convenient time, whereby the realm shall not remain destitute of an heir that may 
be a fit governor, and peradventure more beneficial to the realm than such 
offspring as may come of me. For … yet may my issue grow out of kind and 
become, perhaps, ungracious. And in the end this shall be for me sufficient: that a 
marble stone shall declare that a queen, having reigned such a time, lived and died 
a virgin.      (58; emphasis added) 
Speaking at a time when the early modern imagination was inundated with quasi medical 
theories of maternal impression and scandalous stories of women‟s violation of the basic 
patriarchal right of fathers to identify through imprinting the markings of their paternity 
on their offspring,
1
 Elizabeth positions herself strategically as the ideal female monarch 
who, by remaining virginal, would never risk the future of her subjects by corrupting it 
through an unwise marriage that may lead to a faulty or corrupted offspring.  
 But she goes beyond trying merely to alleviate her people‟s present concerns 
regarding the future of England. Elizabeth mobilizes actively through narrative an 
alternative vision of the state‟s political future, a vision that she offers to her subjects as a 
picture of positive transformation and outcomes that can result from the collaboration of 
divine, royal, and civil desires. Fittingly, even as she nods to the frailty affiliated with her 
                                                 
1
 In Chapter three on biological futurity in plays by Christopher Marlowe and Thomas 
Middleton, I develop at length an analysis of the early modern cultural practices 
surrounding paternal imprinting, maternal impression, and perverse progeny.  
  
10 
feminine form, the Queen embraces the role of political and intellectual architect,
2
 as 
she presents her ideas to the young and old men of Cambridge University on August 7, 
1564: 
… Rome was not built in a day. For my age is not yet senile, nor have I reigned 
for such a long time; so may I, before I pay my debt to nature (if Atropos does not 
sever the thread of life more quickly than I hope), do some famous and 
noteworthy work. Nor, for as long as the impulse guides my mind, will anything 
deflect me from the purpose. And if it should come to pass (which clearly I do not 
know how soon it might) that I have to die before I am able to complete that 
which I promise, yet will I leave an exceptional work after my death, by which 
not only may my memory be renowned in the future, but others may be inspired 
by my example, and I may make you all more eager for your studies.    (88-89)  
The Queen that stands before them, Elizabeth seems to state, is neither naïve or jaded but 
is at a perfect age for rulership. The future therefore holds for her a promising venue—the 
England of her making in the time that is to come—for creativity. She makes it equally 
clear to her audience that she does not mean to shy away from her ideas about the future 
of her state, and hopes that death, which is the termination of temporal experience, will 
not compromise her desires. But even if death should get the better of her by rendering 
incomplete her vision of an altered England, she declares that she means to continue 
                                                 
2
 Elizabeth begins her speech with the conventional apology for choosing to speak as a 
relatively unlearned, “barbarous,” woman before a highly learned audience. After 
articulating quickly and effectively her purpose in being so bold, the Queen concludes her 
speech with another mirthful apology. Notably, neither her opening nor concluding 
apologies conceal her will to construct a future for herself and for her state that is to her 
liking.    
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during her lifetime to be an exemplary figure whose “exceptional work” will convince 
the likes of the Cambridge men to construct their futures based on their “studies” of her 
conception of futurity. Her biology and her age, matters with which she initiates her 
speech and narrative of futurity, are transformed from being the ingredients of concern 
and debate into the features that necessarily equip the Queen with her abilities as both the 
creator and enabler of transformation.  
Increasingly unlikely to marry and bear children, then, during the time that she 
composed “Doubt of Future Foes,” the thirty-eight year old Queen was a double threat to 
her people: as a single woman who was not governed by a man but instead exercised 
material and political power over her own and others‟ beings, she posed threat to the 
future of patriarchal authority; as a female who managed to avoid her reproductive 
responsibilities, she jeopardized the future of the family unit, an institution that enabled 
the smooth operation of monarchy. Elizabeth, in short, shook not only England‟s ideas 
about its own future but also disrupted fundamentally the construction of the future as an 
idea. In so doing, she became one of the principal architects of early modern futurity. 
That she relies on diverse narrative strategies in order to construct futurity is no 
coincidence; throughout this chapter, and in my project as a whole, narration remains 
crucial to characters‟ development of their ideas of the future, and instrumental in their 
disruption of the experience of linear temporality. 
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 „There Are Many Events In the Womb of Time, Which Will Be Delivered‟: 
Narration and Futurity in Othello 
Shakespeare‟s Othello offers a peculiarly rich example of the intersection of 
motifs that are integral to our understanding of early modern literature‟s engagement with 
material, biological, and political futurity. The play is frequently at the center of scholarly 
discussions of the period‟s growing investment in the constructions of identity. Histories 
of race, gender, and sexuality have continued to inform the practices of our critical 
analysis of the characters‟ understanding of their selves in the context of others in 
Othello. More recent evaluations of the play have also studied the means by which 
characters use mundane objects—handkerchiefs and bed linens, for instance—to structure 
and manipulate their own and others‟ beings. Narrative plays a crucial part in enabling 
these characters to present themselves as individuals crafted by experience, in a word, by 
time. Through language they manage to account for the past and present; but they also 
wield language collaboratively in order to bring about future transformations that are 
prompted by their articulation.                 
Almost everyone in Othello has a powerful story to tell. Repeatedly characters 
offer each other true or false tales, and their narratives prompt both judgment and action 
in the listeners, urging them in turn to abandon their hitherto courses to the future and 
adopt instead an alternative futurity that is inscribed by the storytellers‟ designs. Iago‟s 
tall tale to Othello about Desdemona‟s infidelity may be the best known and most 
obvious example of the play‟s pervasive narrative drive—indeed he is a dream-weaver 
and fiction-maker par excellence. But other characters are not too different than the 
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infamous villain. Othello is an impressive storyteller, for example. His narration not 
only wins him Desdemona‟s “sighs” (and/or “kisses”) (1.3.160), but it also holds captive 
a stately Venetian audience that otherwise is in a hurry to settle the military unrest in 
Cyprus.
3
 Othello‟s modest appraisal of his rhetorical abilities runs counter to what his 
“rude … speech” is in fact able to achieve; his “round unvarnished tale(s)” are more 
potent than magic particularly because they are not limited by the formulaic discipline of 
potions or charms. Instead his narratives, which, Brabantio claims have the effect of 
“spells” (1.3.62), connect with others through what the philosopher Gilles Deleuze would 
identify as the transference of the “passionate quality of … experience” (Parr 90). It is 
through this “State of passion,” Deleuze argues, that individuals may share experiences, 
thus “making (them) endurable,” and even finding through them the “lines of flight” that 
emerge from within the folds of experience (Negotiations 116). Experience, Deleuze 
further clarifies, is not limited to that which is immediately perceived or made 
empirically tangible. Rather, experience (and the lines of flight that result from it) 
becomes real owing to the passionate connections we make through it with others; it is 
especially real when “we don‟t see it, because it‟s the least perceptible of things” 
(Negotiations 45). This embedded or imperceptible quality of the connections, which 
emerge from individuals‟ sharing their narratives of experience, has directly to do with 
                                                 
3
 The seriousness of the Turkish threat also is a matter that is reported through narrative. 
Various messengers offer differing stories about the enemy‟s strength; while the first 
Senator has “news” of “a hundred and seven galleys,” and the second Senator reports of 
“two hundred,” the “letters” sent to the Duke suggest there are “a hundred and forty” in 
the fleet. Despite the reporters‟ confusion over the precise number of Turkish ships that 
are sailing toward Cyprus, the members of the senate all agree that the essence of the 
story—that the Venetians are under threat—is true and must therefore be believed “[i]n 
fearful sense” (1.3.1-11). 
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the multiplicity of events that, with the passage of time, become interwoven and even 
overlap.     
Like Homi Bhabha‟s contemplative “self” that is sensible to having “lived that 
moment of the scattering of the people that in other times and other places, in nations of 
others, becomes a moment of scattering” (139), Shakespeare‟s Othello is a man 
altogether aware of identity as a “rhizomatics” of place, time, and exchange. What I, 
following Deleuze, refer to here as rhizomatics is similar to what Bhabha identifies in his 
work as “gatherings.” Identity, especially the identity of “exiles and émigrés and 
refugees,” claims Bhabha, is a fusion of gatherings: “gathering on the edge of „foreign‟ 
cultures;  gathering at the frontiers; gatherings in the ghettos or … city centres; gathering 
in the half-life, half-light of foreign tongues, or in the uncanny fluency of another‟s 
language; gathering the signs of approval and acceptance, degrees, discourses, 
disciplines; gathering the memories of underdevelopment, of other worlds lived 
retroactively; gathering the past in a ritual of revival; gathering the present” (139). 
Instead of Bhabha‟s “gatherings” I appropriate Deleuze‟s term “rhizome” to 
evaluate the multiple connections that saturate and erupt within Othello. Deleuze‟s 
adoption of botanical language, which includes “roots,” “trees,” “rhizomes,” and 
“arborescence,” is particularly useful to our understanding of the multiplicity of 
relationships and their networks (intercrossings) that continually are forged and 
transformed within early modern texts. In particular, the composition and expansion of 
Deleuze‟s theories of “rhizomes” enable us to understand the ways in which characters in 
Othello navigate the social complexes within or outside of which they find themselves. A 
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detailed analysis of “rhizomatics” will also be useful to our understanding of important 
related concepts—concepts such as “becoming,” “deterritorialization,” and 
“reterritorialization,” all of which are central to my study of early modern futurity.  
Deleuze and Guattari declare that in order for us to comprehend multiplicity, we 
must abandon our desire for uniqueness: “subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be 
constituted,” they advice (A Thousand Plateaus 6). They propose the model of the 
“rhizome” as one that abandons uniqueness and enables a true multiplicity: 
A rhizome as a subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. 
Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. … Even some animals are, in their pack form. 
Rats are rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, 
movement, evasion, and breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, 
from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and 
tubers. When rats swarm over each other. The rhizome includes the best and the 
worst: potato and couchgrass, or weed. (A Thousand Plateaus 6-7) 
In this characteristically lyrical if unruly passage, Deleuze and Guattari present through 
examples the fundamental basis on which all rhizomatic multiplicity takes place. They go 
on to explain the characteristics of the rhizome in a more systematic manner. As its first 
two features, Deleuze and Guattari list the rhizome‟s “principles of connection and 
heterogeneity.” “Any point of a rhizome,” they state, “can be connected to anything 
other, and must be. This is very different from a tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an 
order.” In the context of human activity or interaction, “[a] rhizome ceaselessly 
establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and 
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circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (A Thousand Plateaus 
7). The philosophers use the example of language to show its rhizomatic social 
movement: “there is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language 
within a political multiplicity” (7). Like a bulb, language too “evolves by subterranean 
stems and flows, along river valleys or train tracks; it spreads like a patch of oil” (7). 
While language may be broken down to establish its structure or roots, Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest that a preferable method of analysis, one that would follow peoples‟ 
methodologies of linguistic adoption, adaption, and appropriation, will necessarily be 
decentered “onto other dimensions and other registers” instead of being “closed upon 
itself” (A Thousand Plateaus 8).  
Another characteristic of the rhizome is its multiplicity. By multiplicity Deleuze 
and Guattari do not mean a subject or object‟s capacity to modify and/or increase itself. 
Rather, multiplicity has “determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot 
increase in number without … changing in nature” (8). In other words, rhizomes do not 
multiply themselves (in short, they do not reproduce); nor do they have a structural unity. 
Instead their connections change them fundamentally. Thus “the laws of combination … 
increase in number as the multiplicity grows” (8). The next feature of the rhizome 
involves its rupture. As with arborescent structures (such as trees) that can be broken, 
split, or segmented, rhizomes too may be broken. However, the breakage does not 
conclude their connective capacity but enables them to find what Deleuze and Guattari 
call a “line of flight,” an escape from termination or permanent containment. Broken at a 
given point, rhizomes will grow out of other points, or even at the point from which they 
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were broken (though this growth or expansion will neither imitate the former 
connection nor rejuvenate the old).  
Related to the idea of the rupture of rhizomes are two principal Deleuzean 
concepts that are crucial to my study: “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization.” 
“Deterritorialization” is the process by which a rhizome contaminates the structures that 
try to define, organize, and limit its connections. By deterritorializing the rhizome finds 
unlimited and disorganized ways of spreading. But the deterritorialized rhizome is always 
at risk of being “reterritorialized” by another structuring body. That is, its connections 
may be limited by organizations (systems) that render predictable its modes of expansion. 
This, in turn, enables the organizations to contain or limit rhizomatic activity. The 
example that Deleuze and Guattari use to explain the processes of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization is especially striking: 
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the 
wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, 
becoming a piece in the orchid‟s reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes 
the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, 
form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its 
image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only 
on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two strata such that a plant 
organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same 
time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of 
code, … an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the 
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orchid and the becoming-orchid of the wasps. (A Thousand Plateaus 10; 
emphasis added) 
While both the orchid and wasp reterritorialize onto the system of biological reproduction 
(reproducing their own kind), they also are deterritorialized at the moment that they make 
a cross-species connection (a connection that dismantles momentarily the distinction 
between “self” and “other”). Thus deterritorialization and reterritorialization are 
interlinked in the rupture and spreading of rhizomes. 
Finally, rhizomatic activity comprises mappings. Unlike tracings, which follow 
linear direction and assume the existence and superiority of originals, maps are “open and 
connectable in all … dimensions, … detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant 
modifications” (A Thousand Plateaus 12). Maps may be accessed or invaded from any 
point; they do not have prescriptive means or routes of exit; and they need not be 
complete in the same way as tracings must be. In short, since they are open to continual 
conception and transformation, movements on maps need not be limited to movements 
backward or forward, which are the only two possibilities of motion in tracings. Maps 
therefore enable the experience of space and of connectivity in ways that may be 
paradoxical and unsystematic. 
As Othello speaks of his “most disastrous chances” and near-impossible 
adventures (1.3.135), then, he not only places an imaginable, mappable distance between 
his “travailous history” of enslavement and his present free condition of narration, he also 
provides Desdemona with a “line of flight” that enables her to transcend the limits of her 
experience of domesticity (“the house affairs” that are imposed on her by the Venetian 
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codes of female conduct) and passive privilege, and to connect with his experiences of 
self-construction (1.3.148). Put differently, the language that Othello offers to and shares 
with Desdemona embraces the contradictions of their respective experiences and leads 
them to Deleuzean “becomings.” For Deleuze states:  
It is language which fixes the limits …, but it is language as well which 
transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited 
becoming. Hence the reversals which constitute … adventures: the reversal of 
becoming larger and smaller …; the reversal of the day before and the day after 
…; the reversal of more and less …; the reversal of cause and effect.  (Logic 
of Sense 2-3)  
While others in Venice—notably the powerful senators, including Brabantio who, with 
his daughter “devour[ed] up (Othello‟s) discourse” and “loved” him for it (1.3.151, 
129)—also enjoy their General‟s stories of violence in foreign lands, their interest is 
similar to that of a tracer‟s curiosity, which lacks sympathy but desires non-contradictory, 
convenient consumption and closure. Unlike the men‟s, Desdemona‟s “greedy ear[s]” 
cause her as much trouble or “pains” upon hearing of Othello‟s past as they bring her 
present pleasure and fill her with hopes for her future: “She wished she had not heard it, 
yet she wished / That heaven had made her such a man” (1.3.161-62). Also unlike the 
senators, who prioritize Othello‟s direct actions over his narrative capabilities because 
they depend on his valiance and military experience for the uninterrupted propagation of 
their political ideology, Desdemona relies on his discourse to unfix her present state of 
being and bring about a radical transformation in her identity; not surprisingly, she 
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wishes to be united with such a man as “would woo her” in non-filiative ways by 
learning of Othello his “story” (1.3.165-67). In short, Desdemona deterritorializes by 
means of Othello‟s narratives of his past, and thus experiences what Deleuze 
provocatively terms a “becoming.” 
In The Logic of Sense Deleuze puts forth his theories of “becoming,” theories that 
are of central importance to my study.  “Becoming” is paradoxical, essentially. Deleuze 
explains “becoming,” using the example of Alice‟s movements in Lewis Carroll‟s Alice 
in Wonderland. The constantly transforming Alice has an unfixable identity and location 
because she straddles oppositions; she grows bigger and smaller, moves forward and 
backward: she does not stay the same. In continually transforming (experiencing 
“ruptures”), she escapes the fixity of the three temporal phases—the past, present, and 
future—but instead is always in the middle of all three. Thus Alice never is anything in 
the simple present or present perfect sense of being. At the same time, she is not 
contained by a simple past or the future perfect tense. Alice experiences her 
transformations in the present-continuous. Hers is not a be-ing, then, but a “becoming.” 
While “[g]ood sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense of direction, 
… paradox is the affirmation of both sense or directions at the same time” (Logic of 
Sense). It is paradox, again, that defines “becoming.”  
Where the passion of narrative may move characters such as Desdemona and 
Othello to love and pity and to experience becomings, it is Brabantio‟s hope that the 
Venetians will recognize only the limitations of words. (Ironically, he had wished 
initially with his speech to sway the Senate to unleash bitter justice upon Othello and to 
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punish him.) But the Duke—eager to clear up the present anxiety within Brabantio‟s 
household that is brought about by miscegenation, and to free Othello so he may perform 
his function of securing Venetian interests in Cyprus—advices the old senator to forget 
his sorrow as a thing of the past: “To mourn a mischief that is past and gone / Is the next 
way to draw new mischief on” (1.3.205-06). He moreover attempts a clever rhetorical 
ploy through which he hopes to erase the distinction, in Brabantio‟s perception, between 
Othello‟s and Desdemona‟s beings: “[N]oble signor, / If virtue no delighted beauty lack / 
Your son-in-law is far more fair than black” (1.3.289-91). Clearly, despite their many 
other similarities (of race, religion, politics, and status) the Duke does not wish to share 
Brabantio‟s language and his experience of betrayal at the hands of the other. Instead he 
wishes strategically to align himself with Othello, who, in Deleuzean terms, functions as 
a “war machine”: 
There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is 
a different assemblage, than a State apparatus. One of the fundamental problems 
of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a 
piece of its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution. (A Thousand 
Plateaus 230)  
Deleuze and Guattari‟s statement about the complex relationship of the State to the war 
machine is exemplified by the early interactions in Othello, where the statesmen, who 
quite clearly rely on their valiant General‟s foreignness to gain control over the Turkish 
insurrection and to return stability to Cyprus, are at the same time anxious to tether the 
Moor to Venetian laws. Unlike Desdemona, they do not desire contradictory connections 
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of passion to form between them and Othello, but rather wish to mimic sympathy in 
order to make Othello their own, an outstanding citizen who would propagate their 
interests. Thus, even as the Duke‟s “special mandate for the state affairs” bestows on 
Othello a near absolute authority and personal freedom to marry the fair Desdemona 
(1.3.73), there is a simultaneous expectation that the Moor‟s future actions must 
necessarily solidify the state‟s authority over all its subjects, including Othello himself. 
Being black, Othello must adopt through a bellicose display of his loyalty a Venetian 
identity, and thereby embrace a whitened rhetoric of pride in virtuous citizenship.     
The Duke‟s strategy of indoctrination is similar to what Bhabha identifies as the 
fundamental work of metaphors in constructing bonds and narratives of national 
affiliation: “The entitlement of the nation is its metaphor: Amor Patria; Fatherland; Pig 
Earth; Mothertongue; Matigari; Middlemarch; Midnight‟s Children; One Hundred Years 
of Solitude; War and Peace; I Promessi Sposi; Kanthapura; Moby-Dick; The Magic 
Mountain; Things Fall Apart” (141). To Bhabha‟s formidable list of texts, each of which 
articulates the narrative strategies that interlock nationhood and identity, one easily could 
add Othello. A play that presents each character‟s engagement with belonging and 
unbelonging in terms of the acts or inversions of enslavement and service, obligation and 
loyalty, elopement and matrimony, and racial and religious affinity, Othello exemplifies 
Bhabha‟s understanding that “the narrative and psychological force that nationness brings 
to bear on cultural production and political projection is the effect of the ambivalence of 
the „nation‟ as a narrative strategy” (140). Moreover, “as an apparatus of symbolic power, 
it produces a continual slippage of categories, like sexuality, class affiliation, territorial 
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paranoia, or „cultural difference‟ in the act of writing the nation” (Bhabha 140). 
Othello is a play that reveals characters‟ flows of identity through the mobility of 
discourse. Narration is mobile in this play precisely because in it the “temporality of 
representation … moves between cultural formations and social processes without a 
centered causal logic” (141). If anything, the Duke is keen to suggest that the Venetian 
culture of virtue and heroism forms or locates itself “more around temporality than about 
historicity” (140). Because the temporal organization of such a culture is not systematic, 
it is also not reproducible formulaically. Rather, it relies for its propagation on instability 
and unpredictability, on events (such as past acts in past wars and anticipated acts in 
future wars) that gain symbolic significance through the effective use of narrative, and by 
comprising the narratives. These narratives—of cultural production and indoctrination, 
among others—are marked by what Bhabha refers to as the “continual slippage of 
categories” (140). The Duke wields his language of benevolent unification and solidarity, 
then, specifically in order to undercut Brabantio‟s emphasis on the impossibility of 
transcending difference. 
Fully cognizant of the political situation embroiling Venice and Cyprus, and 
conscious of Othello‟s utility in the context of these military affairs, Brabantio is no naive 
subject; nor is he easily comforted by the Duke‟s seemingly kind words to him. He points 
to the hypocrisy of his leader‟s advice, and suggests that he is wiser than to take seriously 
words that cannot bring about a desirable modification in his future. However, already 
fooled once by his child and by Othello, Brabantio plays the fool inadvertently for the 
second time when he calls attention to the impotency of equivocation. “[W]ords are 
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words” (1.3.219), he states, suggesting that language, being powerless without the 
conjoining force of direct experience, can neither do harm nor be the cause of relief. His 
claim that he “never yet did hear / That the bruised heart was pierced through the ear” is 
all too ironic (1.3.220); for the rest of the play unravels precisely as a series of actions 
committed by heartbroken characters “pierced through the ear” by others‟ words. 
Almost immediately after Brabantio makes his statement about the 
impoverishment of words, for example, Desdemona moves the Senate with her plea to 
escort her new husband to the potentially war-torn shores of Cyprus:  
That I did love the moor to live with him 
My downright violence and scorn of fortunes 
May trumpet to the world. My heart‟s subdued  
Even to the very quality of my lord: 
I saw Othello‟s visage in his mind, 
And to his honours and his valiant parts 
Did I my soul and fortunes consecrate, 
So that, dear lords, if I be left behind, 
A moth of peace, and he go to war, 
The rites for which I love him are bereft me, 
And I a heavy interim shall support 
By his dear absence. Let me go with him. (1.3.249-60) 
Having given up the secured future that is afforded to Venetian women who know their 
proper place within society—a comfortable marriage to a man of her father‟s choosing or 
  
25 
liking, and also an uninterrupted if transformed relationship with her father—
Desdemona craves the thing for which she has sacrificed these “fortunes.” The stories of 
Othello‟s past acts of heroism and suffering that drew her to him in the first place now 
must be received first hand as narratives told to her in the present tense. In short, the 
connection that Desdemona felt in the past with the experienced soldier Othello is made 
more intense through their marriage. As a result, she does not wish to be oppressed by the 
order of “peace” when her sympathy is for “war.” The “rites” or rights of which she 
speaks boldly are not so much sexual as they are discursive—qualities of marital 
intimacy that are unfamiliar to most Venetians, whose heternormative relations are 
limited mainly to sexual dynamics and are marked by mutual suspicion.  
To gauge Venice‟s cynical vision of the sexual union between men and women, 
we need only consider Iago‟s obsession with his marriage bed as a space abused by 
Emilia, whom he suspects of having slept at the least with Othello and Cassio, in 
violation of the sexual contract that informs matrimony. For her part, Emilia suggests that 
sexual infidelity is not an unimaginable offense, and that the sexual monopoly that 
contractually binds individuals within matrimony is tiresome to women and men alike. 
Likewise, Roderigo is willing to believe that Desdemona is sexually corruptible and that, 
with some effort and persistence on his part, she may cuckold Othello. Bianca fears that 
Cassio is sexually deceptive and has another mistress, who offers him favors and trinkets. 
Of the exhaustive list of sexually organized Venetians, perhaps the most indirect yet 
telling comment on the culture of heteronormative jealousy and suspicion is made by 
Brabantio, who warns Othello about his daughter‟s propensity for unchastity, thus 
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locating Desdemona and the institution of matrimony within the damaging Venetian 
climate of suspicion and sexual difference.  
But as Claire Colebrook argues, “sexual difference, like any other difference, is 
always disrupted or opened by the question of its meaning and condition” (122). In 
Othello this opening up comes in the shape of discursive intimacy. Desdemona‟s 
eagerness to participate in the masculine discourse community surrounding war (and 
warriors) seems to be an extension of Othello‟s earlier description of her greedy ears 
absorbing his stories of his history and subjectivity. No longer willing to be a passive 
recipient of retrospective narrative, she wants to accompany her husband to Cyprus and 
permeate the masculine space of military homosociality in order to receive first-hand (in 
the present tense) word of his actions.  Othello too is eager to assert the non-sexual 
dimensions of the couple‟s intimacy and proximity in Cyprus. Sex is far from the 
newlyweds‟ minds, it would seem. Othello even admits to being too old “to comply with 
heat, the young affects” of sexual desire that in him are “defunct” (1.3.264-65). Instead of 
the “wanton dullness” that the Senators fear might result from the company of most 
“housewives,” he insists on the heightened cerebral and speculative qualities that his wife 
inspires in him (1.3.266-73). With little time to waste, the Senators give in without 
hesitation to Desdemona‟s and Othello‟s desire to be together while they are away from 
Venice. Notably, with even lesser time to share together before embarking on their 
momentous journey to Cyprus, the couple spends their final hour in Venice not in the 
throes of speechless (silent) love but rather in articulation—the giving and receiving of 
“direction” or advice (1.3.300).  
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To suggest that Othello‟s and Desdemona‟s love is not of a sexual nature may 
seem problematic. There is, after all, a long and complex history of critical engagement 
with the topic of sexuality in Othello, especially as it emerges within the analyses of 
feminist, postcolonial, and queer theorists who study the play and focus on the sexual 
relations of Othello, Desdemona, and Iago. Feminist interpretations often defend 
Desdemona‟s love for Othello as a balanced combination of romance and realism that is 
marked by her “healthy, casual acceptance of sexuality” (Neely 74). Further articulating 
this trend in criticism, Emily Bartels argues that Desdemona‟s “gestures of submission 
paradoxically enable (her) expression of desire” and empower her as one of the few 
female characters in early modern drama who “inhabit their subjectivities, who are able 
to seem as well as be and, consequently, be as well as seem” (420). Bartels points to the 
early scenes in the play when Othello conjures up the figure of his wife as a “vicarious 
adventurer” (424). Desdemona herself, she claims, performs the role of a balanced, 
conventional Venetian woman not unlike her mother, specifically so that she may have 
her way and escort her husband to Cyprus. Critics such as Karen Newman, on the other 
hand, point not to the balance and possible healthiness of female love and sexuality but 
rather to the “link between femininity and the monstrous which Othello‟s and 
Desdemona‟s union figures in the play” (137). Also focusing on the monstrous, Ania 
Loomba complicates the play‟s engagement with sexuality by triangulating the workings 
of race, class, and gender within the Venetian world. She studies the couple‟s relations 
through the “shifting positions” that Desdemona “occupies in relation to Othello, and to 
the contradictions that they impose upon her” (177). The shift, Loomba argues, has to do 
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with Desdemona‟s movement away from her initial sense of power, which derives 
from her “confidence of both race and class,” toward her eventual recognition of “the 
more sobering reality of the power of the husband over the wife, a power that Othello 
asserts despite his blackness, or … because of it” (179-80).  
Reading through a queer critical lens, Nicholas Radel also pays attention to the 
coincidence of gender, sexuality, and social class, and suggests that, with Romeo and 
Juliet, Othello too may “easily be explained by modern conceptions of sexuality” (62). 
He notes, however, that the play is often misread as “a love tragedy ostensibly about a 
heterosexual couple, and to the extent that other kinds of desire factor into the plot, they 
seem to constitute perverse others to normative heterosexual functioning” (62). As 
opposed to such interpretations, Radel‟s thesis, which he pursues chiefly through his 
reading of Iago, is that the play “attempts to contain within discourses of sodomy the 
disruptions to its homosocial military bonds” (63). Through his “sodomitical 
perversions,” Iago manages not only to threaten “marriage and reproductive sexuality,” 
but he also violates social hierarchy, “particularly when he so deftly reads and then 
mishandles his superior, Othello” (Radel 69). The important differences in their 
approaches notwithstanding, most recent critics of Othello contend that the play focuses 
primarily on sexuality and sexual difference. Whereas Michael Bristol is among the few 
scholars who maintain that Desdemona “remains perfectly submissive to the end” and her 
“very self consists in not being a self, not being even a body, but a bodiless obedient 
silence,” for the most part Desdemona is interesting to critics as the exemplary figure of 
femininity and female sexuality. They suggest moreover that all the male characters in 
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the play construct and appropriate their masculine, sexual identity in the specific 
context of their perceived or desired relationships to women, notably Desdemona. 
Without diminishing the importance of the issue of sexuality in the play, I want to 
draw attention to a peculiar quality of the intimacy between Desdemona and Othello, one 
that fruitfully may be discussed using Deleuze and Guattari‟s theories of non-filiative 
connections. The philosophers suggest that “propagation by epidemic, by contagion, has 
nothing to do with filiation by heredity, even if the two themes intermingle and require 
each other. The vampire does not filiate, it infects” (A Thousand Plateaus 241-42). Iago 
recognizes Othello as a threatening figure of contagion, one who connects or bands with 
Desdemona through the non-filiative means of sympathy and narrative. But as he instills 
fear first in Roderigo and then in Brabantio, Iago uses the language of filiation—in 
Deleuzean terms, of “evolution” and “regression”—thus forcing the bond between 
Othello and Desdemona to be interpreted in terms of sexual mixing and miscegenation, 
problematic concepts for Venetians but at least recognizable and therefore containable 
(through the proper or improper use of the law and conventions). 
Strangely, Desdemona‟s and Othello‟s affinity, which, before Iago interferes with 
them, is based on non-propagative terms of intimacy, shares something with the 
alternative model that Brabantio proclaims early in the play as the ideal for the future of 
patriarchy: 
I had rather to adopt a child than get it. 
  Come hither, Moor: 
  I here do give thee that with all my heart 
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Which, but thou hast already, with all my heart 
  I would keep from thee. For your sake, jewel, 
I am glad at soul I have no other child, 
For thy escape would teach me tyranny 
To hang clogs on them. I have done, my lord.  
(1.3.192-99; emphasis added) 
The horror of Desdemona‟s brief but efficient appropriation of patriarchy, whereby she 
reminds Brabantio of the institutional necessity of the daughter “preferring” her husband 
in marriage “before her father” (1.3.187), spurs the Senator‟s bitter speech, which 
functions simultaneously as his public disownment of his only offspring and his betrothal 
of his daughter to the man whom he would least like to see as her husband. His mind 
already full of images of monstrous births, it is not surprising that Brabantio talks of the 
avoidance of copulation and reproduction; so much so that, when he declares adoption 
and not biological reproduction to be the ideal medium through which a parent may 
propagate his patriarchal ideology (of obedience and female chastity), Brabantio inverts 
the trope of paternal imprinting, which within the early modern context of biological 
futurity, was meant to promote the secured lineage and footing of patriarchs. Since his 
offspring‟s actions prove her to be nothing like her father, Brabantio claims that he would 
rather rely on a child that is not begot by him. Again defying the patriarchal conventions 
with which an early modern English audience must have been familiar, Brabantio 
expresses his gratefulness for being parent to only one child. Hitherto of loving and open 
nature but now betrayed by his daughter, Brabantio implicates Desdemona in the 
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transformation of his character and admits to feeling compelled in future to lock up all 
that he possesses—even imaginary children—so that he may never again experience a 
child‟s disobedience, the kind that has led to his present condition of abandonment. The 
bonds of sympathy form much stronger connections than those of blood, Brabantio 
recognizes painfully. 
In light of the seeming victory of the unconventional love between Othello and 
Desdemona, Roderigo promises to end his sorrows, not by changing his approach to 
cultural norms, but by reinforcing them.  Roderigo swears that he will drown himself—
thus returning the audience to the all too familiar conventions that inform the erotic 
dynamic between men and women in Venice. But Iago is quick to catch his foolish 
friend‟s error: Roderigo‟s disappointment in what he believes is his love for Desdemona 
the ancient identifies correctly as the young man‟s frustration with unfulfilled “lust of the 
blood and … permission of the will” (1.3.335). The popular misnomer of lust as love 
defines erotic relations in Venice, and Iago, who is an expert in Venetian ways, promises 
the “snipe” Roderigo that he will transform (or, to use a Deleuzean term, 
“reterritorialize”) Othello‟s and Desdemona‟s love—a thing held together by “a frail 
vow”—into lust, which, unlike narratives of shared experience that with time may grow 
in complexity and engagement, reduces itself quickly after being “sated” into a base and 
changeable “error” (1.3.356; 351-52). Ironically, Iago also recognizes that in order for 
him to force this transformation upon Othello and Desdemona, he will have to “abuse 
Othello‟s ear” by narrating stories not only about Cassio‟s intimacy with the General‟s 
wife (1.3.394-95), but also about the affects of Venetian citizenship.      
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As the action moves from Venice to Cyprus, Act two, scene one, seems at first 
to move us away from the labyrinthine discussions of filiative and non-filiative bonding 
that are held in the mainland to the anxious and hurried exchanges between soldiers and 
gentlemen on the stormy coast of Cyprus. But we return quickly to the conflict that is at 
the heart of the play. The storm, which anticipates the opening scene of Shakespeare‟s 
late play The Tempest, dampens the scope of Othello‟s future activity and heroism. Even 
before the General lands on the coast, we hear from the third gentleman that the “wars are 
done” for no other reason but that “[t]he desperate tempest hath so banged the Turks / 
That their designment halts” (2.1.20-22). The valiant Othello does not even have the 
chance to witness the destruction of his enemies; that fortune falls upon Cassio, who 
happened to be on board the “noble ship” that encountered the “grevious wrack and 
sufferance” of the Turkish fleet (2.1.22-23). This scene is important because it draws 
attention to Othello‟s failure to gather the very experiences or stories that would fuel 
Desdemona‟s love and pity for him. The pressing “cause” of war on alien soil that led the 
Venetians to give away one of their most prized women no longer exists and so closes off 
the possibility of the aging hero displaying to his wife the reasons for which she forsook 
her father‟s affections. From here on Othello‟s visions of the future are contaminated, a 
phenomenon best described by Jean-Paul Martinon as follows: 
[F]uturity as contamination means that the unhinging of space (and) time operates 
only by retaining and encouraging the impurity of space(s) (and) time(s): here, 
there, past, present, or future. … What we are left with … is therefore not a 
perpetually recurring contamination …, but a „state‟ of unrest, where one never 
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knows what or how things are coming or going and yet are compelled to take 
action. (Martinon 189) 
Defeated in his bellicose enterprise at the hands of nature, Othello cannot even 
manage to land in Cyprus in time to welcome his bride. Instead he finds her waiting 
along with the “valiant Cassio” and the quick witted Iago to “meet him and receive him” 
(2.1.87, 179). Indeed it seems that Othello is outdone in his journey by his “fair warrior” 
who, as Iago recognizes astutely if corruptly, may soon starve for want of adventure. 
Dangerously, the stage is set wherein the experiences of the General, who admits to 
dormancy—having for “some nine months wasted” the skills for which he has been 
employed by the state (1.3.85), and who now “prattle[s] out of fashion, and … dote[s] / In 
(his) own comforts” (2.1.205-06)—may be reduced by Iago, but possibly even by 
Desdemona, into mere tales of “bragging” and “fantastical lies” (2.1.221). Moreover, 
with no new stories of his action to recount to his wife, Othello, the hitherto expert 
storyteller-actor, offers himself as the anxious audience of Iago‟s dramaturgy, as an ear 
into which the ancient may pour poisonous “prologue[s] to the history of lust and foul 
thoughts” (2.1.256).  This scene, then, is positioned crucially within the play to mark the 
transformation in various characters‟ roles in the context of storytelling. Those who have 
been narrators move steadily from this point on to becoming recipients of narrative; the 
storytellers change their subjects from experiences of heroic suffering to lurid acts and 
dreams of sexual corruption. What remains consistent despite the other changes and 
inversions in narrative is the pull of the story, the drive of futurity: “[f]or every minute is 
expectancy/ Of more arrivance” (2.1.41-42). 
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 „To The Last Syllable of Recorded Time‟: (S)Pacing Futurity in Macbeth 
The overlapping of narratives and temporalities that is crucial to the action in 
Othello finds a more urgent representation in Macbeth, a play that quintessentially is a 
drama of the paradoxical movement of futurity. Elizabeth Grosz suggests that most texts 
focusing on the movement of time adopt one of two categories for charting temporality: 
time in these texts is either “linear, progressive, … even, regulated, and teleological” or 
else it is “circular, repetitive, and thus infinite” (98). But Macbeth, like Othello, presents 
a challenge to this model by invoking disruptive temporalities. The play insists on the 
paradoxical nature of characters‟ experience of time and on the flux that emerges from 
their chiasmic manipulations of events. The opening lines, for instance, spoken by the 
first witch, suggest a potential repetition of an event: “[w]hen shall we three meet again?” 
The second witch‟s answer, however, does not engage a linear time by offering a 
categorical answer, such as “When Macbeth has killed Macdonwald”; nor does it 
accommodate a circular, repetitious time with a response, such as “When the sun sets 
again.” Instead the second witch‟s response—“When the battle‟s lost and won” (1.1.4)—
mobilizes a paradoxical temporality similar to what Deleuze explains in The Logic of 
Sense is Alice‟s experience in Wonderland. Having set the stage for contrariness, the 
witches in unison utter the notoriously paradoxical words that usher in not only the action 
of the play but also the future dispositions of the characters: “Fair is foul and foul is fair” 
(1.1.11). 
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The spirit of this chiasm is picked up almost immediately by King Duncan, 
whose exchanges with his soldiers and subjects in Act One, scene two, are steeped in 
paradox. Death and life collide in the “bloody man,” a captain whom Duncan accosts for 
the “newest state” of the battle. Upon his king‟s demand to learn about the latest news 
from the battlefield, the Captain halts his progress toward death (or “surgeons”) and 
unravels with enthusiastic detail the violent means by which Macbeth and Banquo, 
having first defeated “the merciless Macdonwald,” are now paving the way to Scotland‟s 
victory over Norway and the traitorous Thane of Cawdor. His anticipation of Norway‟s 
plight at the hands of Macbeth is made certain—as a thing of the past—when Ross 
announces to Duncan that “[t]he victory” indeed “fell on” Scotland (1.2.59; emphasis 
added). Often remarked upon by scholars,
 4
 the hasty pace of the events that move the 
action forward is unsettling specifically because of the corruption of the linear temporal 
flow, both in terms of action and narration. 
The action of the play is also unsettling because of its complex spatiality. The 
physical and psychical spaces occupied by characters in Macbeth may best be understood 
in terms of Deleuzean “mappings” that engage the “conceptions of space and time” 
alongside the “exploration of corporeality” of the characters (Grosz 84). The witches‟ 
                                                 
4
 The subject of time has been central to scholarship on Macbeth. Critics such as Tzachi 
Zamir and Geza Kallay draw attention to the relationship between Macbeth‟s moral 
“hollowness,” his “vaulting ambition,” and the speed with which the play catalogs the 
central character‟s transformative journey from hero to villain. George Williams and 
Douglas Burnham, among other scholars, focus on the “verbal echoing” of events, which 
dominates Macbeth‟s experience of time. While their insights offer valuable approaches 
to interpreting the temporality of the play, the critics neglect to study the overlapping 
experiences of time, which prompt, even force, characters to live simultaneously in the 
future and in their past.  
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physical appearance, for example, intertwines problematically spatio-temporal and 
corporeal dimensions of experience. It is no wonder that Macbeth and Banquo are 
puzzled by the witches and by their own response to the appearance of the “weird 
sisters.” The men‟s puzzlement stems directly from their inability to plot the witches on a 
familiar course of identity that maintains throughout the distinctions of space, time, and 
corporeality. Grosz explains that, typically, space-time and corporeality are evaluated 
separately in social settings: “[t]he two sets of interests are defined in reciprocal terms, 
for bodies are always understood within a spatial and temporal context, and space and 
time remain conceivable only insofar as corporeality provides the basis for our perception 
and representation of them” (84). Their encounter with the witches estranges Macbeth 
and Banquo from their hitherto familiar processes of comprehension. This is because 
Banquo‟s “What are these?” is a question that neither he nor Macbeth can answer without 
addressing simultaneously the contrariness of the time during which they encounter the 
mysterious figures: the time (“day”) at which the beings meet is both “foul and fair.” In 
conjunction with the oppositional pulls of the time, the witches occupy contradictory 
bodies and spaces. They are on the earth, though they do not look earthly; they have 
beards, yet seem to be women; they seem alive but escape humanity; they silence 
themselves but are fully cognizant of the power of language. (While we know that they 
are capable of speech, Banquo and Macbeth are first baffled by the witches‟ silence 
because “each at once her choppy finger laying / Upon her skinny lips” refuses to provide 
the men with straightforward answers to their inquiries (1.3.45-6) Their eventual speech, 
of course, dazzles the men—particularly Macbeth—even more than did their silence.)  
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When the witches break their silence and speak to the men, they remain agents 
of dense mystery, specifically of spatio-temporal and corporeal confusion. On a “blasted 
heath” that is somewhere between the gory site/s of battle and the familiar geography of 
Forres in Scotland, the witches “stop” Macbeth and Banquo‟s systematic movement 
forward on the course of what seems to be smooth and linear progress, and confound the 
men with “prophetic greeting” and “great prediction” (1.3.55-79). Notably, at least one of 
their prophetic claims about Macbeth‟s future is an utterance of a past event. Neither 
soldier is surprised by the witches‟ addressing of Macbeth as Thane of Glamis because 
both men are assured of systematic success even before their encounter with the witches; 
their valiant actions in the recent wars have guaranteed them reasonable ascendancy 
within Duncan‟s court. But it is the strategic positioning of the utterance to which I wish 
to draw attention. By articulating their knowledge of an event fresh in the past, the 
witches manage to validate their corporeality and, in so doing, induce in the men a 
system of faith or belief about their predictions for all time, including the future. That is, 
because their claim suggests that they know intricate tidbits of Macbeth‟s recent past, of 
events that even the King needed to be educated on, the witches gain credibility as beings 
that comprehend both time and space, even as they position themselves as the Others of 
spatio-temporal existence. That their strategically confusing utterance embarks Macbeth 
on his momentous journey, which is navigated by his overlapping drives of material, 
biological, and political futurities, is a testament to the power of their narration. 
Remarkably, their utterance not only prompts in Macbeth the rhizomatic rupture that 
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leads to his “becoming-criminal,” but also enables a powerful display of his identity as 
a conjunctive composition of self and Other.  
Like Deleuze and Bhabha, Jacques Lacan also engages theories of the Other to 
explain the workings of the self within spatio-temporal realms. Lacan states famously 
that the individual‟s discovery of identity takes place when she first encounters her 
mirror-image. This image necessarily will: 
…crystallize in the subject‟s internal conflictual tension, which determines the 
awakening of his desire for the object of the other‟s desire: here the primordial 
coming together (concours) is precipitated into aggressive competitiveness 
(concurrence), from which develops the triad of others, the ego and the object, 
which, spanning the space of specular communion, is inscribed there… (Lacan 
19) 
In other words, it is only through this initial encounter with our mirror-image that we 
recognize identity as a space that we occupy. Moreover, it is only after our encounter 
with the Other or the mirror-image that we begin to understand and strive for our own 
place in society. Confronted by the future of Banquo‟s children, who, the witches 
prophesy, “shall be kings”, Macbeth immediately constructs his identity as one who 
desires to capture the Other‟s—in this case Banquo‟s—code. Thus, even when he 
theoretically is made aware by the witches‟ prophesies of his own identity, it is only the 
news of Banquo‟s future identity that draws from Macbeth his desire to know more about 
himself: “stay, you imperfect creatures, tell me more,” he orders the witches. But these 
are disobedient creatures, who, like the “bubbles” or like melting “breath,” defy 
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“corporal” dimensions. Notably, they leave Macbeth pondering—and desiring—
Banquo‟s future, specifically the good fortune promised to his children. 
Lacan‟s theories share much in common with those of Roger Caillois, whose 
work, as Elizabeth Grosz suggests, analyzes “the effects of the image on the subject‟s 
acquisition of spatial comportment” (87). Caillois in fact argues that while the “anchoring 
of subjectivity in its body is the condition of coherent identity,” one that enables the 
subject to have a “perspective on the world” (28), an individual‟s psychosis results from 
his inability to position himself in a space that he ought to occupy. This in turn leads to 
his failure to gain perspective. Caillois ponders the experience of psychotics at length: 
To these dispossessed souls, space seems to be a devouring force. Space pursues 
them, encircles them, digests them in a gigantic phagocytosis. It ends by replacing 
them. Then the body separates itself from thought, the individual breaks the 
boundary of his skin and occupies the other side of his senses. He tries to look at 
himself from any point whatever in space. He feels himself becoming space, dark 
space where things cannot be put. He is similar, not similar to something, but just 
similar. And he invents spaces of which he is the convulsive possession. (30) 
Upon hearing from the witches about his future, and having portions of their 
prophesies fulfilled, Macbeth experiences a categorical break from linear temporality. His 
“psychosis” results from his inability to situate himself spatially in the present. For him 
the future becomes a site of haunting and persuasion; indeed it “ends by replacing” all his 
other spatial and temporal experiences. His sense that “[p]resent fears / Are less than 
horrible imaginings” couples paradoxically with his new-found conviction that “[t]he 
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greatest is behind” (1.3.136-37; 115). From here on Macbeth experiences the present 
solely as a “step” that he “must … o‟erleap” to catch up with his “deep desires” for a 
mysterious future time (1.4.48-51), one that Lady Macbeth recognizes can only be 
experienced through contradictory pulls: “To beguile the  time,” her husband she states 
must also “[l]ook like the time” (1.5.61-62). A quick learner, Macbeth adopts his wife‟s 
advice of deceitfulness, and dissembles through the present, seeking not only to 
concretize a future that he is convinced has been promised him, but also to undo the 
future that has been promised to others. The confusing “masterpiece” that he initiates 
with the murder of Duncan is only the first in a series of multiple strokes in his bloody 
painting of a time that is to come (2.3.62). His fear that he holds but a “barren sceptre” in 
his hands prompts Macbeth to wrench from Banquo his life and, with that, his potential to 
bear future kings that might threaten the present usurper with usurpation (3.1.63).
5
 But 
Macbeth‟s ceaseless and “horrible imaginings” work continually within him (1.3.250), 
making it impossible for him to participate fully in the present “pleasure of the time” 
(3.4.97). These “imaginings,” moreover, dismantle his ability to function as a cohesive 
self, producing instead multiple ruptures in his being, which dislocate him temporally and 
spatially at the same time that they fill him with the desire for the state of fulfillment: 
Time, thou anticipat‟st my dread exploits. 
The flighty purpose never is o‟ertook 
Unless the deed go with it. From this moment 
                                                 
5
 Clearly, Macbeth sees in Fleance a visible threat to his own future, which makes the 
child‟s death essential. But Banquo‟s murder is even more important than that of the 
young lad, because he is able to father more children (the as yet invisible threats to 
Macbeth), having already fathered one.   
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The very firstlings of my heart shall be 
The firstlings of my hand. And even now, 
To crown my thoughts with acts, be it thought and done:   
       (4.1.160-65)    
If, as Deleuze suggests in Difference and Repetition, “[w]e are contemplations, … 
imaginations,” and if “[w]e must always first contemplate something else … in order to 
be filled with an image of ourselves” (74-75; emphasis added), Macbeth is divided 
among his multiple contemplations about himself in the future. Beneath his “self which 
acts are little selves which contemplate, … thousands of little witnesses” that pull him at 
differing speeds and in different directions (75). Thus, even as he swears to be focused 
and determined (“This deed I‟ll do before this purpose cool”), Macbeth is split among the 
many “sights” (or imaginings) that he no longer wishes to see (4.2.170-71). That one of 
the sights he cannot bear to see includes the marching woods of Birnam is all too ironic; 
for this forest that creeps into Macbeth‟s present and dislodges him finally from his ever-
racing experience of futurity is itself a product of deception. Similar to the Forest of 
Arden in As You Like, the mobile topography of Birnam Wood, then, marks the 
dangerous marginal space of flux, of simultaneous deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. Like a “petticoat‟s” fringe, the mutable forest disturbs and marks 
boundaries, temporalities, and identities.  
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Perverse Periphery: The Forest in As You Like It 
Petticoats occupy a prominent place in As You Like It. Of the nine occurrences of 
the words in the body of Shakespeare‟s drama (in the singular and plural forms 
combined),
6
 they appear thrice in this play alone. More peculiar still is the connection of 
petticoats to particular locations in As You Like It, and to the unstable conditions of 
characters‟ beings. A closer study of the scenes that involve this trivial article of 
women‟s underclothing reveals the play‟s overarching preoccupation with the complex, 
interwoven network of spatial and temporal flux that informs characters‟ self-
constructions and their engagements with others. In this play, petticoats peep through the 
outer layers or covers of stabilized public identity perversely to catch on the 
contradictions (or complications, to use Deleuzean terminology) that emerge from 
characters‟ encounters with each other at the edges (or fringes) of seemingly demarcated 
spaces of the city and forest.  
Early in As You Like It, Celia responds to Rosalind‟s love-kindled exclamation, 
“O how full of briers is this working-day world,” with the first of the three references in 
the play to petticoats: “If we walk not in the trodden path our petticoats will catch them.” 
The immediate purpose of Celia‟s words is to return Rosalind to the world of reason: the 
“briers” of undesigned (undesignated) love that her cousin finds intolerable are simply 
“burs … thrown upon” her “in holiday foolery” (1.3.9-13), distractions that threaten to 
break up her proper being. When Rosalind claims that she cannot discard the disturbances 
                                                 
6
 The word “petticoat” appears in seven instances in the plays: once each in The Taming 
of the Shrew, Henry the Sixth, Part Three, and Antony and Cleopatra; twice in Henry the 
Fourth, Part Two and As You Like It, respectively. The word “petticoats” appears only 
twice in Shakespeare‟s drama: first in As You Like It and next in Othello.  
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of love as she could “shake … off” other thorns from her “coat,” Celia recognizes her 
cousin‟s sudden attraction to Orlando for what it is: a deviance or “fall” from her hitherto 
organized identity. She points to the fruits of this encounter that await Rosalind down the 
road: “You will try in time, in despite of a fall” (1.3.20-21).  
In the first reference to the piece of clothing, the women‟s petticoats are situated 
on (and off) the “trodden paths” of social norms (1.3.12). Although the cousins are 
located within the boundaries of civil society, Rosalind‟s desire for Orlando situates her 
on the cusp of propriety and impropriety. As a woman who must know her place as one 
that is determined by chastity, Rosalind traverses the imposed limits of female identity 
and initiates multiple “lines of flight,” means by which she might escape the permanent 
containment that accompanies her present material situation at court, and imagine a 
future condition of happiness with her as yet unborn “child‟s father” (1.3.9). Not 
surprisingly, then, the second reference to petticoats is made by Rosalind as Ganymede, 
when she contemplates the complexities of playing the parts of both genders while 
wearing the garb of only one: “I could find it in my heart to disgrace my man‟s apparel 
and to cry like a woman. But I must comfort the weaker vessel, as doublet and hose ought 
to show itself courageous to petticoat …” (2.4.3-5). Having abandoned the institutional 
structures of the courtly world, Rosalind must carve a future for herself in the margins of 
the forest, that is, in an unfamiliar structure. In the final instance, Rosalind, again as 
Ganymede, describes to Orlando the location of her home and hints at her tentative or 
unstable identity: she dwells, she tells the young man, “in the skirts of the forest, like 
fringe upon a petticoat” (3.2.305-06).   
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Indeed it is on the fringes or margins of society that characters in As You Like It 
experience the disruptions of identity. These experiences coincide with their 
consciousness of material abandonment, which triggers in them a nomadic movement and 
a fracturing or splitting of their beings: no longer are they selves that are constructed in 
opposition to others, but rather they are constantly in mutation, othering themselves from 
all predetermined structures. In The Logic of Sense Deleuze elaborates on the fringe or 
marginal identity as follows:  
Filling the world with possibilities, backgrounds, fringes, and transitions; 
inscribing the possibility of a frightening world when I am not yet afraid, or, on 
the contrary, the possibility of a reassuring world when I am really frightened by 
the world; encompassing in different respects the world which presents itself 
before me developed otherwise; constituting inside the world so many blisters 
which contain so many possible worlds—this is the Other.     
       (310; emphasis added) 
Similar to Deleuze‟s theories of migrant otherhood, Bhabha‟s discussion of the Other 
interweaves processes of the historical and material constructions of colonized and 
colonizing identities with philosophical inquiries regarding desire. This interweaving or 
“interposition,” Bhabha states in The Location of Culture,  leads to “perversion,” which is 
represented in the figure of the “post-Enlightened man tethered to … his dark reflection, 
the shadow of colonized man, that splits his presence, distorts his outline, breaches his 
boundaries, … disturbs and divides the very time of his being” (43-44). This 
“ambivalent” connection relies on the “idea of man as his alienated image; not Self and 
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Other but the otherness of the Self inscribed in the perverse palimpsest of colonial 
identity” (44). It is desire, Bhabha asserts, that forces the bifurcation of identity and the 
multiple divisions of being. 
 In As You Like It desire is mobilized at the junctures of rivaling material 
circumstances or locations. More specifically, it is initiated by the realities of banishment, 
homelessness, and relocation. “Spatial mobility,” Neil Smith suggests in his work on 
urban (modern) homelessness, “is a central problem for people evicted from the … 
spheres of the real estate market” (87). Although the immediate context of Smith‟s work 
and terminology is modern America, his analysis of the relationship of socio-economic 
oppression to patterns of migration is useful to our understanding of characters‟ 
movements in As You Like It: away from the court and city into the Forest of Arden. 
Their movement is “an appropriately extreme response to mass social eviction,” and is a 
rootlessness or instability “provoked by poverty, … invasion and attack” (Smith 89).  
Duke Frederick‟s banishment of Rosalind in Act one, scene three is accompanied 
by clear if strict temporal and spatial guidelines. The young “mistress” must leave the 
court with “safest haste” and, in a matter of “ten days,” must also ensure that she places a 
minimum distance of “twenty miles” between her new home and her uncle‟s “public 
court” (1.3.33-38). Duke Frederick‟s decision stems from Rosalind‟s seemingly fixed 
condition of being: she is her “father‟s daughter” (1.3.52), a feature of her identity that 
she cannot change even with the words she uses to craft herself as a loyal and innocent 
subject of the state. His daughter, on the other hand, constructs identity—her own and her 
cousin‟s—as malleable and open to infection. Celia, who pleads on behalf of her cousin, 
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insists on Rosalind‟s innocence and makes a dangerous claim about the seepage or 
interpenetration of the two women‟s identities: she declares to her father that she too may 
be a traitor if her cousin is one. Her brazen statement to her father is also ironic of course 
because, based on Duke Frederick‟s line of argument, she must indeed be a traitor: she is, 
after all, her father‟s daughter, and her father is a treacherous usurper of his brother‟s 
land and identity. But Celia‟s diagnosis of her potential condition as traitor is based on 
the level of intimacy that she shares with Rosalind; she reminds her father of the 
communal environment within which the young girls have grown up, which has led to 
their inseparable connection:  
We still have slept together, 
Rose at an instant, learned, played, eat together, 
And wheresoe‟er we went, like Juno‟s swans 
Still we went coupled and inseparable. (1.3.67-70)  
Celia‟s description of her companionship with Rosalind is similar to many a 
Shakespearean character‟s recollection of friendly unions. Her words are anticipated by 
Helena in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream, for instance, and echoed by Polixenes in The 
Winter‟s Tale. But friendships in Shakespeare‟s drama suffer terrible fortune: as with 
Helena and Hermia, whose friendship is tested and disrupted by patriarchy, Celia and 
Rosalind too experience a forced transformation in their companionship, one that is 
mobilized by patriarchal rivalries. (The Duke‟s brief explanation to his daughter of 
Rosalind‟s danger is marked as much by his suspicion of female friendship as it is by his 
concern that his niece will undo his daughter‟s fortunes by usurping people‟s pity from 
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her by performing virtue, “silence” and “patience” (1.3.71-76). His fears are rooted in 
his patriarchal anxiety about his daughter‟s traffickability, a quality that Rosalind 
compromises with her very presence.) The women‟s bond may also be understood in 
Deleuzean terms as an “unnatural nuptial.” As opposed to filiative relations that rely for 
propagation on reproduction and evolution, non-filiative relationships are “unnatural 
nuptials” that spread by means of communication and connection. They engage in a 
“multiplicity without the unity of an ancestor” (A Thousand Plateaus 241).        
But Duke Frederick, rooted in the ideologies of filiation, focuses on heredity 
(ancestry) as he proclaims his banishment of Rosalind to be final and “irrevocable” 
(1.3.77). The force of his declaration is great enough to rekindle Rosalind‟s acute 
consciousness of otherness, a condition of her being that she manages temporarily to 
simplify when she constructs herself in direct opposition to her cousin; she has “more 
cause” to be unhappy, she tells Celia, because it is she who has been “banished” (1.3.87-
89) from the kingdom, not her cousin. In other words, she “reterritorializes” momentarily 
onto the structures of hierarchy and heredity. She is made to recognize, however, the 
more powerful connection that she has made with Celia, who is willing to rupture the 
codes of heredity—her statement of disownment, “Let my father seek another heir” 
(1.3.93), leaps to mind immediately—and embrace a nomadic future that accompanies 
their transformed material circumstances. With their love reinforced by collaborations 
and connections, then, Rosalind and Celia prepare for their departure from the court, the 
space of discrete identities, and for their experience of the perverse geography of the 
Forest of Arden.  
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But why is the forest a perverse space? Perversion, Deleuze states, “does not 
need to describe behaviors or undertake abominable accounts” (Logic of Sense 280). 
Rather perversion has to do with the paradoxical “structure”—of bodies, locations, 
times—of differentiation, wherein it embraces differences while “never suppressing the 
undifferentiated which is divided in it …” (281). The forest in As You Like It has a 
perverse structure, for here the demarcations of identity are severed or at least 
complicated. The forest, moreover, triggers within its dwellers a desire to manipulate the 
structures that regulated their previous constructions of selves. Thus the distinctions of 
blood, sex, rank, vocation, material possession, and liberty, which mark the composition 
of citizenship in the world of the court are perverted or problematized in the forest. 
Notably, these components are not forgotten but are deliberately disassembled and 
reshaped within the edges of the forest—quite simply, the forest transforms the dwellers‟ 
selfhood.  
Duke Senior‟s speech to his fellow foresters, for instance, insists on the virtues of 
their othered position. He claims that, as outsiders to the civil society of the court, and as 
naturalized subjects of the Forest, he and his followers are “more free,” being now 
“exempt from public haunt” and culture that previously comprised their identity (2.1.4-
15). At the same time, Duke Senior is only able to construct his followers‟ and his own 
freedom in the context of the “envious court” from which they have been exiled. Without 
the memory of the self in history, the Duke is unable to construct his present, othered 
identity. Deleuze explains this complex interplay of past and present self-constructions by 
means of his analysis of the “Other”: 
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[We] must attach a great importance to the notion of the Other as structure: not 
at all a particular „form‟ inside a perceptual field (distinct from the form „object‟ 
or the form „animal‟), but rather a system which conditions the functioning of the 
entire perceptual field in general. We must therefore distinguish the a priori 
Other, which designates this structure, and the concrete Other, which designates 
real terms actualizing the structure in concrete fields. If the concrete Other is 
always someone—I for you and you for me—the a priori Other, on the other 
hand, is no one since structure is transcendent with respect to terms which 
actualize it.       (Logic of Sense 318) 
It is the Duke‟s perception of his new citizenship—of the Forest and Nature—that 
enables him to embrace the paradoxical experience of his identity at the moment that he 
is exposed to the elements: 
Here feel we not the penalty of Adam, 
The seasons‟ difference, as the icy fang 
And churlish chiding of the winter‟s wind, 
Which when it bites and blows upon my body 
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile, and say 
„This is no flattery. These are counselors  
That feelingly persuade me what I am.‟  (2.1.6-11) 
Once othered by Nature and unaccustomed to the perilous “woods,” Duke Senior 
now carves the forest as an a priori Other or “structure that conditions the functioning of 
the entire perceptual field in general.” His process of conditioning himself employs the 
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familiar language of the court (“„This is no flattery. These are counselors”), just as his 
memories of his past comforts enable him to connect with the transformation in him that 
is brought about by natural discomfort.
7
 A similar recognition of paradox erupts in Duke 
Senior‟s desire to go deer hunting in the forest:   
Come, shall we go and kill us venison?  
And yet it irks me the poor dappled fools,  
Being native burghers of this desert city,  
Should in their own confines with forkèd heads  
Have their round haunches gored.  (2.1.21-25) 
No doubt a cultural component of his past citizenship in the courtly world, hunting now is 
transformed in the Duke‟s and his followers‟ perceptions into an opportunity to connect 
with the “concrete Other.” As fellow citizens of the forest, the men and the beast are 
united as others of the court. Thus, Duke Senior is “irked” by his imagining the pain of 
the “native burghers” of his new “city.”     
 Just as soon as Duke Senior articulates his concern for the potential plight of the 
deer that he plans to hunt, his followers describe Jaques‟ encounter in the woods with a 
wounded stag. The juxtaposition of the two men‟s articulation (mimicry) of sympathy 
highlights their perception of their othered condition. The Duke‟s sympathy for the 
animal that he wishes simultaneously to kill is a product of his newly acquired identity. 
                                                 
7
 Herein the Duke is not unlike Lear who, when exposed to the brutal elements of the 
storm, recognizes both his history of othering or alienating the poor subjects of his 
kingdom and his transformed condition of being, which forces his connection with 
Nature: enslaved now to the whims of the elements, he realizes that the “art of [his] 
necessities is strange” enough for him to find the raging storm to be “servile,” even 
pleasurable (3.2.18-69). 
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Unlike Jaques, who moralizes the theme of men‟s invasion of natural spaces, the Duke 
embraces Nature‟s violence as a rite of his new citizenship. Being one with Nature now, 
he moralizes on the theme of silliness that informs civil society. Jaques, on the other 
hand, is unable/unwilling to break away from his educated stance of alienation and reflect 
on the structural differences between the world he now inhabits and the world of the 
court. Instead he recognizes in the deer merely a “concrete Other,” a creature or form that 
is different from him. Thus he waxes lyrically, if “invectively” (2.1.58), over the pain of 
the wounded stag, using “a thousand similes” to compare the animal‟s pain to the 
condition of other “worldlings” (2.1.45-48). Notably, Jaques does not include himself 
among those worldlings that, not knowing better, contribute to cultures of excess; nor 
does he liken himself to the “usurpers” and “tyrants” of the forest that destroy the others‟ 
space (2.1.61). As he anatomizes the corruption of the “country, city, court” and all of 
“life” (2.1.59-60), Jaques posits an unbridgeable gap between himself and all others. At 
the same time, he fails to perceive the structural distinctions of identity that are brought 
about by the difference of location; he remains untransformed by the spaces that he 
inhabits and is always at home with his melancholy condition. 
Unlike Jaques, who insists on (and performs) the alienation of his self from others 
and in the process reinforces the construction of each in the context of mutual opposition, 
Duke Senior is aware both of the importance of belonging and of the interpenetration of 
identities in the forest: having been forced out of the world of the court, he is now 
perfectly at home in the woods. Indeed his experience of otherness renders him perverse 
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because it enables in him a consciousness that Deleuze refers to as “Other-cide.” He 
explains Other-cide in the context of perversion: 
The fundamental misrepresentation of perversion … consists in bringing 
perversion to bear upon certain offenses committed against Others. Everything 
persuades us, from the point of view of behavior, that perversion is nothing 
without the presence of the Other: voyeurism, exhibitionism, etc. But from the 
point of view of the structure, the contrary must be asserted … The world of the 
pervert is a world without Others … All perversion is an „Other-cide,‟ and an 
„altrucide‟ … But altrucide is not committed through perverse behavior, it is 
presupposed in the perverse structure.    
(The Logic of Sense 320-21) 
Rosalind is perhaps the play‟s most perverse figure, though her experiences of 
perversion and Other-cide differ radically from those of her exiled father‟s. Unlike Duke 
Senior, who makes all spaces a home, Rosalind is never at home in any location. While at 
court, she is conscious of her alien status, which weighs constantly on her mind. The 
prospect of sexual and material calamity fills her with anxiety about her future in the 
woods (1.3.104), just as the fear of death makes the court a categorically unwelcome 
space. Once in the forest, Rosalind may be less worried for her life, but she becomes 
doubly alien—a nomad. Remarkably, her alienation is not a performative one, at least not 
in the sense that Jaques‟ is. If anything, Rosalind acts as though she belongs within the 
worlds and bodies that she inhabits, but is aware at all times of the paradox of her 
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untethered identity. Hers is the puzzlement of what Deleuze refers to as the “dissolved 
self”:  
The dissolved self opens up to a series of roles, since it gives rise to an intensity 
which already comprehends difference in itself, the unequal in itself, and which 
penetrates all others, across and within multiple bodies. … That everything is so 
„complicated,‟ that I may be an other, that something else thinks in us in an 
aggression which is the aggression of thought, in a multiplication which is the 
multiplication of the body, or in a violence which is the violence of language—
this is a joyful message. For we are so sure of living again (without resurrection) 
only because so many beings and things think in us …  
(Logic of Sense 298) 
It is her consciousness of the multiple divisions within her being that make Rosalind an 
excellent actor: she is not only able to “show more mirth than” she is “mistress of” 
(1.2.2), or be more generous with her fortunes than she is in possession of (1.2.211-13), 
but as Ganymede she is also able to gauge others‟ performances for what they are worth. 
Thus, in her first encounter with the notorious melancholic of the woods, she reveals to 
Jaques the simplicity of his character, which she declares is “extreme,” lacking in 
multiple dimensions: those individuals that occupy either extremity of mirth or 
melancholy, Ganymede tells Jaques, are “abominable fellows” who “betray themselves to 
every modern censure” (4.1.5-6). In place of Jaques‟ extreme resolve of selfhood, 
Rosalind proposes a fringe identity, one that borders on both mirth and melancholy, and 
which also overlaps (finds connections) with the experiences of others. It is owing to her 
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“dissolving” of her self, for instance, that Rosalind is able to find in the shepherd 
Silvius‟ expression of his love for Phoebe a testament of her own affections (2.4.39-40). 
At the same time, she is “wearied” by the nameless lover‟s poems, whose expression she 
finds “tedious” even as she is filled with “wonder” about his identity (3.2.142-74). 
 Upon discovering that the terrible poet is none other than her love Orlando, she 
finds his articulation suddenly to be more powerful than Jove‟s (3.2.214). Yet Rosalind 
speeds to catch and outmatch the young lover by educating him in the ways of love and 
rhetoric, when as Ganymede she discloses to him the “divers” relationships of 
temporality to being (3.2.281-82). Echoing her cousin‟s words to her from earlier in the 
play, she promises also to restore the young man to stable “reason” by playing the part of 
Rosalind (1.3.5), the woman Orlando loves so deeply that “neither rhyme nor reason can 
express” his intensity (3.2.357). Not surprisingly, for Orlando to be cured of his desire, he 
must collaborate with the boy Ganymede on his imaginations, the successful result of 
which would be that Orlando will “forswear the full stream of the world … to live in a 
nook merely monastic” (3.2.374-75). Remarkably, Rosalind begins this process of 
perverse education by escorting Orlando to her “cot” in the space that she identifies with 
flux and subversion: the petticoat‟s fringe (3.3.381). 
 Similar marginal and impermanent spaces creep into presence throughout the 
literature of the early modern period. They coincide with characters‟ experiences of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization, and of the simultaneous and contradictory 
forces of futurity that pull them in opposing directions. (Orlando‟s confession to Duke 
Senior—as he awaits Ganymede‟s magical transformation of his own and others‟ 
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futures—that he “sometimes do believe, and sometimes do not, / As those that fear 
they hope, and know they fear” is a pithy example of characters‟ acute consciousness of 
the tentative if powerful condition of futurity). As we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
these spaces are indeed the sites of futurity, where characters‟ material, biological, and 
political visions/plans of/for their futures rupture their functioning in their present social 
confines as material, biological, and political agents.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
“THE HOUR MUST HAVE HER PORTION”: MATERIAL FUTURITY IN 
EARLY MODERN DRAMA 
Infringing on the system of early capitalism, working women occupied the 
margins of early modern societies. Their representations within the literature of the 
period are riddled with contradictions, and focus on the women‟s strained relationship 
to the central organizing structures in England, both professional and cultural. 
Scholars have for long studied the complex structure of early modern women‟s work 
with respect to its economic repercussions on the domestic and public spheres during 
the period.
1
 Extending their analysis of the dynamic of women‟s labor, in this chapter 
I will study the socio-economic and cultural framework of the marginal, non-
domestic professions of the prostitutes, midwives, wise-women, and female medical 
practitioners of early modern England.  Using the examples of female workers in the 
works of Lyly, Shakespeare, Heywood, Middleton, and Rowley, I will argue that the 
playwrights complicate their theatrical renditions of working women in order to 
represent the mixed appeal and value that women‟s professions held in contemporary 
                                                 
1
 Alice Clark‟s work is among the more significant early works on this period, but there 
were even contemporary records indicating interest in women‟s economic contributions 
to early modern English society. For detailed analyses of working women in early 
modern England and Europe, see Ian Archer‟s Pursuit of Stability, Amy Louise 
Erickson‟s Women and Property in Early Modern England, and Margaret Pelling‟s 
“Defensive Tactics: Networking by Female Medical Practitioners in Early Modern 
London.” 
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English societies.
2
 Moreover, the complications in the drama arise from the 
characters‟ appropriation of material culture in order to construct for themselves and 
others a future that would empower them. Remaining on the margins or fringes of 
society, then, female characters in early modern drama mobilize a material futurity 
that weakens the hold of the center and destabilizes notions of economic progress.   
As Mother Bombie, The Wise-Woman of Hogsdon, Pericles, The Witch, A Fair 
Quarrel, and Women Beware Women make clear through their diverse presentations of 
independent working women, economically viable women of the Renaissance are 
situated on the margins of a society that is at once dependent on and suspicious of their 
professional capabilities. These women are precariously located within a socially 
constructed spectrum of acceptable women‟s work. At the least threatening or dangerous 
end of the spectrum are Pericles‟ prostitutes and Bawd who, despite their sexual 
indiscretions, work well within a patriarchally recognized, exclusive professional space.
3
 
Although the overtly sexual nature of their profession exposes them to contemporary 
moralistic rhetoric, by no means are they an economic threat to men. Lyly‟s Mother 
Bombie, Heywood‟s Wise-woman, and Middleton and Rowley‟s Anne move steadily 
toward the dangerous and subversive end of the spectrum, encroaching on the male-
                                                 
2
 While Andrew Gurr states that women were actively present in the theater audiences, he 
does not go into much detail regarding the professional status of these women. It would 
be interesting to look into the economic and professional composition of the female 
audience in the early modern theater, because these would most likely have affected the 
dynamic of the theatrical presentations of the working women. 
 
3
 In fact it is precisely because the prostitutes and the Bawd are willing to participate in 
the patriarchally determined cultural practice of sexual and monetary exchange that they 
are working within an accepted socio-economic structure of contemporary women‟s 
work. 
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dominated, relatively lucrative professions of fortune-telling, quack healing, and 
medical apprenticeship. In short they impact the future of men‟s economies by professing 
to manipulate (fortune-telling) and improve (healing) the future of others. But it is 
Middleton‟s Witch and Livia who locate themselves on the most problematic end of the 
spectrum and actively threaten to usurp the patriarchally determined and formally 
structured economic territories of apothecary, medicine, and law.
4
  
Even as early modern authorities strictly monitored the participation and 
representation of women in the public space; and while Church and State collaborated 
actively with each other to restrict women‟s attempts at socio-economic self-reliance and 
autonomy, contemporary drama positions working women in the conflicted 
maneuverings of their lived experiences.
5
 Consequently, even while they are ridiculed as 
quacks and social parasites (as in Heywood‟s Wise-Woman and Middleton‟s Witch), they 
are given a theatrical space within which they operate as sympathetic figures (as in the 
cases of Lyly‟s Bombie and Middleton and Rowley‟s A Fair Quarrel). These women 
invade both a narrative and performative space within which they assert, to varying 
                                                 
4
 Starting with the reign of Henry VIII and continuing well into the rule of James I, 
several laws were passed restricting the practice of medicine and surgery to men alone. 
These laws and sanctions were specifically coded in a language that related medical 
women to witches. For more on this, see Margaret Pelling‟s “Defensive Tactics.” 
 
5
 Various town records indicate that common people—those who were poor—frequently 
depended on the professional services of the early modern non-domestic workingwomen. 
Patients frequented women practitioners of medicine, relied on their prophetic claims, 
and had their children delivered in the care of (unlicensed) midwives. Consequently, even 
while the English authorities formally shunned these women, they played a significant—
even central—part in the lives of the lower orders of society. 
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degrees, a material autonomy that is inextricable from their gendered social and 
professional identity.  
 
 
A History of Women‟s Non-Domestic Labor Market 
The Liverpool Town Books indicate that in 1582 a woman named Alice Wynn 
(Welsh Alice) was expelled by the town authorities for lodging illegally with a local 
married woman.
6
 Such expulsions of single women (and marginalized men, especially 
unemployed foreigners) were frequently conducted using coded laws that ensured the 
economic hegemony of men throughout the English towns.
7
 While several menial and 
domestic forms of labor were accepted as women‟s work, most specialized professions 
were cordoned off from them.
8 
Additionally, even when women were allowed to fend for 
themselves in non-domestic spaces, they were to remain under the verifiable surveillance 
of male members of the community. Town authorities consistently uprooted women who 
                                                 
6
 The standard policy regarding residency stipulated that a (female) newcomer be granted 
residential status only if she could reflect a positive contribution to the town‟s economy 
by having someone vouch for her “good character” and, more importantly, guarantee her 
some work. 
 
7
 For details see Michael Roberts‟ “Women and Work in Sixteenth-Century English 
Towns,” especially pages 86-87. 
 
8
 Women practiced various domestic professions as maids, seamstresses, cleaning 
women, cooks, yard workers, spinners, weavers, and so on. Although older women ran 
primary schools out of their own homes, during the sixteenth century they were 
prohibited from educating boys. While most of the general, non-specialty jobs and chores 
were open for them to occupy, women were especially prohibited from taking up 
specialized, high-paying positions. Professional guilds and associations actively worked 
to keep women out of their professional environments. 
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worked outside the confines of the household economy independently, or without the 
official support of men. By ousting out the nonconforming women on grounds of 
immorality, the authorities tried rigorously to enforce an urban economic infrastructure 
wherein women‟s work, sexuality, and marital status were not only intimately related to 
each other, but were also restricted to the household confines. Consequently, the most 
common and socially acceptable forms of women‟s work were not just thoroughly 
domestic in nature but were also grossly underpaying.  
Of course restrictions and impositions of this kind may have been designed 
specifically so that men could hold on to the better-paid, high-status work in an 
increasingly difficult economy.  Despite these measures, however, as the sixteenth 
century drew to a close, and even through the first half of the seventeenth century, there 
were several women who refused to enter domestic service and instead chose to roam the 
urban and suburban streets, seeking out work and mobility on their own terms. These 
women were chastised in moralistic terms for being “light,” “unchaste,” or “evil-
disposed,” and the authorities tried their best to rid the towns of them and restore the 
economy‟s precarious balance (Roberts 86). Apart from the most obvious threat that 
these women posed of raising levels of unemployment among the men of the towns, if 
they were sexually viable and of reproductive capabilities they also presented the threat 
of overpopulating the towns with illegitimate children.
9
 Consequently, the town 
                                                 
9
 Roberts states that in purely economic terms, women who were illegal inmates of 
houses ran the risk of increasing the town‟s population of illegitimate, dependent children 
(the implication being that as single women, they were prone to sexual encounters with 
male servants, other inmates, and/or employers). For greater details on the issues of 
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authorities and preachers actively associated prostitution and “un-chastity” with 
independently employed and/or unemployed single women. That women‟s chastity and 
their domestic position in the labor market were emphasized at precisely such a time 
when “female economic activity of all kinds appeared to be spilling over into the streets 
and lanes as never before” is ironic (94). The fact remained that, despite the preachers‟ 
and town authorities‟ efforts to control the growth of population by focusing on the 
female body as a troubled site of re/production, productive working women were ever-
growing realities during the Renaissance.
10
 
In addition to working as skilled laborers under the formal or informal supervision 
of craftsmen, women also worked as midwives. But the growing sense of competitive 
professionalism in the fields of medicine and surgery forced quite a few of these women 
to work independently, even secretly, without the required licenses and authority from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
illegitimacy in early modern England, see Keith Wrightson‟s English Society and 
Wrigley and Schofield‟s The Population History of England. 
 
10
 It must be noted here that while women were not formally or openly encouraged to 
enter specialized trades or guilds in England, daughters, wives, and other women in the 
households of craftsmen may have informally acquired the skills so as to help out with 
the family business. Such women would have been considered assets in the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth century economies (as the specialized personnel, who were mainly men, 
jumped from one profession to the next in order to stay afloat and remain lucratively 
employed, such women were often un/underpaid, yet reliable helping hands in the 
business). It was especially for this purpose that, as Weisner states, some “master-
craftsmen went so far as to adopt a number of young women so that they could have 
more workers in their shops” (66; emphasis added). Understandably, as uncontracted 
workers/apprentices, singlewomen were more affordable as compared to their male 
counterparts. Consequently, they may have been popular among the craftsmen who could 
find ways to hire these women despite legal restrictions and offer them shelter and low 
wages. Under such circumstances, masters and other male members of the household 
may have also had sexual relations with such women workers who may have depended 
on their jobs for financial and legal security.  
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church.
11 
While The Byrth of Mankynde (1544) was the first English-language 
midwifery publication, by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, numerous 
male-authored, European and Arabic midwifery texts in translation started filling the 
English markets. Simultaneously advocating men‟s active participation in the birthing 
process and deriding the unscientific and dangerous practices of female midwives, these 
texts also discouraged the formation of women‟s communities by denigrating “women‟s 
speech” and disrupting the connection “between mother and gossips in the name of 
professional self-fashioning and validation” (Bicks 43). Although previously men may 
have regarded the female networks among mothers, midwives, and midwife-assistants 
with some suspicion and even fear, they now were provided with sanction in the form of 
educated male voices that claimed a superior knowledge of women‟s bodies and that also 
undermined the validity, or even necessity, of the formation of women‟s communities 
during child birth.   
The increased demand for such male-authored texts suggests that literate 
individuals (mainly men) were anxious to probe the female body through the male 
interventional economy of scientific practice. With newfound access to the skills of 
midwifery, several male medical practitioners, who had hitherto ignored the professional 
                                                 
11
 In his seminal work on the early English life-cycle, Cressy cites the example of an 
Elizabeth Wyatt who swore before the London Archdeaconry court in 1635 that “she hath 
practiced as midwife for the space of these five years and that she is not yet licensed, for 
she is a deputy to one Mrs. Brown with whom she conditioned to serve seven years, and 
at the expiration of the said years she intendeth to obtain license” (66). Wyatt‟s record is 
significant not only because it addresses her unlicensed practice of midwifery, but also 
because it suggests the possibility of an active master-apprentice relationship among 
women workers within the field. 
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study of women‟s anatomies, were now encouraged to present their written texts and 
translations as the “last word on obstetrical procedure” (44), and to dislocate the 
midwives from their positions of (dubious) authority.
12
 From here on, male medical 
practitioners cut systematically into the autonomy of midwives‟ claims to obstetric 
expertise. As they introduced themselves into the obstetric and gynecological market, 
these men garnered the support of authorities to marginalize such women as may have 
carved out a space for themselves in the birthing market and who may also have been in 
control of such a space.
13
 These phenomena coincided with the increased persecution of 
                                                 
12
 Cressy indicated that opposing traditions in popular literature of the time “both vilified 
and sentimentalized midwives, associating them in one tradition with filthiness, bawdry, 
and witchcraft, in another with ancient goddess wisdom and resistance to patriarchal 
oppression” (59). 
 
13
 Male physicians and surgeons garnered support not just from the state authorities but 
also from the Church. Religiously speaking, one of the “first named battlegrounds” 
regarding midwives was their baptismal power (Bicks 137). In the Catholic faith, during 
emergencies (for instance, the possible death of a newborn), the midwife was responsible 
for the spiritual salvation of the child. While many Puritans considered this practice a 
remnant of popish superstition, certain post-Reformation clergymen desired to retain the 
practice. However, by the end of the sixteenth century several tracts (Admonition to the 
Parliament being one such work) condemned the participation of women in such vital 
activities and even portrayed midwives in a witch-like manner. According to such 
polemicists, midwives violated God‟s will not only because of their improper baptismal 
powers, but also because they intervened in the natural process of labor (a fitting 
punishment for women, owing to Eve‟s act of disobedience) “by developing natural 
painkillers” (Ibid). Women‟s involvement in the development of potions or medications 
(some of which have a place in modern pharmacology) was directly interpreted as an act 
of heresy “performed by witches against newborns and potential mothers” (Ibid). Indeed 
it is significant that such potion-concocting “midwife-witches” threatened male 
apothecaries who, in turn, may have considered these women‟s activities to be an 
economic intrusion on their specialized field. Consequently, various acts were passed that 
centralized the control of medical procedures in England and prevented the medical 
experimentation of “common Artificers, as Smiths, Weavers and Women, (who) boldly 
and accustomably take upon them great Cures, and things of great difficulty, in the which 
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unlicensed female medical practitioners in England during the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and with the increase in the numbers of church and state-backed 
witch hunts.
14
 Interestingly, they also coincided with the negative social and literary 
associations of midwives with gossiping, disruptive, and dangerous female 
communities.
15
   
Just as midwives posed a real threat to the male domination of the economy of 
early modern England, so too did female medical practitioners, who catered to a large 
                                                                                                                                                 
they partly use Sorcery and Witchcraft” (An Act concernynge phisicyons and surgeons,” 
qtd. in Bicks 139). 
 
14
 In light of this, the Royal College of Surgeon‟s persecution of 110 illegal, unlicensed 
female practitioners is highly significant to the study of women‟s work within the field of 
midwifery and medicine. While the college did not make detailed records for most of 
these women (most of them are referred to by their first names alone, and the majority of 
them do not have an affixed marital status), they did categorize these women‟s work as 
“empiric” and also “bold” and “insolent” (Pelling 199). 
 
15
 While the English midwife‟s oath imposed on her a role of patriarchal protection, for 
all practical purposes, she remained a controversial subject in early modern England. 
Although her European predecessors and contemporaries mainly functioned in the 
maternal interest (they served as witnesses to “protect the mother from allegations of 
infanticide”), the English midwife was supposed to uphold patriarchal investments (in 
naming the father as rightful patriarch, or—in case of a bastard birth—by affirming the 
authority of the state). However, as men were physically displaced from their positions in 
the household (during, and even up to a month after the birth, the woman of the house 
entertained the midwife and her staff by exchanging stories with them), they had no real 
control—through observation and censorship—over the delivery and the midwives‟ 
ceremonial functions. Consequently, the vocal nature of this strictly female community 
posed an obvious threat to patriarchy and its representations were often crude, implying 
that the language of an unsurveillanced female congregation was necessarily 
antipatriarchal. Midwives soon came to be associated with the stock fictional convention 
of gossips‟ bowls that were often situated in alehouses or in birthrooms—in A 
Midsummer Night‟s Dream, Puck refers to himself lurking among drunken, gossiping 
women—and that portrayed these working women as drunken, tell-tales—in Titus 
Andronicus the nurse is addressed as a “long-tongu‟d babbling gossip” (IV, ii, 151)—
who reveled in passing on stories of marital discord.  
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variety of patients. In response to women‟s active participation in medical healing 
practices, several laws were enforced to bar women from earning their living through 
medicine. Physicians, surgeons and apothecaries all demanded and obtained exclusive 
privileges to practice their respective trades. The state supported the male specialists‟ 
campaigns and declared in Statute Three (passed under Henry VIII to check the practices 
of witchcraft) that “„none should exercise the Faculty of Physick or Surgery within the 
City of London or within Seven Miles of the same, unless first he were examined, 
approved and admitted by the Bishop of London, or the Dean of St. Paul‟s, calling him or 
them Four Doctors of Physick, and for Surgery other expert Persons in that Faculty, upon 
pain of Forfeiture of Five pounds for every Month they should occupy Physick or 
Surgery, not thus admitted‟ because „that common Artificers, as Smiths, Weavers, and 
Women, boldly and accustomably took upon them great Cures, and Things of great 
Difficulty, in the which they partly used Sorceries and Witchcraft, and partly applied 
such Medicines unto the Diseased, as were very noynous, and nothing meet therefore‟” 
(Survey of the Cities of London and Westminster qtd. in Clark 259; emphasis added). 
Similarly, in 1614 a charter was granted to the Company of Barber-Surgeons at Salisbury 
declaring that women could, under no circumstances, practice the specialized surgical 
skills: 
There are divers women and others within this city, altogether unskilled in the art 
of chirurgery, who do oftentimes take cures on them, to the great danger of the 
patient, it is therefore ordered, that no such woman, or any other, shall take or 
meddle with any cure of chirurgery, wherefore they … shall have or take any 
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money, benefit or other reward for the same, upon pain that every delinquent 
shall for every cure to be taken in hand, or meddled with, contrary to this order, 
unless she or they shall be first allowed by this Company, forfeit and lose to the 
use of this Company the sum of ten shillings.  
(S. P. D. qtd. in Clark 259-60; emphasis added).  
Yet, as Clark notes, the account books kept by several boroughs and parishes 
indicate that women continued to practice their medical profession in the margins of 
urban spaces, especially catering to the poorer sections of the communities, to individuals 
who were themselves located on the outskirts. For instance, Mrs. Lucy Hutchinson‟s 
maidservant “went to Colson, to have a sore eye cured by a woman of the Town” 
(Memoirs of Col. Hutchinson qtd. in Clark 263); and Mrs. D‟ewes left her sick baby boy 
in the care of Mrs. Margaret Waltham, “a female practitioner” (Walter Yonge qtd. in 
Clark 263). Besides the obvious monetary benefit of receiving treatment at lesser costs 
from unlicensed (therefore relatively inexpensive) female medical practitioners, women 
patients sought medical advice from other women because they felt more comfortable 
exposing their (often vulnerable and socially questionable) conditions to members of 
their own sex. In his detailed examination of medical advertisements in early modern 
London, Kevin Siena especially considers the vulnerability of female syphilitic patients. 
He states that the same dynamic that caused “foul” patients to seek confidentiality also 
led them to “demand same-sex practitioners.” Moreover, he provides significant evidence 
that during the early modern period, several women “specialized in treating female 
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venereal patients who preferred not to confide in a male doctor” (200).16 With Syphilis 
and other venereal diseases spreading rapidly across England, women medical 
practitioners who were eager to tap into the “lucrative VD market” (202) advertised their 
skills using gendered strategies.
17
 These female specialists prioritized confidentiality to 
such a degree that they promised to withhold sensitive information regarding their 
patients‟ ailments even from the sexual partners of those infected. In light of the early 
modern fears of slander and the importance of women‟s sexual reputation, it is clear that 
women felt the stigma of venereal diseases even more acutely than did early modern 
men. Naturally, this led to the increasing numbers of women practitioners of Venereology 
in London.
18
 One such practitioner advertised her services to women customers, stating 
that “if Venus should Misfortunately be wounded with a Scorponious Poyson by 
                                                 
16
 While Siena mostly concentrates on promotional medical literatures prevalent in late 
Stuart London (1660-1715), he indicates that even previously women had been known to 
treat patients (especially other women) suffering from venereal diseases. For a thorough 
study of women medical practitioners throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
in early modern England, see Margaret Pelling‟s “Medical Practitioners,” in Health, 
Medicine, and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century; “Thoroughly Resented? Older Women 
and the Medical Role in Early Modern London,” in Women. Science and Medicine, 1500-
1700: Mothers and Sisters of the Royal Society; and “Medical Practice in Early Modern 
England: Trade or Profession?” in The Professions of Early Modern England. Also see 
Pelling‟s full-length work, Medical Conflicts in Early Modern London. 
 
17
 According to Siena, “throughout the seventeenth century venereal patients represented 
roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of the patients treated by St. Bartholomew‟s Hospital” 
(205). Interestingly, the hospital‟s records of the century show that patients often lied 
about the nature of their disorder in order to obtain treatment without having to enter “the 
dreaded foul wards” (206).   
 
18
 Examining various records of the College of Physicians in “Medical Practice in Early 
Modern England,” Margaret Pelling argues that “the College prosecuted unlicensed 
practitioners in London and that a consistently significant percentage of those prosecuted 
were women, usually 15 percent” (qtd. in Siena 217). 
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Tampering with Fiery Mars, to her own Sects [sic] it is she brings Comfort and Relief 
and by her Antidot expels the Poyson Jove-like, though never so far gone without 
Fluxing” (qtd. in Siena 218).  
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then, women were practicing within 
the competitive and diverse field of medicine, among other specialized professional 
areas; and even if their clientele comprised the poorer, marginalized communities of 
England, it is evident that these women were paid for their services. Gauging from the 
increasingly stringent laws and religious policies in the seventeenth century that restricted 
the economic viability of non-domestic women, it is clear that autonomous and 
economically self-reliant women were considered a real and present threat to the socio-
economic structure of patriarchal England. While contemporary drama problematically 
re/presented these working women as dangerous yet essential identities living on the 
fringes of society, their key positions within the theatrical spaces of the English stage 
speak for their strong influence on the minds of their diverse audiences.  
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Working Women in Early English Drama 
While maids and nurses are the consistent representatives of women‟s work on 
the early English stage, non-domestic workingwomen are also problematically 
represented in contemporary drama.
19
 From Shakespeare‟s Bawd and prostitutes to 
Middleton‟s Witch, independent single women are strategically positioned (physically 
and socially) on the rim of the early modern consciousness. Even as they evoke laughter, 
ridicule, grotesque horror and/or fear, they function respectively as the murky glue that 
binds together (and infects) the mainstream and marginal identities of the audiences and 
protagonists. While these professional women are not cast in the unambiguously 
appealing light that other women in the plays may be granted, they perform crucial roles 
in bringing about positive resolutions to the main characters. Moreover, it is entirely 
through these women‟s agencies (either direct or indirect) that the main characters unite 
in positive relationships—chiefly in marriage. Positioned in the plays at various points 
within the socially constructed spectrum of female labor, the theatrical representation of 
working women problematizes contemporary socio-economic structures and presents the 
gaping contradictions that abound within them.     
Since syphilis was a real threat to many early English women and men, the 
brothel scenes in Pericles may have been easily recognizable to various members of the 
audience. Both Gurr and Cook state that prostitutes were frequently present among 
audience members of the early modern public theatres, which were mostly situated in 
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 For a comprehensive coverage of the literary representation of early modern helping 
women and servants, see Susan Frye and Karen Robertson‟s Maids and Mistresses, 
Cousins and Queens. 
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suburbs that were surrounded by brothels and alehouses—the primary haunts for local 
prostitutes seeking business. While Cook considers their presence in the theatres strictly a 
business related choice, Gurr suggests that prostitutes could even have patronized the 
public theatres for their own entertainment on their days off from work. In such a case, 
women in the audience may well have been empathic towards the plight of the theatrical 
syphilitic men and, more importantly, women, whose professional obligations as 
prostitutes made them most susceptible to the disease.  
 Pericles analyzes the interrelationship of a profession that is particular to women 
and a clientele that is specifically male, and situates consciously the non-domestic, 
sexually subversive profession of prostitution within the controlled folds of a patriarchal 
economy. Variously referred to in the play as a “profession,” a “trade,” and a source by 
which women—even when they grow old—can “earn” a living, prostitution is indeed an 
established, if unhealthy, industry. Additionally, the fact that the brothel advertises itself 
publicly (there are multiple references to a “sign,” indicating the organized presence and 
functioning of the brothel) shows that, as prostitutes, women could acceptably have 
economic interactions with each other and with men outside of the domestic space. 
Exemplified by moments such as the one wherein Lysimachus pays the Bawd for 
Marina‟s syphilis-free virginity, Pericles represents contemporary (and accepted) 
conventions regarding the ready exchange of wealth among individuals for the 
gratification of sexual appetite and health.
20
 
                                                 
20
 Boult‟s references to the town‟s “swearers” and to his “crying” out of the brothel‟s new 
merchandise are additional signs that indicate the acceptable status of the brothel as a 
place of business. As with the other signs in Pericles, these too suggest that the 
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However, while the prostitutes are presented as economically unproblematic 
workingwomen, not all women‟s work in the play is considered acceptable.21 Frustrated 
by his failure to seduce Marina, and irritated at having been recognized by the Bawd 
despite his disguise, Lysimachus angrily addresses the older woman as “herb-woman”:    
Lysimachus:   What, hath your principal informed you who I am? 
Marina:   Who is my principal? 
Lysimachus:  Why, your herb-woman; She that sets seeds of shame, roots 
of iniquity.  
(Pericles xix; emphasis added) 
Healy refers to the common practice during the Renaissance of addressing quack-
healers and potion-making women as herb-women. These women secretly concocted and 
sold “medications” that claimed to alleviate various pains and ailments, most especially 
those involving sexually transmitted diseases. In Pericles it is, of course, deeply 
significant that none other than Lysimachus makes the connection between the Bawd and 
the threatening practice of quackery and witchcraft. Since the Bawd discloses 
Lysimachus‟ true identity to Marina and the audience, she threatens to unravel his corrupt 
sexual politics. Thus threatened by the power that the Bawd has over him, Lysimachus 
                                                                                                                                                 
profession of the prostitutes was a well-established one that need not have been hidden or 
in any way treated secretively. More importantly, the open communication of these and 
other signs implies that in spite of their lived experiences as workingwomen, prostitutes 
did not threaten the economic patriarchy of early modern England.   
 
21
 While socio-sexually the prostitutes may have been threatening to mainstream early 
modern societies (their syphilitic condition in the play being a physical sign of the risks 
and threats of their profession); it is clear that the women‟s sexual transgressions catered 
to and were monitored by upstanding male members of the community. 
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deliberately refers to her as “herb-woman,” thereby connecting her to the 
unacceptable—and punishable—professions of witchcraft and quackery. While 
apothecaries and medical specialists “purchased their drugs from a wandering army of 
„green men and women,‟ who scoured the countryside looking for medicinal roots and 
herbs,” Lysimachus distinctly likens the Bawd to other potion-toting, witch-like women 
that the early modern audiences would have immediately recognized (Kail 123).
22
 
Notably, his act of naming the Bawd something other than what she is re-establishes 
Lysimachus as the source of power, as one who can, in changing her name, undo the 
woman‟s material security.  
While it is dangerous for the women in Pericles to be accused of practicing the 
cunning skills of medical healing, men may openly profit from such powers: 
Cerimon:  Virtue and cunning were endowments greater 
Than nobleness and riches. Careless heirs 
May the two latter darken and dispend, 
But immortality attends the former, 
Making a man a god. ‟Tis known I ever 
Have studied physic, through which secret art, 
                                                 
22
 As popular literature and treatises warning against witchcraft frequently associated 
healing women and medical practitioners with witches and quacks, it is likely that early 
modern audiences would have comprehended the severity of the consequences of 
Lysimachus‟ accusation. As state and religious authorities actively persecuted unlicensed 
women practitioners of medicine; and as notorious theatrical figures such as Middleton‟s 
Hecate and Heywood‟s Wise-woman physically concocted potions and medications to 
solve their clients‟ (patients‟?) problems, early modern audiences would surely have been 
familiar with the dangerous, contemporary repercussions of being called a herb-woman.  
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By turning o‟er authorities, I have, 
Together with my practice, made familiar 
To me and to my aid the blest infusions 
That dwells in vegetives, in metals, stones, 
And so can speak of the disturbances  
That nature works, and of her cures, which doth give me 
A more content and cause of true delight 
Than to be thirsty after tott‟ring honour, 
Or tie pleasure up in silken bags 
To glad the fool and death. 
(Pericles xii) 
The discrepancy is meant to be clear. While the Bawd is accused of being a herb-woman, 
in the hands of a male practitioner, the same dangerous herbs can magically transform 
into lifesaving “blest infusions”; and “vegetive” concoctions are no longer the result of 
quackery or witchcraft, but rather the product of “studied physic” and “practice.”  
Healy presents Pericles primarily as Shakespeare‟s commentary on political 
dissent, (Fictions of Disease 182), but she does not connect the Bawd‟s potential healing 
practices to what clearly was construed in the early modern period as politically and 
materially problematic.
23
 This connection is crucial to our appreciation of the tensions 
                                                 
23
 Healy suggests that syphilitic prostitutes may have practiced healing measures on 
themselves and on other brothellers. Given the prevalence of venereal diseases among 
prostitutes, it seems likely that the Bawd may have been familiar with popular (and 
affordable) treatments for syphilis and other ailments. For further details regarding 
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within the medical field that erupted as a result of the pressures of professionalization. 
While Healy focuses on the play‟s “particular implications and dangers of … the 
tyrannical and abusive power-relations” that satirize the corruptions of the Jacobean 
court, I would suggest that Pericles explores these ideas predominantly through the 
socio-economic relationship that exists between the townsmen and the prostitutes (181). 
Although it is the town‟s prostitutes whose professions render them women of ill repute, 
it is the gentlemen and dignitaries who participate in the spread of a debilitating social 
disease. Even as the working women struggle to survive within a patriarchally 
determined economy, it is the gentlemen who threaten to topple the economic and sexual 
balance of “this murky playworld” through their ability to transgress “Jacobean society‟s 
safe boundaries” (181).24 If, as the title page claims, Pericles was popularly performed at 
the Globe, there likely will have been gentlemen, whores, and bawds in the audience. 
(Perhaps even herb women attended the play.) The brothel scenes of the play, then, must 
be viewed within the dynamic of an actively present and represented audience. Just as 
importantly, the scenes must be appreciated within the professional dynamic of women‟s 
prostitution and healing practices in a male-centered economy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
prostitutes‟ self treatment of the pox, see Healy‟s “Pericles and the Pox” and “The Pocky 
Body: Part I” in Fictions of Disease.  
 
24
 It is with the specific purpose of problematizing the socio-economic relationship 
between the marginalized women workers and the mainstream male clients that 
Shakespeare presents Lysimachus as a lecherous nobleman who threatens the stability of 
the economy not only by his sailor-like sexual appetite and lechery (“How now, how a 
dozen of virginities? … How now, wholesome iniquity have you, that a man may deal 
withal and defy the surgeon?”), but also with his loose tongue (Pericles xix). It is, after 
all, he who accuses the Bawd of possible affiliations with witchcraft, when he finds that 
his economic security may be threatened by her refusal to acknowledge and play along 
with his desire to camouflage his identity. 
  
75 
 As with Pericles, Lyly‟s Mother Bombie too was probably designed for a 
public performance to be held before a large and diverse audience. While Bombie is 
repeatedly called an “old cunning woman,” and though she is presented as someone who 
is often misconstrued as a witch (“They saie you are a witch. / They lie, I am a cunning 
woman”), her powers and prophesies are benevolent throughout. As three sets of lovers 
are faced with problems, it is Mother Bombie‟s positivist visionary powers that unite 
them, respectively. The protagonists of the main plot are Candius and Livia. Though 
intelligent and attractive, the young lovers are kept away from each other by their fathers, 
who want their children to make profitable matches (I.iii). Sperantus, Candius‟ father and 
a farmer by profession, having invested in his son‟s education, chooses Silena as his 
son‟s bride-to-be. Similarly, Prisius, Livia‟s father, locks up his daughter and hopes for 
her to make a profitable marriage with Accius. Silena and Accius are mismatched to 
marry the lovers and are brother and sister (changelings who were swapped with Maetius 
and Serena by the latter‟s wet nurse, Vicinia, who then raises the nurselings as her own). 
Maetius and Serena fall in love, but are heartbroken because their love cannot be 
accepted or confirmed in marriage. They go to Bombie who tells them not to be 
diheartened because she foresees their marriage. The troubled lovers are shocked at 
Bombie‟s seemingly incestuous predictions and threaten the old woman with punishment. 
Eventually, however, Vicinia reveals the truth that Bombie had foretold, and all lovers 
are happily re/united with each other (the fathers Sperantus and Prisius realize that their 
children must not be treated as objects to be traded or sold). 
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While the plot of Mother Bombie is based on the popular conventions of 
mistaken identity that informs Roman comedy, Lyly makes certain crucial adjustments to 
tailor Bombie‟s identity to the represent the population of early modern lay-women and 
charlatans who claimed to be fortunetellers, soothseers, and healers.
25
 These women were 
mostly old and single, and depended almost entirely on their ability to convince the 
townsmen and women of their mystical powers. While such women did not obviously 
threaten to usurp the male-dominated, established economy of early modern England, 
they were often treated with reservations by male “competitors” and were pushed out 
towards the margins of the communities. Given this, it is highly significant that Bombie 
is presented as a good woman who uses her skills and resources to benefit others. Yet, 
when her prophecies seem too unbelievable (for instance, when she tells Maetius and 
Serena that they will marry), or threaten to topple patriarchal structures of organization, 
Bombie is referred to as a “witch.” The contradictory nature of the treatment that she 
receives at the hands of the young and expectant lovers suggests not only the youths‟ 
suspicions regarding her identity, but also their anxiety to avail of her potent utterance.
26
   
                                                 
25
 Kevin Siena comments on the large numbers of advertisements placed by both men and 
women who claimed to possess miraculous powers to heal and cure the mental, physical, 
and emotional troubles of their clients. Similarly, David Hoeniger suggests that several 
single laywomen claimed to have mystical powers, and hoped to attract customers and 
gain (nominal) fees for their “services.”  
 
26
 It is significant that while the desperate lovers shun Bombie‟s predictions as witch-like 
and unnatural, they initially are willing to risk her foretellings when they approach her for 
help. Lyly, in presenting this duplicity in the otherwise sympathetic couple, questions the 
imposed marginalization of such single women as Mother Bombie.    
 
  
77 
Unlike Bombie‟s rather benevolent presentation of the fortune-telling single 
woman, Heywood‟s Wise-Woman of Hogsdon draws on the more complex realities of the 
status of workingwomen. Having no magical powers that might benefit her customers, 
the wise-woman strategically employs herself and her assistants to outwit—and therefore 
win over—her clients. As she hides in the secret chamber of her suspicious, multi-
functional home, the old woman is presented as common cheat whose customers are 
stupid, though upstanding, members of mainstream society. With the proper facilities to 
cater to multiple needs, ranging from the gratification of sexual appetites to the secret 
delivery and disposal of illegitimate babies, the wise-woman‟s home is a well-rounded 
capitalist establishment dealing in her customers‟ weaknesses of the flesh.  
Like Lyly‟s workingwoman, Heywood‟s wise-woman is also an independent 
economically motivated woman, who merely caters to the needs and fetishes of the 
central figures of the play. Although she lines the walls of her home—much in the 
convention of contemporary brothels—with portraits of women available as prostitutes 
for her customers, the wise-woman also questions the validity of the distinctions drawn 
between the mainstream and the marginalized sections of the communities that intersect 
within her subversive premises. In her ability to resolve the troubles of other, morally and 
socially upstanding women of the community whose fringes she dwells on, Heywood‟s 
wise-woman emerges as a problematic hero-figure of the play, a character who, through 
deception and cunning, restores the sanctity of the mainstream world. Indeed she is the 
material other without whom the self-serving community of Hogsdon cannot regulate its 
own future.  
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Middleton and Rowley‟s Anne similarly helps restore the precarious balance of 
the world that populates A Fair Quarrel. The play presents the workingwoman in the 
threatening role of physician‟s assistant. Jane, an expectant mother, is introduced to 
Anne—a “counsellor” of the same sex as the patient, when she hesitates to reveal her 
pregnancy to the male physician: “Have you no friend so friendly as yourself / Of mine 
own sex, to whom I might impart / My sorrows to you at the second hand?” (2.2.46-48). 
Though she is affiliated to her brother‟s economic enterprise, the play highlights the 
Anne‟s ability to act on her own accord, and to keep a secret regarding an illegitimate 
birth without upholding the patriarchal and religious requirements that were written into 
the midwifes‟ oaths.27 Working in collaboration with her brother, Anne helps deliver 
Jane‟s baby and then financially supports it by paying the Nurse money for her services.28 
Significantly, Middleton and Rowley present Anne in the role of an able medical 
practitioner, who, though breaking the laws regarding women‟s work and midwives‟ 
oaths, is a sympathetic figure on the early modern stage.  
                                                 
27
 While fathers were anxious to establish their patriarchy through the birth of a legal 
heir, the Church and State too took active interest in the midwives upholding the 
patriarchal laws by voicing any illegitimate births that they may have overseen. 
Consequently, midwives‟ oaths instructed them not to “consent, agree, give or keep 
counsel, that any woman be delivered secretly of that which she goeth with” (The Book 
of Oaths. qtd. in Bicks 25). Similarly the bishop also required midwives to inform him of 
any “illegal” activities (that is, anything that amounted to a breach of the midwife‟s oath) 
performed by other midwives. 
 
28
 In Act three, scene two, Anne, along with Jane and the physician, gives the Dutch 
Nurse money, thereby indicating that she had a monetary income that was separate from 
her brother‟s.  
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Doubling as midwife and medical assistant, Anne‟s figure poses multiple 
threats to a society that depended on midwives to establish proper patriarchal lineage. 
The midwife‟s oath clearly indicated that it was the midwife who “determined which 
genealogical tale, with its attendant privileges or stigmas, would be delivered to a wider 
audience.” This emphasis on naming and exposing the true father reveals a “specifically 
male concern about the birth attendant‟s supposed proximity to what is true,” thereby 
signaling the increased attempts by men to control or regulate the “production and 
dissemination of a child‟s origins” (Bicks 24). Because Anne performs the medical 
functions of a midwife without fulfilling her ceremonial roles, she precariously locates 
herself on the cusps of the socio-economic spectrum of dangerous and subversive labor. 
In doing so, she embodies the “potent range of fears” of midwifery that constructed “its 
darker side: social inequality, contested paternity, fraud, conspiracy, infanticide, 
witchcraft, abortion, extortion, and the revival of Roman Catholicism” (Cressy 66).  
Moreover, as she readily displays her economic self-sufficiency, she subverts the 
conventional notions of women‟s economic dependency and domesticity, and comes 
dangerously close to toppling the patriarchal balance.   
But it is really Middleton‟s Witch who finally dismantles the patriarchal hold over 
early modern economies. As she openly concocts potions and medicines for customers in 
exchange for material gains, The Witch presents all the dangers that were stereotypically 
associated with single workingwomen.
 Stavreva states, “in the (early modern) period‟s 
language of contrariety, which defined good through evil, order through disorder, soul 
through body, male through female, and the ordered commonwealth through demonic 
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tyranny, witches epitomized the inversion of natural, patriarchal, Christian, and 
national order” (309). Middleton‟s witch breaks all the codes of a patriarchally 
established, English and Christian society when she demands sexual attention from her 
son and threatens to live for as long as she desires, thus controlling the man‟s futures by 
keeping him away from her amassed wealth. At a time when authorities were insistent on 
the domesticity of women‟s work, and when James passed multiple regulations that 
increased the number of witch hunts in England, Middleton‟s Hecate displays all the 
dangers of the uncontrolled identity of the autonomous workingwoman. Refusing to play 
the roles of the docile and domestic parent, she openly assumes authority and power over 
a patriarchal culture. Since she refuses to submit herself to Firestone‟s control and instead 
controls him (and potentially may do so endlessly), she subverts all established laws of 
patriarchy and asserts her autonomy as an independent working woman. While Middleton 
represents her as a witch, what is truly threatening is her human, economic prowess. 
It is interesting that James‟ regulations were passed around the same time that the 
population of illegitimate children and unemployed single women was at an all-time high 
in England. Everywhere women were struggling to survive on their own in such 
professions as fortunetelling, midwifery, prostitution, and independent shopkeepeing. 
Their identities must have been powerful and significant enough to be displayed 
theatrically, even if they are accommodated within contemporary dramatic conventions.  
Plays such as Middleton‟s Women Beware Women that seem at first glance to 
share nothing in common with the dramas that engage early modern anxieties regarding 
working women unravel surprisingly the period‟s deeper concerns about women‟s 
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abilities to break down economic infrastructures and transform the fixed conditions of 
subjects. Women Beware Women is in this a sense a Deleuzean text about “becoming-
woman.” If “becoming-woman” is, as Catherine Driscoll suggests, “a way of 
understanding transformative possibilities” that enable identity to “escape from the codes 
which constitute the subject” (75), Livia is certainly an agent of becoming. Livia situates 
herself on the most problematic end of the spectrum of women‟s work. The embodiment 
of the early modern adventuress, she performs the role the dangerous thinker, and, 
through her schemes, disrupts the smooth operation of Florence‟s patriarchal economy. 
Her labor is an intellectual encroachment on men‟s key positions of power and social 
architecture, specifically because it is “capable of crossing and impregnating an entire 
social field, and of contaminating men …” (A Thousand Plateaus 274). That she does not 
have to penetrate a professional space cordoned off by men for themselves in no way 
undermines her ability to overreach the established limits of her own and others‟ material 
beings to construct alternative economies.   
The game of chess that sets up the infamous rape scene in Women Beware Women 
engages women‟s strategizing their victory, both in the space of “play” and “work.” Seen 
from the twenty-first century perspective, a time when we readily accept sports as 
profession, the chess match between Livia and Leantio‟s mother could be considered a 
professional tussle. However, to translate this professionalism into the early modern 
context, we need to be able to theorize work—more specifically women‟s work—during 
the period. Livia, while staying within the confines of her home and not earning her 
livelihood, works towards restructuring her society in direct opposition to contemporary 
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patriarchal norms. Livia‟s work, though not recognized as a force of labor, should 
qualify as such, as a dramatic representation of the intellectual production of women such 
as Amaelia Lanyer and Lady Mary Wroth—writers who, in their works, imagined 
alternative communities, and mobilized alternative futurities that destabilized patriarchal 
organizations of power and progress. 
Livia‟s unusual plans for the dismantlement of Florence‟s present economic 
culture involve what Herbert Marcuse would refer to as artistic if cruel innovation. It is 
through her “estranging language and images” that she renders “perceptible, visible, and 
audible that which is … not yet … perceived, said, and heard in everyday life” (Aesthetic 
Dimension 72). Specifically, the “everyday life” of women‟s unstated desire that Livia 
relocates from the subterranean realms into places of prominence serves as an 
“indictment of … the monopoly of the established reality” of capitalist and patriarchal 
oppression within the period (66). The specific moments and phenomena of her 
indictment embody the revolutionary work of “art” and represent her resistance to 
“enslavement … by the objective conditions (which remain those of domination)” that 
deny her autonomy, or “freedom and happiness” (69).  
Marcuse‟s statement that women‟s liberation from patriarchy “require(s) changes 
of such enormity in the material as well as intellectual culture, that they can be attained 
only by a change in the entire social system” is made in the context of modernity and 
advanced capitalism (“Marxism and Feminism” 280-81). However, he provides us with a 
valuable lens through which to read the effects of the disruptive behavior of the unruly 
characters that inundate early modern drama. I utilize Marcuse‟s sense of “feminist 
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socialism” to make clear the interrelationship between the practices of Renaissance 
women‟s socio-cultural and economic marginalization, and focus on the representation in 
the drama of the spectrum of women‟s struggle for liberation from patriarchy. The 
spectrum of female resistance that ranges from the representation of women‟s desire for 
economic autonomy within patriarchal society to women‟s attempts at dismantling 
completely social structures of oppression forces in the drama a re-envisioning of “the 
established hierarchy of needs—a subversion of values and norms which would make for 
the emergence of a society governed by a new Reality Principle” (285-86). 
Not only does Middleton epitomize female resistance to hegemonic structures of 
futurity, but his female characters embody a Marcusean spirit that links in varying 
degrees the oppressed subjects‟ sense of liberation with their radical actions that change 
their present condition and dismantle the smooth progress of hegemony in the future. As 
Livia in Women Beware Women readies her home for the seduction-molestation of 
Bianca, she remarks to the widow, “Are we not well employed, think you? An old 
quarrel/ Between us, that will never be at an end” (2.2.265-66). The “quarrel” of which 
Livia speaks is, of course, the infamous chess game that sets up Bianca‟s sexual “fall,” 
alongside the widow‟s defeat at the hands of her “cunning” hostess. But at a more 
profound level, theirs is an irresolvable “quarrel” between their class identities, a quarrel 
that the women have inherited through their participation in the fundamentally patriarchal 
institution of marriage. While both women have been widowed, one twice before, they 
retain the class positions—and the accompanying liabilities and privileges—to which 
their dead husbands contractually bound them with the act of marriage. However, while 
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the nameless widow accepts her socio-economic class as unchangeable fate, and 
indeed attempts to propagate patriarchal ideology, Livia threatens its notions of stability 
and continuity by propagating and participating in illicit, cross-class relationships. While 
the old widow occupies the dubious position of being the sole patriarchal woman in the 
play, Livia leads the other women in their communal resistance to hegemonic ideologies: 
through their practice of incest, infidelity, and interclass sexual/economic liaisons, 
Isabella, Bianca, and Livia disrupt the space of the early modern family, rendering 
inadequate its oppressive tools of matrimony and futurity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“YOUR CHANGE IS STILL BEHIND”: APPROPRIATED BODIES AND 
BIOLOGICAL FUTURITY IN MARLOWE AND MIDDLETON 
Considering their centrality to the Renaissance canon, it would seem outrageous 
to propose that Marlowe, Middleton or Rowley is an author of minor literatures. Yet that 
is my purpose in this chapter. More precisely, I will suggest that certain characters in two 
plays—Doctor Faustus and The Changeling—engage in the Deleuzean politics of 
becoming and minoritarianism. Faustus and Beatrice-Joanna “amplify” the schizophrenia 
and the “disjunctions” that Deleuze and Guattari identify in their work as features of 
minor language and literature (Anti-Oedipus 76-77); they forge their identities by 
asserting their desire to “conquer” the hegemony of the “major language” and “delineate 
in it as yet unknown languages” of resistance through which they might construct 
alternative ideologies (A Thousand Plateaus 105). But as is the case with the various 
institutions in these plays, such as patriarchy, that work to monitor and control individual 
desire and disruptive futurities, the minor languages become reinvested in the established 
(conventional) methods of secured futurity. In limiting their visions of alterity, Faustus 
and Beatrice-Joanna eventually “reterritorialize” onto the fundamental ideology of 
reproduction and filiation. While their momentary breaks from structural modes of being 
are a sort of “deterritorialization,” a flight away from the encoded body of contemporary 
authority, their employment of the tropes of biological futurity—in hopes of perpetuating 
a temporal vision and culture wherein the future would propagate through their body and 
bloodlines the hegemony of the past—reorganizes their potentially dispersive movement 
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and repositions the characters within the social limits that accompany a linear 
temporality. In other words, even as the protagonists in the plays attempt to articulate 
their desire in spite of the limits imposed on them, their respective quests for locating 
themselves in a future wherein the present power relations may be inverted but not 
dismantled re-enters them into a culture of oppression. Their attempt at 
deterritorialization is “negative” because it is “overlaid by a compensatory 
reterritorialization” (A Thousand Plateaus 508).  
The negativity, however, must not be interpreted as a complete failure of the 
characters‟ attempt at a minoritarian politics. For theirs is an expression of their desire for 
transformation, a tangible sign of their willingness to seek out ways in which to construct 
alternative futures. In their work on Kafka‟s literature Deleuze and Guattari explain 
minoritarianism as a concept that “forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately 
to politics,” wherein even microcosmic relations such as those of “the family triangle 
(connect) to the other triangles—commercial, economic, bureaucratic, juridical—that 
determine its values” (Kafka 17). Faustus and Beatrice-Joanna practice, albeit fleetingly, 
a minoritarian politics of transformation and resistance before reentering the dominant 
majoritarian worlds of patriarchy and capital. This transformation necessarily disconnects 
them temporarily from the linear temporal logic and enables their participation in a 
process that Deleuze and Guattari term “becoming.”  
A detailed analysis of this and related terms that are specific to the philosophers‟ 
glossary will be helpful here in foregrounding my discussion of the plays. Becoming 
“constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man‟s land, a non-localizable 
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relation” that “sweeps up” the seemingly isolated structures or bodies that (b)lock 
power within their beings (A Thousand Plateaus 293), and that, by destabilizing them, 
forces connections to form between them through ungoverned flows of energy or desire. 
Becoming works in conjunction with deterritorialization, a movement that effects 
transformation. Invariably the deterritorialized bodies are once again reterritorialized, 
when they formulate alternative bases of structuring power and energy. But it is the 
moment of flux that is the site of becoming. This moment, Deleuze asserts in an earlier 
work, “does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past 
and future”; rather, “the essence of becoming … move(s) and … pull(s) in both directions 
at once” (The Logic of Sense 1). In becoming, individuals experience connections with 
other beings, objects, and institutions, as opposed to merely responding to them or being 
absorbed by them. The product of these connections, howsoever transient, emits energy 
and power that sustains the relations between/among the subjects. As our encounters 
multiply, so too does our composition, so too the mutations or shifts in the flows of our 
energy. It is these shifts that interest the philosophers, who suggest that we can best 
understand them in terms of “lines.”  
There are three broad categories of lines that Deleuze and Guattari identify in 
their text: “line[s] of molar or rigid segmentarity, … of molecular or supple 
segmentation, (and) line[s] of flight” (A Thousand Plateaus 204). The result of the 
intersection between the individual and larger structural organizations such as the State, 
molar lines serve to curtail the individual‟s desire or to impose homogeneity over it and 
so bring it under the umbrella of collective interest. Molecular lines, on the other hand, 
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mark the intersections of experiences within an individual, the physical or emotional 
responses to stimuli. These internal lines are relatively free from social control and 
therefore are capable of expressing the individual‟s desire. But the most potent effects of 
individual desire are the lines of flight, which, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, “are very 
dangerous for societies” because they mark individuals‟ creative methods of 
reconfiguring, not simply escaping, their larger social problems (204). It is through 
molecular lines and the lines of flight that we cease to be and instead experience 
becomings. 
 In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari identify and outline various kinds 
of becomings: becoming-animal, becoming-child, becoming-minoritarian, becoming-
vegetable, and so on.
1
 While becomings are unique and therefore non-definite, they must 
pass through a stage that the theorists identify rather problematically as “becoming-
woman,” the necessary first-step that all revolutionary practices must take in order to 
dismantle successfully majoritarian ideologies.
 2
 The theorists‟ explanation and 
contextualization of the term within minoritarianism is important enough to be quoted at 
length. They state:  
                                                 
1
 While various combinations of becomings are scattered throughout their texts, Deleuze 
and Guattari focus on these in a section of A Thousand Plateaus that is titled “1730: 
Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible.”  
 
2
 Feminism has a long-standing tradition of resenting Deleuzian politics, specifically on 
account of the hyphenated category of becoming-woman that seemingly absents female 
subjectivity from the female body. In fact it is only recently that theorists such as Camilla 
Griggers, Elizabeth Grosz, Verena Andermatt Conley, and Claire Colebrook have 
managed to complicate fruitfully the feminist interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari. For 
a comprehensive history of feminist engagement with Deleuzian philosophy, see Deleuze 
and Feminist Theory.  
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… [T]he majority in the universe assumes as pregiven the right and power of 
man. In this sense, women (and) children … are minoritarian. It is perhaps the 
special situation of women in relation to the man-standard that accounts for the 
fact that becomings, being minoritarian, always pass through a becoming-woman. 
It is important not to confuse “minoritarian,” as a becoming or process, with a 
“minority”, as an aggregate or a state. Jews (and) Gypsies … may constitute 
minorities under certain conditions, but that in itself does not make them 
becomings. One reterritorializes, or allows oneself to be reterritorialized, on a 
minority as a state; but in becoming, one is deterritorialized. … Even women 
must become-women … (and) [b]ecoming-woman necessarily affects men as 
much as women. … [B]ecoming-woman … (implies) two simultaneous 
movements, one by which a term (the subject) is withdrawn from the majority, 
and another by which a term (the medium or agent) rises up from the minority. … 
Becoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates a labor of power 
(puissance), an active micropolitics. This is the opposite of macropolitics, and 
even of History, in which it is a question of knowing how to win or obtain a 
majority. … Unlike history, becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of past 
or future. Becoming-revolutionary remains indifferent to questions of a future and 
a past of the revolution; it passes between the two. … [A]historical societies set 
themselves outside history, not because they are content to reproduce immutable 
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models or are governed by a fixed structure, but because they are societies of 
becoming.  
          (A Thousand Plateaus 291-92)    
 In their respective opposition to a “macropolitics,” and owing to their momentary 
disjuncture from a historical timeline, Faustus and Beatrice-Joanna come close to 
becoming-woman. The minor languages that they forge in the plays‟ worlds “exist only 
in relation to (the) major language” whose oppression they resist (A Thousand Plateaus 
105). And it is because they cannot escape completely the history of patriarchy or capital 
that they reterritorialize on the ideology of biological futurity. While Deleuze and 
Guattari extend their philosophy to interpret modern minoritarian literature, specifically 
works by Kafka that express a “politics that is brought forth around a „most 
contemporary‟ problematization of … social forces in the social movements of anarchism 
…” (Thoburn 28), a similar critical claim may be made for the dramatic investments of 
Marlowe, and Middleton and Rowley. Marlowe‟s protagonists, infamous in the literary 
canon as overreachers, at the same time traverse various socio-political “triangles” or 
boundaries: Marlowe‟s Faustus, for instance, forces the overlap of human, divine, and 
diabolical trajectories of desire; of biological and sociological systems of patriarchy. 
Similarly, Middleton and Rowley‟s plays almost always dissect urban, suburban, and 
rural spaces, and plunge into the dramatic confusion that stems from the mixing of 
societies, classes, sexes, and peoples. These playwrights, then, anticipate a minor 
literature, and their characters epitomize the creativity of minoritarian modernists such as 
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Kafka, whose work “takes place in choked passages” amidst impossibilities 
(Negotiations 133). 
Early Modern Futurity: A History 
The future is clearly at stake in much of Renaissance drama, and the plays‟ plots 
seem designed to accommodate the future of the plays‟ worlds. Yet futurity as a concept 
is not articulated as a separate ideological category in either the plays or the non-dramatic 
literature of the period, but is often collapsed with contemporary notions of temporality. 
For instance, in A New and More Exact Map or Description of New Jerusalem‟s Glory, a 
work published in 1651, the prophet writer Mary Cary has a “vision for the Millennium,” 
a future time wherein individuals‟ present fears and material concerns will be eradicated.3 
She declares with optimism that in the future “[t]here shall be no outward wanting to the 
Saints …: for what is it that can be desired or that heart can think of, that ever at any time 
maketh the lives of people comfortable, but the Lord hath promised that his people shall 
enjoy it, in (future) times” (Cary qtd. in Crawford and Gowing 286). Cary remarks on the 
pain of mortality, specifically the loss of male children, and goes on to makes a prophecy 
of a time in the future that would boast of higher life spans for children and adults: “[n]o 
infant of days shall die; none shall die while they are young; all shall come to good old 
age” (286).  
                                                 
3
 Although the Cary text was published in 1651, I am using her work to clarify 
theoretically the underpinnings of early modern futurity. Cary‟s writing is a valuable 
source of information on Renaissance concerns regarding material well being, most of 
which, the author claims, will not only be addressed in a mysterious future time, but also 
be resolved once and for all.   
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Cary‟s millenarian rhetoric is especially useful for our understanding of the 
ways in which the ideology of futurity is constructed in the early modern period. While 
she imagines a future that is free of human desperation and helplessness, her specific 
examples—material comforts and elongated human lifespan—stem directly from her 
concerns for improving, not dismantling, her present situation and surroundings. 
Although her text takes on the rhetorical shape of a prophecy, the direct objects (and 
beneficiaries) of her prediction are individuals whose present is precarious and future 
uncertain. Her prophetic remarks are aimed at conjuring visions of a better time without 
sparking the possibilities of radical change in the future. The future, as Cary will have it, 
then, promises merely an improvement of the past and present ideologies. Cary‟s 
optimistic visions of the future lifespan of children, for instance, are rooted in a 
fundamental premise of patriarchy that was central to early modern society in England: 
one needed heirs—ideally male heirs—to carry on one‟s bloodline. Thus it was an 
especially “bitter thing to lose an only son” (Cary qtd. in Crawford and Gowing 286). 
Notably, Cary‟s visions do not entail a fundamental change in politics; her prophecies are 
not lines of flight in so far as she continues to imagine a future society that depends on 
male heirs for its propagation and that only barely modifies the present realities to make 
more comfortable (and certain) the structure of hegemony.  
A New and More Exact Map is representative of most early modern experiences 
and expressions of futurity. These experiences most often find representations within 
early modern comedies, but occasionally also noticeable in tragedies that seem to 
promise, howsoever obliquely, a future that reproduces the value-systems of the present. 
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In both cases, the Renaissance preoccupation with biological futurity is most clearly 
represented in contemporary drama‟s focus on marriage, filial ties, and proper and 
improper trafficking between men and women of female bodies—the vehicles of 
propagation. But in brief flashes, futurity as a revolutionary concept is subversively 
addressed, as is the case in Doctor Faustus and The Changeling. In specific moments in 
these texts, Marlowe and Middleton and Rowley symptomatize the female body as a 
“space,” a “no-man‟s land” but also an everyman‟s land, wherein radical experiments 
may be conducted by women and men who desire to transform their own and others‟ 
future within patriarchy by actively taking part in its construction. In their strategic ab/use 
of the female body, the protagonists (and the playwrights) force a feminization of 
patriarchy, specifically through the characters‟ convoluted wielding of power and 
authority. While the ideological center of the plays remains patriarchal, what changes in 
each instance is the subject position of those that occupy the empowered positions within 
the hegemonic state. That is, even as the fundamental principles of patriarchy remain 
unchanged, the “new” patriarchs are a new breed altogether.  
Body Potential: Pregnancy and Molarity Plays 
 Translated from the French and published anonymously in 1682, The XV 
Comforts of Rash and Inconsiderate Marriage declares women‟s labor pains to be no 
more remarkable than “the laying of a great Eg, by a Hen, or a Goose, the ordinary effect 
of Nature, no more, notwithstanding all [women‟s] Tittle-Tatle” (54). While Patricia 
Crawford refers to the work as a misogynistic “satire” against childbearing women (13), I 
would argue that the text betrays simultaneously its nervousness about a precarious and 
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exclusively female bodily experience, one that could only be contained in masculine 
rhetoric as “ordinary effect.” Thus in Birth, Marriage, and Death David Cressy notes 
male diarists‟ anxiety regarding pregnancy, even as he acknowledges that some men 
accepted the risks of labor as “natural, ordinary, and common” (28).  In reality, 
pregnancy and labor were considered anything but ordinary aspects of early modern 
experience,
4
 and many women even took pains to avoid the process.
5
 Those who became 
pregnant often expressed fear for their lives because “[c]hildbirth was,” as Linda Pollock 
reminds us, “a very conspicuous single cause of mortality and a fate which a prospective 
mother had several long months to contemplate” (47; original emphasis). 
Given both men and women‟s fears regarding pregnancy, it is not surprising that 
the topic occupied a privileged position in the metaphorical language of the period.
6
 Early 
                                                 
4
 For an exhaustive study of the various stages of conception and pregnancy, and the 
corresponding early modern anxieties, see Linda Pollock‟s “Embarking on a Rough 
Passage: The Experience of Pregnancy in Early-Modern Society.”  Cressy‟s Birth, 
Marriage, and Death, especially the early section on “Childbed Mysteries” is a rich 
source of the period‟s complex reception of pregnancy. In his work Cressy includes 
“[t]he classic story of … Elizabeth Joceline, … who looked on her first pregnancy in 
1622 as a likely sentence of doom” (30); according to records, Joceline died six days after 
giving birth. Cressy states vehemently that, in spite of the abundant records of women‟s 
and men‟s fear of “childbed mortality,” anxiety regarding pregnancy was often 
unfounded and that “[m]ost women survived childbirth without complications …” (30). 
But he is quick to add that “one does not need actuarial precision to be frightened” 
(Cressy 31).   
 
5
 In Travesties and Transgressions in Tudor and Stuart England, Cressy provides a 
detailed analysis of the trial and hanging of a Richard Skeete, who, the historian claims, 
may have been an abortionist and who worked alongside other practitioners to “cure” 
women of their undesired pregnancies (80). 
 
6
 A basic “keyword” search on EEBO for the word “pregnant” in texts published between 
1473 and 1700 produces 70 hits. The term “pregnancy,” which lends itself less willingly 
to metaphorical usage, yields only three hits. While the most popular use of “pregnant” 
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modernists have duly noted this preoccupation, and works ranging from John Hankin‟s 
“Hamlet‟s „God Kissing Carrion‟: A Theory of the Generation of Life” to Kathryn 
Moncrief and Kathryn McPherson‟s Performing Maternity in Early Modern England 
address Renaissance literature‟s fascination with pregnancy. However, while most of 
these works engage the relationship between marriage, childbirth, and lineage in the 
context of patriarchy, they hardly address the notion that the pregnant body offers itself 
as a biological space wherein futurity may be implanted and shaped. That is, the woman‟s 
womb offers her, but also other (male and female) experimenters, a unique medium that 
can appropriate nature and biology to conceive (of) an alternative future society and so 
affect a shift in power relations. The scenes from the plays that I analyze dwell on this 
malleable and corruptible quality of the body that allows characters to invade it but also 
transform it by means of their own desires for transforming the future. While ostensibly 
the texts seem to share nothing in common, each is invested in the mutable shape of the 
pregnant body and in women‟s ability to generate alternative relations of power. 
Ironically, in the simultaneous, oppositional movements of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization,
7
 the protagonists, who experience Deleuzian becomings and thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
within early modern parlance seems to be metaphorical, the term was also used to signify 
women‟s reproductive status. The OED notes that the earliest recorded use of the term 
within this latter context is in a 1425 text titled Grande Chirurgie. It also notes the 1545 
translation of Byrth of Mankynde, which cites Hypocrates‟ observation that “[t]he 
pregnant Woman which hath Tenasmum for the most part aborteth.” Arguably the most 
famous literary (and literal) use of the term in the early modern period comes from Book 
Two of Milton‟s Paradise Lost: “My womb Pregnant by thee, and now excessive grown 
Prodigious motion felt” (779).  
   
7
 In the Introduction, I discuss Deleuze‟s theories of rhizomatic and arborescent overlap 
(which he explains using the example of the orchid and the wasp), to elaborate the 
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extract themselves from linear temporality, are almost immediately restructured by the 
pregnant body onto a filiative and reproductive futurity.  
The earliest of the plays, The Tragedy of Doctor Faustus, is a notable exception to 
Marlovian standards of violence, and is surprisingly scant in its spilling of blood and 
guts, focusing instead on Faustus‟ tragic mental transformation. But even as the text 
consumes its protagonist with self-doubt and despair about the future of his body and 
soul, it offers him, through the shape of a pregnant woman, the possibility of escaping the 
complete extermination and deterministic fatalism to which he has contractually been 
bound. 
Grape-craving and pregnant, the Duchess of Vanholt seems at first glance to be 
irrelevant not only to the grand scheme of Marlowe‟s Doctor Faustus, but also to the 
majority of critical conversations about the role of women or gender in the play. Even a 
text such as Sara Deats‟ Sex, Gender, and Desire in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe, 
which offers a “feminist reading” of the play (217), manages only once to mention the 
Duchess in a chapter titled “The Rejection of the Feminine in Doctor Faustus.” Indeed 
the Duchess is an oft-rejected figure in Marlovian criticism. Yet she is one of two female 
human subjects in the play,
8
 and the only woman to escape omission from either the “A” 
                                                                                                                                                 
processes by which individuals may deterritorialize, or break away from systematic 
thoughts and modes of being, but be reterritorialized immediately by a different set of 
organizing principles.    
 
8
 All references to the play‟s texts are from Christopher Marlowe: Doctor Faustus and 
Other Plays. Eds. David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Unless indicated, all textual citations are from the B-text.  
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or “B” texts.9 The Duchess, I would argue, survives these textual cuts because she is 
crucial to the play‟s investment in futurity. She inadvertently offers her pregnant body to 
Faustus, who renders it the primary site of his experimentation with the future. Drawing 
on his awareness of the socio-medical phenomenon called the “Andromeda effect” and 
on the contemporary anxiety regarding the corporality of the “maternal impression,” 
Faustus utilizes the malleability of the fetal form in order to inject the Duchess‟ womb 
with his influence and thereby “father” through her an offspring that may prevent the 
extermination of his desiring soul. Consequently, the tragedy that befalls Faustus at the 
end of the play, which stems from his realization of the crisis of his soul, is undercut by 
his potentially successful effort at “impressing” himself onto the future.      
We discover as early as in the first scene of the play that John Faustus is a man 
discontent with what Deleuze and Guattari would call the molarity of his present 
condition. Thus he obsesses over his future and strives to escape the limits of temporality. 
Weighing the benefits of the established forms of knowledge and self-empowerment, he 
dismisses them hastily, announcing that the fields of “Oeconomy,” “Physic,” and even 
“Divinity” are limited in their scope, since they cannot help him “be eternalized” 
(1.1.14), or furnish him with wisdom that could “make men … live eternally” (1.1.22). 
Clearly Faustus‟ denunciation of the branches of institutionalized knowledge has to do 
with the fact that they, being rooted within the temporal scheme, cannot take him outside 
                                                 
9
 While the Dramatis Personae of the B-text include “A Woman Devil,” Alexander‟s 
“Paramour” (a spirit), “A Hostess,” “The Duchess of Vanholt,” and “Helen of Troy, a 
spirit” as the play‟s cast of female characters, only the Hostess and the Duchess qualify as 
human. Notably, the A-text‟s abbreviated list of characters makes no mention of the 
Hostess, listing the Duchess as the sole female human subject in the play.      
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of time (to “eternity”). Consequently, he abandons these pursuits and promises instead 
to glut himself with magic—an intellectual medium that he has not yet explored and that 
has not been structured or organized along molar lines, through which he hopes to find 
“omnipotence” (1.1.54), possibly even a line of flight. Magic, as Faustus imagines it, 
offers him the possibility of experiencing limitless movement between spaces and forms. 
Even before he trades his soul with the devil in exchange for what he hopes will be 
seamless and uncensored identity, Faustus prophesizes his magical capabilities and 
claims boldly that he will have his “spirits fetch (him) what (he) please[s]” (1.1.78), be it 
precious rarities—pearls or fruits—from India and the new world, or “secrets” pertaining 
to “foreign kings” (1.1.86). Imagining himself to be enriched by the uncoded flows of 
magic that may traverse time(s), space(s), and mind(s), Faustus signs up for the 
fulfillment of his desires, so he may experience the hitherto unrealized sensations “of 
profit and delight, / Of power, of honour, and omnipotence” (1.1.53-4).  
But his plans for writing himself outside of time are promptly shattered by 
Mephistopheles. Just moments after he turns in the bloody scroll and signs over his soul 
to Lucifer, Faustus learns of the insufficiency of magic to secure him in eternity; and he 
experiences the first in the series of multiple disappointments with respect to his future. 
Receiving equivocation from Mephistopheles in place of guidance regarding the location 
and condition/s of hell—the site that has no future, and to which the scholar has promised 
his citizenship—Faustus reverts to thinking more structurally about his material future: 
he demands to have a wife who would satiate his “wanton and lascivious” desire to 
procreate (2.1.141). But Mephistopheles refuses to fulfill even this conventional, 
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patriarchal drive, prioritizing his own bond to Lucifer over his promise of obedience to 
Faustus. Mephistopheles proclaims marriage to be “but a ceremonial toy” (2.1.146), and 
distracts the new recruit from seeking the socio-legal, Christian, and contractual means of 
procreation and futurity, promising him in its place sexually gratifying experiences with 
courtesans, experiences that would necessarily be more immediate (and less Christian or 
contractual) in nature.  
It is vital to note the differences in the forms of desire that are at play in this 
scene. Faustus‟ initial quest for omnipotence and unbounded knowledge is 
unschematized; it is, in fact, what Deleuze and Guattari would consider a line of flight 
that shatters the organized movements—or exchanges—of epistemology, of power and 
desire. When Faustus finds his resistance to normativity countered by the force of 
Mephistopheles‟ ambassadorial refusal, a negation that represents both heaven and hell‟s 
denial of his desire, he is forced to define structurally the scope of his quests and reduce 
himself to seeking futurity within earthly realms; thus his wish to be married. But even 
this desire is refused him because its institutionalized constituents conflict with those of 
Satan‟s contract, itself a product of organization. With marriage taken out of the dynamic, 
Faustus is offered what seems to be a viable option for sexual gratification, perhaps even 
reproduction: countless encounters with diverse courtesans. However, the apparent 
freedom from the marital sexual economy is undercut by the twofold limit of the 
“courtesans”: being products of Mephistopheles‟ conjuration, even if they are capable of 
bearing children, surely they would be servile to their devilish maker and therefore 
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reproduce his ideology, not Faustus‟.10 Moreover, as courtesans and not wives, their 
wombs would be refused recognition as legally valid, socially accepted spaces to 
generate proper bloodlines.  
Recognizing fully the precariousness of his offer of the courtesans, 
Mephistopheles is careful to throw in by way of additional recompense a tool that would 
continue to keep the Good Angel at bay and Faustus in check: a book that will instruct 
the scholar in ways of manufacturing gold, “thunder, whirlwinds, storm, and lightning” 
(2.1.157). However appealing these shiny toys may be to Faustus, he now recognizes 
them to be impotent in their generative capabilities. And in keeping with his quick 
intellect (Prologue 16), he quickly sees necromancy per se for what it is: a fickle pursuit 
that will at best provide him with cheap thrills but not more sustainable sources of 
proliferation or satisfaction. Having given up, perhaps prematurely, the possibility of 
experiencing becomings, Faustus reverts to the patriarchal ideology of secured biological 
futurity. In fact, from this point on he combines his existent knowledge of the 
conventional arts and sciences (for instance, the Andromeda effect) with the hard-earned 
petty privileges of magic to attempt to insert himself into the future. Since magic cordons 
off the experience of unearthly eternity (timelessness) at the same time that it distances 
Faustus from the social institution of marriage and its accompanying promise of 
                                                 
10
 It is evident that the service of the courtesans will be modeled on the dynamic that we 
observe between Lucifer, Mephistopheles, and Faustus: Mephistopheles‟ true affiliations 
are to Lucifer; his simulation of service to Faustus is a matter of opportunity. So in all 
matters of consequence, he prioritizes his true master Lucifer, as is made amply clear 
when Mephistopheles resists once again Faustus‟ questions regarding the maker of the 
world by asserting that he is only bound by contract to answer questions that are “not 
against (Lucifer‟s) kingdom” (2.3.70).    
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legitimized continuity, he hybridizes and perverts his approach to futurity: he focuses 
on his monstrous potential to infect the female body with (his) desire, to disrupt the 
process of “natural,” biological reproduction and inject himself—as an object of 
“unnatural” female desire—into the pregnant woman‟s body.   
Thomas Underdowne‟s Æthiopian Histories (1569) is the first known English 
translation of Heliodorus‟ romance, Aithiopika, the popular tale of the dark-skinned 
Queen Persina, who during conception was affected by an image of the white-skinned 
Andromeda to give birth to a child—Chariclea—who is marked by the whiteness of the 
mythical princess and not the blackness of her biological parents. As Sujata Iyengar notes 
in Shades of Difference, Underdowne‟s was not the first or only Renaissance text that 
adopted this ancient story about bodily transformation (19). Early modern authors seem 
to have been fascinated with the physical miracle that was Chariclea, and various texts 
such as Jacques Amyot‟s Histoire Aethiopique (1559), William Lisle‟s The Faire 
Ethiopian (1631), John Gough‟s The Strange Discovery (1640), and the anonymous The 
White Ethiopian draw from the Greek romance to narrativize miraculous births.  
While Iyengar suggests that the Andromeda effect made available the notion of 
racial passing, and even allowed for the benevolent reception of difference (racial but 
also biological), I would argue that the popularity of the tale simultaneously betrays 
contemporary anxiety regarding unclean bloodlines, corrupt lineage, and the participation 
of non-biological agents in the conception or manipulation of a biological product: the 
human fetus. M. D. Reeve suggests that many Renaissance scholars and scientists offered 
the notion of the maternal impression or the Andromeda effect to account for physical 
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attributes—desirable or otherwise—of a child. They proposed that the child might be 
shaped in the womb either by the mother‟s visual perception of an image or by her secret 
desire for sources of pleasure. Referring to the popular Renaissance rationalizations of 
monsters and monstrous births, Marie-Hélène Huet states that “a remarkably persistent 
line of thought argued that monstrous progeny resulted from the disorder of the maternal 
imagination” and desire. Consequently, “[i]nstead of reproducing the father‟s image, as 
nature commands, the monstrous child bore witness to the violent desires that moved the 
mother at the time of conception or during pregnancy,” and was scarred by her perverse 
desires instead of by the legitimate markings of its “legitimate genitor” (Huet 1). 
Similarly, tracing the history of science‟s fascination with the possible relationship 
between the womb and the female imagination or desire, Simon Reynolds notes that 
thinkers ranging from Aristotle and Saint Augustine to Montaigne and Robert Burton 
warned against the “dangerous power of strong (female) imagination” (436). The effects 
of a pregnant woman‟s fantasy could be as harmless as to produce in the offspring 
“blemishes and birthmarks”; but they could also lead to “the creation of monsters” 
(Reynolds 436).  
Reeve, Huet, and Reynolds note that early modern scientists and philosophers 
were not only cautious of the fetal corruption caused by the Andromeda effect; they also 
warned against female acts of transgressive desire, such as “sex with devils or animals,” 
which could lead to monstrous births (Huet 6). But even more innocent female fantasies 
were not without consequence. Pregnant women‟s cravings for certain food items also 
could shape the fetus and leave physical marks or scars on it by way of evidence of the 
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mother‟s fetish. It was commonly accepted that “[i]f a pregnant woman greatly 
desire(d) a chickpea, she will deliver a child bearing the image of a chickpea,” or “[i]f, 
during pregnancy, she desire(d) a pomegranate, she (will mark) her child with a 
pomegranate or something that resembles it” (Pietro Pomponazzi qtd. in Huet 17-18). 
Clearly in the early modern mind monstrous births resulted from an intervention that 
“literally imprinted on progeny a deformed, misshapen resemblance to an object that had 
not participated in their creation” (Huet 5). While in rare instances the monster may have 
reflected the glory of God, as in the case of Chariclea, who bore the markings of white 
royalty, the most common assumption was that it was a horrible aberration that 
“shamelessly reveal(ed) its shameful origins” (Huet 31).   
In light of the popular understanding of the Andromeda effect and of the sinister 
implications of birthmarks, an early modern audience may have recognized immediately 
the potentially monstrous connotations of the “little wart or mole” that marks the neck of 
Alexander‟s otherwise “fair” paramour, whom Faustus conjures for the viewing pleasure 
of the Emperor (4.1.110-11). And later in the play they may have been troubled by 
Faustus‟ use of the common knowledge regarding “great-bellied” women‟s desire “for 
things … rare and dainty” to extract successfully from the Duchess of Vanholt her 
craving for “a dish of ripe grapes” (4.6.10-15). These troubles would have only been 
heightened by the audience‟s recognition of the magical nature of “the sweetest grapes” 
that the scholar has his spirit deliver from India or Saba (4.6.30): nothing good could 
possibly spring from a culinary concoction conjured by the Devil‟s advocate for 
consumption by a pregnant woman!  
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I would suggest that in discovering the Duchess‟ pregnancy-induced food 
fetish and then fulfilling it by using his craft of magic, Faustus makes a singular attempt 
“to shun the snares of death” (5.1.67). Through the grapes that he feeds (into) the 
Duchess, the flamboyant-pathetic scholar inseminates and fertilizes her desiring body and 
imagination. Knowing full well that he is “but a man condemned to die” (4.4.21), that his 
“flesh and blood (are) frail” (4.6.76), and that Helen‟s kiss will not “make (him) 
immortal” (5.1.95), Faustus tries to secure within the Duchess‟ body the shape of his 
future. In the process, he perversely fulfills in the immediate sense his earliest prophesy 
(1.1.78-86), as he has his “swift spirit” conjure “pleasant fruits” from the orient (1.1.81-
4). More essentially, he uses his magic and his earthly knowledge to transform the 
Duchess‟ body into “a vessel for reproducing … [his] bloodlines” (Jankowski 228), into a 
space wherein his powers may be exerted on the “products of her body” that will record 
his “paternal” influence (228). This progeny would not only corrupt the noble lineage, 
but also help the dying scholar escape absolute extinction by retaining for posterity marks 
of his hybrid, conventional-magical creation. Having lost forever his place in Heaven—
possibly the only space where he could finally break out of the cyclical burdens of both 
temporality and the conventional experiences of futurity—Faustus combines his 
knowledge and desire to return himself to a position of social power: having no clear 
future of his own, he manages nonetheless to participate in patriarchal futurity.   
Faustus‟ attempt to defy molarity and leave behind the monster-child of his desire 
is echoed in Negotiations by Deleuze, who announces that when studying the ideas of a 
philosopher he imagines himself “taking (the) author from behind and giving him a child 
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that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous,” a violent mix of ideas, “all sorts of 
shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions” (6). The imagined child, Deleuze 
proposes, could be the fruit of his “buggery or … immaculate conception” (Negotiations 
6). While the philosopher‟s rather flamboyant fantasy has nothing directly to do with 
Faustus, it nonetheless emphasizes the common flows of knowledge, appropriation, and 
penetration that mobilize their respective desires to break free from defined and 
organized, in a word, territorialized, modes of being and knowing. The uncertain result of 
mixing energies is also common: the product of their desire could be monstrous or 
miraculous. In any event, it would defy the molar structures of reproduction, biological or 
epistemological.  
“The Deed‟s Creature(s)”: The Refusal of Futurity 
The Changeling shares with Doctor Faustus the anxiety about pregnancy and 
women‟s role in patriarchal futurity. The play is permeated with images of the results or 
consequences of maternal influence, crowded with descriptions of physical and mental 
deformity, of quasi-medical practices that target the policing of the female anatomy, and 
of the memory of a corrupt maternal womb that continually engenders corruption.  
The Changeling opens with Alsemero remembering, not unlike Polixenes in The 
Winter‟s Tale, his fall to heteronormativity and mortality. Mesmerized at the temple by 
Beatrice-Joanna‟s beauty, the young voyager imagines a future union between himself 
and Beatrice that would parallel the course run by Adam and Eve, their earliest ancestors. 
Alsemero‟s lines are significant because they schematize the interplay of fantasy, desire, 
and agenda that informs characters‟ temporal experiences in the play: 
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‟Twas in the temple where I first beheld her, 
And now again the same; what omen yet 
Follows of that? None but imaginary. 
Why should my hopes of fate be timorous? (1.1.1-4) 
Clearly, the young man‟s past and present experiences—of beholding Beatrice-Joanna‟s 
“beauties”—fill him with a contradictory desire. On the one hand he wants not to give in 
to flighty imagination, which might lead him to read into mere coincidences great omens; 
on the other he wants to assert the acceptable, even higher qualities of his attraction to the 
young stranger: his love is doubly holy because it is located within the pious space of the 
temple, and because he craves its fulfillment by legitimatizing it through marriage.      
His romantic course to the secured futurity that informs matrimony runs counter 
to the mercantile visions that previously he shared with Jasperino, his companion and 
fellow “venturer” (1.1.90). Notably, even when he is surprised by his friend‟s sudden 
transformation from stoic seaman to melancholic lover, Jasperino recognizes the 
similarities between the adventures offered by the sea and by the female sex: both entail 
risks and rewards; and both can lead to material futurity. But both forms of adventure 
also rely on external mediums—on waves and wind in one case, and on women‟s chastity 
and their ability to breed in the other—that can never be fully controlled or tamed by 
men. (Like Alsemero, who interprets his repeated visions of Beatrice-Joanna in terms of 
the supernatural (“omen”), Jasperino also draws out the connection between witchcraft 
and the trafficking of waterways: gales, he states may be purchased “amongst the 
witches” (1.1.17), if they are not gifted to the shipmen by God.)  Perhaps it is owing to 
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his recognition of their similarities that Jasperino decides to join his friend on land in 
his heteronormative path to futurity, and seeks through Diaphanta similar rewards for his 
romantic/sexual future. He promises to at “another time” “board” the waiting-woman and 
take down her “topsail” on the condition that she is a “lawful prize” (1.1.153; 91-92).  
But both men‟s respective investments in the women are doomed to failure as 
their hitherto stoical sensibility collapses into the “frequent frailty” of filiation that 
Alsemero claims is the “general” human condition (1.1.116), one that, as Deleuze 
suggests,  reproduces itself without much alteration throughout the generations. 
Strangely, Beatrice anticipates both men‟s futures, when she means only to bemoan her 
loss of Alsemero: “That he should come so near his time, and miss it!” (1.1.86). The 
reproduction and appropriation of human frailty informs the subjectivity of each of the 
characters in the play; among the most puzzling of which is Beatrice-Joanna‟s. Famously 
hailed by her rapist as “the deed‟s creature” (3.4.140), Beatrice-Joanna has perhaps the 
most radical and fertile imagination in the play; more importantly, she uses her 
imagination in order to convert her desires into actions or events. Besotted with 
Alsemero‟s good looks and charm, the young woman acts on her desire and hatches a 
plan that would kill, as it were, two birds with a single stone: she designs a plot wherein 
De Flores, having murdered her betrothed Alonzo for a fee, would flee from her 
household with her money, leaving her free to construct the opportunity for her father 
Vermandero to warm up to her new lover, thereby securing her future happiness with the 
Valencian. Beatrice-Joanna‟s plans, though somewhat speedily arrived at, would even 
  
108 
have materialized as per her designs, had it not been for her inability to negotiate with 
De Flores the material terms of his service to her.  
No stranger to contractual negotiations,
11
 Beatrice-Joanna makes a surprising and 
fatal slip in trusting that “his dog-face” will prioritize one form of material futurity over 
another (2.2.147). But when De Flores refuses the “three thousand golden florins” that 
she offers him for his future security (3.4.62), and seems obstinate to remain at her side 
despite her willingness to raise her offer to “double the sum” (3.4.74) or send after him 
whatever amount of money that he would demand in writing (3.4.82), Beatrice-Joanna 
recognizes with shock the price that she must pay: in submitting to him sexually, she 
must set aside her agenda of becoming a self-made woman and be “undone … endlessly” 
by the villain (4.1.1). 
Judith Haber suggests that Beatrice‟s rape by De Flores is prompted by his 
knowledge of her “perfect virginity” (3.4.120), and that it is the im/perfection of the 
hymen that unites the violence of rape and marriage that shapes much of the action in the 
play (80-84). While Haber is right to note that virginity clearly is an obsession not just 
with the men but also most of the women in the play, it is futurity that invades all the 
characters‟ imagination, even their fantasies of maintaining or dispensing with their own 
or others‟ virginity. “[A] thing but is both loved and loathed” (1.1.125), virginity in The 
Changeling functions literally as a passage to the site of futurity. Consequently, 
Alsemero‟s closet concoctions predict results not only regarding women‟s virginity, but 
                                                 
11
 When Beatrice hears in Act Two, scene one of Alonzo‟s return and of his designs of 
marrying her shortly thereafter, she negotiates privately with her father in order to delay 
the loss of her maidenhood by three days, time enough to set her murderous plans in 
motion (2.2.105-118).     
  
109 
also their pregnancy.
12
 His attempts to fix by means of scientific knowledge the non-
localizable components of women‟s desire result from a shared patriarchal anxiety about 
the impossibility of their controlling in absolute ways women‟s mental and physical 
mobility. Not surprisingly, then, early in the play a similar anxiety shapes Tomazo‟s 
fearful visions of his friend‟s married future with Beatrice-Joanna:   
Think what a torment ‟tis to marry one  
Whose heart is leaped into another‟s bosom. 
If ever pleasure she receive from thee, 
It comes not in thy name, or of thy gift; 
She lies but with another in thine arms, 
He the half-father unto all thy children  
In the conception—if he get ‟em not, 
She helps to get ‟em for him in his absence.    
     (2.1.132-139) 
Tomazo‟s cautious advice to Alonzo as the groom-to-be awaits his postponed wedding 
night is marked by the fear not only of the monstrous power of the maternal impression to 
disrupt patriarchal lineage, but also of the autonomy of women‟s fantasies (times that are 
lived in the imagination), which men may never control, not even through the rites of 
marriage.  
                                                 
12
 It is interesting to note that Alsemero‟s dabbling with the dubious and magical science 
of potion-making likens him to Faustus, who is also invested in women‟s capacity to 
shape the future, and in his own ability to penetrate and monitor the womb.  
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But if Tomazo‟s observations of women are conventional, so too are De 
Flores‟, who hopes to control Beatrice-Joanna‟s visions and fantasies. His recognition 
that women have been known to “chid themselves abed to men” is based on the servant‟s 
observation of the perverse scope of “wrangling,” which may yet bring about such an 
erotic transformation in his mistress as mimics the course run by other women who have 
loved “bad faces … beyond all reason” (2.1.84-89). The unreasonable monstrosity of 
women‟s fantasies inundates his imagination, much in the manner that it does the other 
men‟s. However, while Alsemero, Tomazo, and even Vermandero fear the loss of 
patriarchal authority and control that is mobilized by female desire, De Flores hopes to 
benefit from a woman‟s unnatural (transformed) appetite.  
Haber claims quite rightly that such obsessions interlock men‟s patriarchal “fears 
and fantasies about women, sexuality, and marriage” (80). But it is crucial to note that 
these fears and fantasies are not exclusive to men. Women too could share the fear of the 
female body‟s production of the future. Beatrice-Joanna‟s desires, for instance, which 
involve changing the course of her future, also focus on the preservation of her virginity. 
Promising with “giddy” speed to “change” her “saint” (1.1.158-59), first she persuades 
her father to plead to Alonzo for a three-day prolongation of her maidenhood, the 
condition that all of the men that surround her seem also to value, but only in so far as 
they may oversee its eventual demise. Next, when De Flores demands her “perfect” 
virginity as just reward for his murder of Piracquo, she attempts to place between her and 
the servant a distance of social class (“Think but upon the distance that creation / Set 
‟twixt thy blood and mine”). But when De Flores insists on proximating himself to her by 
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emphasizing the equality of their “conscience” (“Look but into your conscience; read 
me there. / ‟Tis a true book; you‟ll find me there your equal”), Beatrice-Joanna in turn 
begs for the preservation of her “honour.” It is only when De Flores reminds her that she 
cannot “wee fate from its determined purpose” that Beatrice-Joanna recognizes the 
impossibility to sustaining her condition of virginity. Notably, having failed to avoid De 
Flores‟ sexual invasion, she retains her desire to avoid sexual contact. Reading secretly 
from her husband‟s “Book of Experiment” (4.1.24) and discovering Alesemero‟s 
perverse and interventional medical practices, Beatrice promises to sabotage the “two 
spoonfuls of the white water” that can identify female pregnancy (4.1.31). And, having 
used one of her husband‟s secret drugs to ensure Diaphanta‟s maidenhood, she transfers 
the threat of pregnancy from her own body onto her maid‟s as she bribes the servant to 
lose her maidenhood to Alsemero. Diaphanta‟s plans for her own future of material and 
marital luxury, of course, are shattered (4.1.129-30), and she is murdered, once again by 
De Flores, thereby preventing once and for all her ability to create a future of 
(in)advertent corruption and bastardy. 
The most powerful symptom in the play of a woman‟s fear of the womb, 
however, takes place immediately prior to Beatrice‟s rape, when she realizes that she 
cannot escape her monstrous sexual destiny. Still kneeling at De Flores‟ feet, she resigns 
herself to her sexual partner, stating resentfully that:  
  Vengeance begins; 
  Murder, I see, is followed by more sins. 
Was my creation in the womb so cursed, 
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It must engender with a viper first?   
                                (3.4.166-69) 
Strangely, this is not the first time in the play that Beatrice‟s mother‟s womb is 
summoned as a creative or destructive space. Wishing he “had a daughter … for” 
Alsemero (3.4.2), Vermandero speaks fondly of his wife who, being long dead, cannot 
provide him (or the younger man) with further vessels of futurity. Ironically, and in spite 
of the old father‟s best efforts to protect his blood from spilling and entirely expending 
itself, Vermandero cannot secure futurity per se: infectious in her deathly condition and 
stamped with the signs of anti-futurity, Beatrice warns her father: 
O come not near me, sir. I shall defile you. 
   I am that of your blood was taken from you 
   For your better health. Look no more upon‟t 
   But cast it to the ground regardlessly … 
          (5.3.149-152) 
With the death of all the women in his household, Vermandero is left at the mercy 
of Alsemero, a son-in-law who did not have the opportunity to produce or ensure the 
future production of the family line. Significantly, Isabella, the sole remaining biological 
vessel of futurity in the world of The Changeling, defers her bodily productivity to a time 
when her husband will behave as per her desire, wherein he will leave her free to move, 
think, and do as she pleases. In other words, Isabella desires a similar ideological and 
physical condition to that in which we find Beatrice-Joanna at the play‟s beginning: in a 
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public space, gazing upon a strange, foreign, and forbidden vision, and casting the net 
to ensnare a catch, pleasant or otherwise.        
Futurity and Deleuzean Becomings  
While many of the characters in these plays adopt atypical, even problematic, 
tropes of futurity, their visions remain linked to the body and to the propagation of their 
present identity. In other words, the sense of futurity that they express is essentially 
corporeal, in so far as it is invested in the physicality of individuals, communities, and 
institutions. So, crafty as they are, their forgings of the future are not artistic or 
revolutionary in the Marcusean sense, which is rooted in individuals‟ desire to sever 
future society from present modes of oppression. Instead the characters use and 
appropriate social tools that are available to them in the present—bodies, language, and 
knowledge—to attempt to write themselves into more powerful positions in the future, 
positions that at the present moment are unavailable to them. They strive to appropriate 
the culture of capital and patriarchy so as to usurp and occupy the position that hitherto 
belonged exclusively to molar identities, to dominant subjects. Because Faustus (as a 
disruptive agent of generation), Beatrice, and even Isabella crave power and dominance, 
“performance” standards that form the crux of a capitalist culture,13 they reterritorialize 
onto the foundations of patriarchal civilization. And they fail consequently to establish a 
                                                 
13
 Early in “Marxism and Feminism,” Marcuse defines the term “Performance Principle” 
as a “Reality Principle” that is based on the efficiency and prowess in the fulfillment of 
competitive economic and acquisitive functions.” A “Reality Principle,” he states, is “the 
sum total of the norms and values which govern behavior in an established society, 
embodied in its institutions, relationships, etc” (279). Marcuse notes the contradictory 
culture of capitalism, whose “Reality Principle” is inextricably tied to notions of 
performance and performativity.   
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new, alternative society that is freed from the collective ideals of molarity. Doctor 
Faustus and The Changeling represent precisely the destabilizing effects of the social 
economy that Margot Heinemann identifies as being specific to a “prerevolutionary 
situation,” wherein “no single ideology is capable of holding the society at large 
effectively together” (151).  Refusing to accommodate convincingly the comedic 
conventions of marriage that may mollify the horror, excess, and tragedy of the multiple 
deaths in the plays, the texts also decline to offer sublimity, a quality that is essential to 
the propagation of hegemonic stability. Instead they seem to be lurking in the dark spaces 
of futurity, in the aftermath of becoming, which Gilles Deleuze in his work identifies as 
the critical first step in the direction of revolutionary and radical social change.  
The Deleuzian purpose of “becoming” involves fundamental philosophical 
explorations of humanity. Specifically, Deleuze and Guattari‟s method targets the 
attainment of means through which human beings may “animate the possibilities of life” 
(Sotirin 99), constantly dissolving social and, indeed, the biological limits posed on them. 
“Becoming,” Sotirin states, “explodes the ideas about what we are and what we can be 
beyond the categories that seem to contain us: beyond the boundaries separating human 
being and animal, … child from adult, micro from macro …” (99). Deleuze suggests that 
in our quest for non-hegemonic futurity, “on the near-side, we encounter becomings-
woman” (A Thousand Plateaus 248), the introductory but constantly mutating force of 
generation that can (and therefore should) defy the various disciplinary social and cultural 
forms, including normative marital, sexual, and economic relations, that are designed, 
“through their effects” (Sotirin 101), to reproduce oppressive ideologies. In other words, 
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becoming-woman is a politics that is “capable of … impregnating” and traversing, 
even infecting “an entire social field” with its energy (A Thousand Plateaus 276). I would 
suggest that Doctor Faustus and The Changeling engage this very body politic, infusing 
the female or feminized form with generative capabilities, ones that can simultaneously 
dismantle hegemonic structures and methods of futurity. The primary principle of early 
modern futurity, however, remains more or less intact, as the promise of a continuous 
culture of patriarchy marks the plays‟ conclusions. But even as the three texts discussed 
above do not quite manage to liberate themselves from the rhetoric of hegemonic futurity, 
in their refusal to propagate it unproblematically, the plays take the first, Deleuzean, step 
towards the ultimate goal of socio-political liberation.            
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CHAPTER FOUR  
“IN HOPE TO ALTER KINDE”: MAPPING POLITICAL FUTURITY IN 
LANYER AND MORE 
Cities and human bodies have distinct shapes, and when locked into a disciplinary 
system they function more or less predictably, like clockwork. It is when the systems of 
containment are disrupted that interesting possibilities emerge regarding the future, both 
with respect to bodies and cities. In the previous chapter, I considered the possibilities 
that emerged in early modern drama from disrupting the structures that organized the 
Renaissance human body. Specifically, I discussed the period‟s investment in the mutable 
female anatomy and analyzed texts that presented women‟s bodies as the sites of 
experiments on (toward) the future. I suggested that while there is potential in such 
experimentation for the production of revolutionary change, or, to use Deleuzian 
terminology, for becoming, the human subjects cannot quite sustain their disparate 
visions of the future and invariably return to conventional and accepted systems of being. 
Yet, despite their reterritorialization, the protagonists articulate the possibilities of 
rupturing the linear logic of time wherein the future reproduces oppressively the 
structures of the past and present. In this chapter I will continue my analysis of the 
conflicted location of the future within the early modern temporal and cultural schemes. 
Instead of focusing on human bodies and on biological futurity, however, I will now 
move to an evaluation of communal and urban spaces that during the period offered 
themselves as the ideal mediums to bring about social and political change. My 
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discussion will involve an exploration of the limits and flexibility of the terms 
typically identified with urbanity and city culture.  
 In The Urban Revolution Henri Lefebvre notes that during the Renaissance “the 
city developed its own form of writing: the map, or plan, the science of planimetry” (12; 
original emphasis). Lefebvre adds that, quite unlike present-day maps, which are scaled 
and abstract, early modern maps were “[a] cross between vision and concept, works of art 
and science …” (12). Focusing primarily on the mappings of utopian spaces, including 
those represented in Renaissance literature, Louis Marin similarly states that “the city‟s 
utopic figure seems somewhere between geometry and panorama” (207). The purpose of 
mapping the early modern city, in other words, was not simply to mark and categorize its 
geographic and cultural limits or features; rather, Renaissance cartography represented 
contemporary intellectual interest in designing possibilities and organizing urban futures. 
It emphasized, moreover, the versatile, even disruptive, power that Deleuze in his work 
recognizes as the essential quality of mappings, which may be “adapted to any kind of 
mounting” or medium—they may be “drawn on a wall, conceived as a work of art, 
constructed as political action or as mediation” (Thousand Plateaus 12).  
Writers of the period recognized this power and shared the cartographers‟ 
preoccupation with the Renaissance city. Not surprisingly, the genre of city comedy 
flourished in the seventeenth century at the same time that masques and pageants 
celebrated urban culture.
1
 Even the poetry and prose asserted the value of the city as a 
                                                 
1 
For a detailed study of the treatment of the city as reflected in early modern masques, 
pageants, and city comedies, see Gail Paster‟s The Idea of the City in the Age of 
Shakespeare.   
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space wherein futures could be written. “[S]imultaneously of the narrative and of the 
descriptive domain,” cities and other “utopic figures” emerge within early modern 
literature as “graphic texts” that witness transformations while interrogating present and 
past systems of organization (Marin 207-08). But while it is clear that the writers‟ visions 
of the future are inextricably linked to their desire for change in present conditions of 
living, the precise direction of their imagination ranges from being nostalgic (wherein the 
future implies a re-turn to systems of the past) to being new and revolutionary, even 
aberrant (wherein the future is a radical deconstruction of past and present systems of 
being).
2
  
The ideology of nostalgia combined rapidly with the historical reality of 
urbanization to produce anxious pastoral narratives that emphasized the paternalistic 
culture of feudalism. The pastoral futurity articulated in texts such as The Passionate 
Shepherd and Lycidas entails what Raymond Williams recognizes in The Country and the 
City to be an imagining of a future time that returns the protagonists and the readers to 
“good old days.” Williams is quick to ask the obvious but responsible question: “Is it 
anything more than a well-known habit of using the past, the „good old days,‟ as a stick 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2
 Isabella Whitney‟s Will to London is an interesting example of a text that represents 
both the poet‟s disillusionment with her present socio-economic conditions within the 
city and her desire to bring about change in the general future of London. Her designs for 
the future certainly are not nostalgic, in that they do not allude to a glorious past that has 
since been lost and to which Whitney‟s imagination returns. At the same time, her 
musings of a future society are neither apocalyptic nor millenarian, but they are rooted in 
the material reality of Londoners. For details on Whitney‟s imaginary production of a 
London after her time, see especially lines 33 through 236, wherein the poet catalogs the 
geographical transformations that she enables in the city.     
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to beat the present?” (12). While the question leads Williams to an important book-
length analysis of the role of nostalgia in the construction of pastoral identity and to 
tracing cultural movements within and between rural and urban England, I want to 
appropriate the terms of his inquiry to consider literary history‟s investment in the future: 
is it anything more than a well-known habit of using the future as a stick to beat the 
present?  
Intent on being ahead of his time, Francis Bacon admits readily to his son that it is 
his “most profoundest care for the future” that fuels his humanist imagination but also his 
harsh critique of the epistemologies of the past and present (“The Masculine Birth of 
Time” 62).3 Far from encouraging nostalgia in his son, who is the intended reader and 
also the kernel of the future, Bacon embraces futurity as the much-needed antidote to the 
fetishistic culture of antiquity.
4
 His ensuing theories regarding the nature of the arts and 
sciences may be extreme, and his desire to sever all ties with past systems of knowledge 
unqualified. But what is of interest is his simultaneous quest for a reliable methodology 
of constructing an improved future society, a methodology that he claims will usher 
                                                 
3 
See especially chapter two of the essay, where Bacon chronicles with astonishing speed 
and carelessness the achievements (each one being an intellectual faux pas, in Bacon‟s 
opinion) of philosophers and scholars ranging from Aristotle and Plato to Hippocrates 
and Paracelsus.   
 
4 
In Book One of Utopia Raphael Hythloday expresses a similar contempt for the culture 
of intellectual and political passivity that camouflages as respect for preexisting systems 
and procedures. The example that he uses is particularly interesting because it draws 
attention to the temporal stasis implied by the intellectuals‟ opposition to change: the 
hypothetical “counsellor” that Hythloday constructs “seize[s] the excuse of reverence for 
times past” as his justification for the avoidance of structural improvements for present 
and future societies. For details see More, Thomas. Utopia. Trans. and Ed. Robert M. 
Adams. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995, especially pages eight and nine. 
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England into recognizing “the noblest, the truly masculine birth of time” when 
citizens would rely for the betterment of society not on mere “intuition” or other “things 
accessible to the senses,” but would focus on concrete steps that result from “better … 
management of the human mind” (92).5 Better management: while Bacon‟s phrase bears 
a particularly modern connotation that, in an age of global capitalism, has become the 
mantra for corporate success, in the Renaissance it worked within a broader cultural 
spectrum, one that the humanist shared with other writers and artists of the period. 
Indeed for most English scholars of the early modern period, there was a clear 
connection between their visions of an improved time and the construction of England as 
a better communal space. Specifically, urban centers such as London became the focus of 
contemporary art and design, and works ranging from Anthony Munday‟s spectacular 
pageants to the city comedies of Middleton and Dekker emphasized the urban terrain and 
cosmopolitan culture that were becoming increasingly desirable among the people of 
England.
6
 In other words, in the literature the Renaissance city became witness to the 
                                                 
5
 Bacon seems deliberately to steer clear of the more sense-oriented, street-wise forms of 
knowledge that were employed by many of his scientifically inclined contemporaries, one 
of them being Hugh Plat, who collected his observations on diverse matters in a text titled 
The Jewell House of Art and Nature, which was published in 1594, the same year that 
Bacon composed his Gesta Grayorum, a fictional piece that is decidedly more abstract 
and conceptual than Plat‟s work. For a detailed comparison of the scientific methods of 
the two men, see Deborah Harkness‟ The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the 
Scientific Revolution, specifically chapter six.  
 
6
 For a discussion of Munday‟s pageantry and the ceremonial representation of London‟s 
commercial and political success, see Ian Archer‟s “Material Londoners?” in Material 
London, ca 1600. Ed. Lena Orlin. See Theodore Leinwand‟s The City Staged: Jacobean 
Comedy, 1603-1613 and Swapan Chakravorty‟s Society and Politics in the Plays of 
Thomas Middleton, among others, for Renaissance drama‟s growing focus on urban 
space and culture.   
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changing times, but it also represented a space where possibilities unfurled, where, 
moreover, the future could be planned and regulated. Almost as if it were a malleable 
female form, the city took on the shape of individuals‟ desires.  
 The Body as Citadel: Communal Transformation in Aemilia Lanyer‟s 
Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum 
Here in equall sov‟raigntie to liue, 
Equall in state, equall in dignitie, 
That unto others they might comfort give, 
Rejoycing all with their sweet unitie.  
Aemilia Lanyer. “The Author‟s Dreame” (93-96).  
In Writing Women in Jacobean England, Barbara Lewalski applauds Aemilia 
Lanyer‟s proto-feminist approaches toward her potential patrons and states that 
“[w]hatever actual patronage Lanyer may have received, her dedications rewrite the 
institution of patronage in female terms, transforming the relationships assumed in the 
male patronage system into an ideal community” (221). By dedicating her work to other 
women, prospective patrons of her art, the poet appropriates (with or without success) the 
notions of patriarchal capital to suit the changing needs of an early modern, urban society 
where women increasingly were testing the limits of the non-domestic economy.
7
 At the 
                                                 
7 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, early modern Englishwomen continued to struggle 
against the various legal, political, and religious measures taken to restrict women‟s work 
to the domestic sphere. Despite the various laws passed by the rulers, such as Statute 
Three passed during Henry VIII‟s reign, declaring women‟s specialized labor to be a 
dangerous and punishable offense, “female economic activity of all kinds appeared to be 
spilling over into the streets and lanes as never before” (Roberts 94). 
 
  
122 
same time that Lanyer economically empowers the women whom she addresses, by 
presenting herself as their equal both in terms of intellect and virtue, she manipulates the 
social conventions of patronage. In her poetic flight towards egalitarianism she imagines 
a future society that breaks down both the feudal notions of status and rank and the 
increasingly class-based system of capital. She constructs in their places an alternative 
system that is founded on relationships of exchange among equals. Her book, Lanyer 
claims, is “the glass which shows (her dedicatees‟ and her own) several virtues,” and 
emphasizes the common bond among them: their disinterested appreciation of Christ 
their Bridegroom. In the poet‟s imagining of a better time and a better society, not only 
would the women abandon their patriarchal stance as her superiors (Lewalski 221), but 
they would also be united and equalized in a rather idyllic communal marriage to a 
strategically feminized Christ figure.
8
  
  Lanyer‟s seemingly risky or at least impractical insistence on the equality among 
women may well have its roots in a personal history. As a young woman, she held a 
dubious status as mistress to the Lord Chamberlain Hundson, when she was hurriedly 
married off to the court musician Alfonso Lanyer to prevent the scandal that would have 
stemmed from her illegitimate pregnancy. Her marriage decidedly lowered (if also 
stabilized) Lanyer‟s socio-economic station and she became firmly rooted within the 
middling class as a resident of the “minories,” a locality populated by artists and 
foreigners. (Interestingly, the location of the minories is not unlike the problematic 
                                                 
8
 Several critics, notably Wendy Wall and Jonathan Goldberg, have suggested that 
Lanyer‟s Christ figure is “often feminized (in his suffering) and thus appears as a site of 
female-identification … (and) cross-gender identification” (Goldberg 33).  
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fringes of the forest occupied by Rosalind in As You Like It; it is also similar to the 
marginal economic spaces occupied by workingwomen in Renaissance drama.) Her 
sexual history, combined with the revised material realities that resulted from her 
relocation from the aristocratic outskirts to middle-class London, may have been a 
constant source of anxiety for the young woman; so much so that it triggered in her the 
desire to construct an alternative urban society for women, a utopia that absolved them of 
class and rank, that situated women at a plateau or citadel, and that banished patriarchy 
from its political system.
9
 Through Lanyer‟s poetic representation of her politics, then, 
she disrupts patriarchal futurity by offering an alternative organizational vision of the 
future, one that refuses to reproduce past structures of oppression. In fact her construction 
of the future goes so far as to revise religious thought.    
The feminized body of Christ, which is the central male figure in Lanyer‟s poems, 
most obviously validates and purifies the poet‟s own sexual history. Moreover, by 
complicating the gaze it unwrites for future times the negative contemporary conception 
of women‟s sexual objecthood: Christ‟s body and the reader‟s gaze upon it are 
intertwined, inseparable. As a result, the distinctions between the two “collapse,” just as 
“the positions of „other‟ and „self‟” overlap (Wall 328). Indeed Lanyer‟s poetry 
celebrates not only Christ‟s body but also the female gaze as it locates itself in “[h]is 
joints dis-joynted …/ His alabaster breast, his bloody side, / His members torne, … / His 
bowels drie ….” (“Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum” 1161-8). In making Christ the object of 
                                                 
9For details regarding Lanyer‟s socio-economic position, see Pamela Joseph Benson‟s 
essay in Opening the Borders: Inclusivity in Early Modern Studies.  
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all women‟s desire and the subject of all literary women‟s writing, in short, by 
making him like the women whom Lanyer addresses in her poetry, the poet balances—at 
least within the scope of her utopia—any material differences that exist between the 
author and her intended readers. While Jonathan Goldberg clarifies that Lanyer‟s 
treatment of religion is not exclusively sexual, he asserts that the poet uses the rhetoric of 
“sexualized religious passion … to overcome social disparity and to put (herself) on some 
kind of footing with her patrons” (36-7). In Lanyer‟s poetry “religion vehiculates many 
things, not all simply to be understood as religion: power relations, gender relations, 
patronage, and sex among them.” (36). Goldberg‟s use of the term “vehiculates” is 
especially useful because Lanyer uses her poetry precisely as a tool that will bring about 
motion and transformation. Put differently, Lanyer‟s religious verse is a vehicle of 
futurity, one through which she confronts contemporary hegemony and presents 
alternative polities.  
The plight of Christ on the crucifix is akin to the common experience of shame 
and pain that Rosi Braidotti suggests is essential to women‟s identities within patriarchal 
cultures. She states, “„I, woman,‟ am affected directly and in my everyday life by what 
has been made of the subject of woman; I have paid in my very body for all the 
metaphors and images that our culture has deemed fit to produce of woman” (187). These 
words may well encompass Lanyer‟s consciousness of her own plight within a 
patriarchally determined women‟s world. Her comment to the “[v]ertuous [r]eader” that 
“all women deserve not to be blamed” indicates her awareness that much fault lies in 
men, “who forgetting they were borne of women, nourished of women, … doe like 
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Vipers deface the wombs wherein they were bred” (“To the Vertuous Reader 48). 
Clearly, Lanyer is alert to the injustice that forces women such as her to endure 
contemporary patriarchy. In response, her poetry consciously appropriates the literary and 
cultural metaphors that work to contain women. Thus, refusing to limit herself or her 
readers to the role of mourner of injustice, which was, as Wall points out, traditionally 
ascribed to women, Lanyer calls for a radical shift in the communal dynamic.
10
 And 
much as she diagrams Christ‟s body as a fluid site that unites pleasure and pain, she 
presents her own work as a “diagram (of) the future” that disavows patriarchal practices 
and reconfigures the “art of seeing and acting” within society (Rajchman 43). 
Unlike Mary Sidney, who was one of her target patrons, Lanyer uses the 
permissible genre of religious writing but reinterprets it “in terms which enable her to 
negotiate both authorial and social authority, particularly in relation to what she assumes 
is a shared identification with Christ” (Clarke 158). At a time when religious writing was 
the only acceptable form of women‟s writing, Lanyer fully exercises and stretches the 
rhetoric of religious verse to propose a radical political, economic, and gendered 
transformation in early modern culture. Whereas Danielle Clarke argues that Lanyer 
manages to stress her connection with Christ‟s piety despite her “individual class 
position” (158), I would suggest that she does so specifically because of it. Her 
                                                 
10Wall states that because “women have historically been forced into, and thus 
subsequently allowed, the social position of mourning” (321), it becomes an almost 
domestic function assumed by women in households. For details on Lanyer‟s poetic 
appropriation of mourning, see Wall‟s The Imprint of Gender, especially the section titled 
“Dancing in a Net.” 
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representation of Christ emphasizes the similarity between the poet and her creation; 
they are both victims of patriarchal corruption and aristocratic eccentricity. In drawing 
the connection between the two bodies (and many more, if we include all female bodies), 
Lanyer becomes a cartographer of radical futurity. The city of feminine subjects that she 
maps out is a unifying if fluid one, similar to the streets that Lefebvre describes as crucial 
to the growth of urban culture. “The street,” he claims “is where movement takes place, 
the interaction without which urban life would not exist, leaving only separation, a forced 
and fixed segregation” (Lefebvre 8). Refusing to accommodate the segregation of classes 
and gender, Lanyer embodies the quintessential characteristics of Renaissance 
intellectuals who, as Russell Ames identifies in his foreword to Citizen Thomas More and 
his Utopia, “dreamed of brave new worlds” wherein “the ideals of freedom, democracy 
and republicanism—born in the capitalism of medieval towns—now showed new 
possibilities …” (i).  
The geography of Lanyer‟s “new world” or utopia may not qualify it in modern 
studies as a space but rather as a “place,” which, Gillian Rose argues, is deliberately 
feminized by geographers, who “represent (it) as the location of direct experience, a 
sensuous swirl of emotions and perceptions and myths, which rational (masculine) 
analysis can only ignore or destroy” (71). By contrast, space is “completely transparent, 
unmediated and therefore utterly knowable” and open to “rational analysis” (70). While 
lacking the theoretical specificity expressed here by Rose, Lanyer in her poetry manages 
nonetheless to unite space and place by constructing and mapping a feminine Christian 
city. In so doing, she anticipates the need for a cultural geography, a need that has only 
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recently been articulated by scholars such as David Harvey and Neil Smith. The 
utopia that Lanyer imagines is the result of a revolutionary futurity precisely because in 
the topography of her text place and space become one. Christ‟s body is the physical 
representation of this union: recognized and fully appreciated by and among women, who 
“more than man can comprehend” that his form in itself is a synthesis, a “union of 
contraries” (“Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum” 1217, 1258). Wall points out that “the Salve‟s 
copious preliminary material announces the text‟s site of production as collective and 
socially collaborative.” While her “dedications inform the work with a reciprocity that 
reproduces in print the community of the patronage system,” they encourage a 
reconfiguration of social responsibility (Wall 322). What Lanyer wants to establish in the 
women‟s community is not simply a system of exchange whereby she will receive 
economic support in return for her literary services to her readers. Rather, she posits 
solidarity and empathy as the foundations of her utopia. Indeed this is a world where 
men‟s rules no longer apply because hierarchy is forced out, howsoever tentatively, from 
its geographical limits. Instead citizenship implies common experiences (misogyny), 
common hurdles (patriarchy and socio-economic instability), common desires (an 
appropriated Christ figure). Lanyer‟s political futurity is revolutionary in the “concrete” 
sense that Ernst Bloch in The Principle of Hope recognizes to be an agent of change, not 
simply a weak articulation of desire.
11
 Ruth Levitas explains Bloch‟s point at length:  
Ernst Bloch … makes an important distinction between abstract and concrete 
utopia, between the elements within utopian images which are purely escapist, 
                                                 
11
 For further details on Bloch‟s distinctions between abstract and concrete utopias, see 
especially Part Four of The Principle of Hope.  
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compensatory, wishful thinking and those which are transformative and will-
full in the sense of driving forward to action and a real, possible, transformed 
future; between expressions of desire and expressions of hope.  
 (Levitas 262) 
In addition to being concrete, Lanyer‟s call to revolutionize communal formations is also, 
in the Deleuzean sense, a dangerous act that corrupts the clean (masculine) segmentations 
of art, politics, and praxis by pushing for a restless future of becoming that is at the 
convergence (or “correlate”) of all three (What is Philosophy?108).  
Here and There: Spatial Futurity and the Cultural Geography of Utopia 
“I simply cannot imagine the present situation of mankind as being the one in which it 
will now remain, simply cannot imagine it as being its whole and final destiny. … Only 
in so far as I can regard this state as the means to a better one, as the crossing-point to a 
higher and more perfect one, does it acquire value for me …”  
(Fichte, The Destiny of Man). 
Like Lanyer‟s work, Thomas More‟s Utopia is also a mapping of a radical 
political transformation. If, as Levitas states, “… utopia implies drawing up blueprints for 
the future and supposing that they can be realized through sheer force of will” (257), 
More‟s construction of the ideal community is mobilized by his vision of a future space 
that erases the distinctions between the self and other. Here “[n]othing is more humane 
… than to relieve the misery of others, assuage their griefs, and by removing all sadness 
from their life, to restore them to enjoyment, that is pleasure” (Utopia 51; emphasis 
added). But Utopia is also the space where the self must be served similarly. The 
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community that More designs is a vision of such a political system as will engage in 
collaboration and erase binary polarizations. As is the case in Lanyer‟s community of 
female citizens forging a shared identity with Christ, in Utopia “no man is placed so 
highly above the rest,” but all are united by Nature, which “cherishes alike all those 
living beings to whom she has granted the same form” (Utopia 51).    
I want to draw attention to an important aspect of the utopias painted by More and 
Lanyer: neither is temporally fixed. That is, the societies that each author constructs are 
not specifically placed in the future. Rather, they are presented as spaces of difference. 
Ruth Levitas rationalizes the fact that More‟s Utopia is “located elsewhere in space rather 
than elsewhere in time” by suggesting that the society that he presents is “intended as a 
critique, not an escapist fantasy” (259). Levitas asserts that it is “only with the advent of 
… the belief in some degree of human control over social organization that the location 
of utopia in the future, as a point to which society either inexorably tends or can be 
pushed by human action, becomes a possibility” (259).  Zizek complicates Levitas‟ point 
by stating that: 
In a proper revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither simply fully 
realised in the present nor simply evoked as a distant promise which justifies 
present violence—it is rather as if, in a unique suspension of temporality, in the 
short-circuit between the present and the future, we are … for a brief time allowed 
to act as if the utopian future is (not yet fully here, but) already at hand, just there 
to be grabbed. Revolution is not experienced as a present hardship we have to 
endure for the happiness and freedom of the future generations, but as the present 
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hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their 
shadow—in it, we are already free while fighting for freedom, we are already 
happy while fighting for happiness, no matter how difficult the circumstances. 
Revolution is … as it were its own ontological proof, an immediate index of its 
own truth.      (247; emphasis added)     
The suspension of temporality is crucial to our understanding of Lanyer‟s and 
More‟s utopian mappings. It is in the suspended temporalities of becoming that the 
writers construct their revolutionary spaces. These and similar spaces, Jameson suggests, 
have two specific moments within their revolutionary movements. He states that the “first 
moment of world-reduction, of the destruction of the idols and the sweeping away of an 
old world in violence and pain, is itself the precondition for the reconstruction of 
something else” (89). This moment of initiation or of “absolute immanence”, Jameson 
adds, “is necessary … before new and undreamed-of-sensations and feelings can come 
into being” (89). It is only after such a moment has been initiated that life, and our 
accompanying visions or dreams about it, might be constructed anew. Jameson asserts 
that the second moment in the reconstructive process would involve not only the 
restructuring or reimagining of state and cultural apparatuses, but also a fundamental 
redefinition of our imagination: “we might think of the new onset of the Utopian process 
as a kind of desiring to desire, a learning to desire, the invention of the desire called 
Utopia in the first place, along with new rules for the fantasizing or daydreaming of such 
a thing—a set of narrative protocols with no precedent in our previous literary 
institutions” (90). More‟s and Lanyer‟s utopias mobilize precisely the kind of education 
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of the imagination that Jameson outlines in his work. Alongside the reinvention of the 
schemes of imagination, the authors also prompt a shift in the experience of temporalities 
in the geographies that they construct within their literary narratives. These spaces of 
literary architecture and futurity are “simultaneously narrative and imagistic” (Vosskamp 
264), and their geographies are peculiarly contradictory because, in their insulation of 
future spaces, they present a sharp criticism of the historical moments from which they 
erupt.      
At the end of Utopia‟s Book One, “More” urges Hythloday to map out the 
geography of Utopia. But he is careful to request that it be a cultural geography that 
“explain[s] in order everything relating to their land, their rivers, towns, people, manners, 
institutions, laws—everything” (30). Far from it being an abstract map of the land, 
Hythloday‟s description of Utopia, which takes up most of Book Two, unravels in the 
manner of a picture story. It is crucial to note that the physical or spatial geography is 
inextricable from the human and social ones; the descriptions of Utopian place, space, 
cultural practice, and political activity blend seamlessly in a labyrinthine vision not 
unlike the maps that Lefebvre attributes to the Renaissance cartographers. Let us consider 
an example: early in Book Two Hythloday provides his audience with a virtual tour of 
the “most worthy” city of Amaurot, whose infrastructure, he claims, is representative of 
all urban spaces in Utopia (More 33).  
While the narrative begins as an identifiable geographical description that locates 
Amaurot on an “almost square” plot of land “against a gently sloping hill” (33), it quickly 
weaves in a discussion of Utopian architecture and town planning. We are told of the 
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planned placement of bridges that allows ships to “sail along the entire length of the 
city quays without obstruction”; of the man-made walls around the river‟s source that 
would prevent a potential enemy from cutting off, diverting, or poisoning the city‟s water 
supply; of streets that “are conveniently laid out for use by vehicles and for protection 
from the wind” (34). In addition to this telescopic view of the city, Hythloday provides an 
inset detailing the microcosmic geography of Amaurot.
12
 “Every house,” he states, “has a 
door to the street and another to [a] garden” (34). The lockless construction of the doors 
as “two leaves” that freely swing open and shut leads Hythloday to comment casually on 
the nature of the Utopian economy: here “there is no private property” (34).  
The seemingly casual nature of Hythloday‟s comment is especially puzzling 
because in Book One he initiates a more philosophical debate over the nature of private 
property. Even before he takes on the role of the cartographer of Utopia, he tells “More” 
and Peter Giles that “as long as you have private property, and as long as cash money is 
the measure of all things, it is really not possible for a nation to be governed justly or 
happily” (28). His position on the matter seems clear: “justice cannot exist where all the 
best things in life are held by the worst citizens; nor can anyone be happy where property 
is limited to a few, since those few are always uneasy and the many are utterly 
wretched”; and that “[a]s long as private property remains, by far the largest and best part 
                                                 
12
 More‟s descriptive strategy here is surprisingly modern and anticipates the guide-maps 
that tourists find handy while negotiating a foreign city. The overlapping structure of 
macrocosmic and microcosmic views of Amaurot reminds me of the city-sponsored 
foldout maps of cosmopolitan spaces such as London or Chicago that provide tourists not 
only with an abstract grid of roadways and railways, but also with popular spots—
museums, bars and restaurants, hotels, places of worship and theaters—that encourage a 
cultural engagement with the city and prompt an economic exchange.) 
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of mankind will be oppressed by a heavy and inescapable burden of cares and 
anxieties” (28).  
When Giles and “More” express their skepticism regarding Utopia‟s superior 
political and economic structures, Hythloday concedes that the western minds (primarily 
the English) “surpass them in natural intelligence” (30). However, he is quick to add that 
Utopian institutions are superior to their European counterparts. But he fears that despite 
their superiority, they “would seem inappropriate because private property is the rule 
here, and there all things are held in common” (26). In fact it is Hythloday‟s position on 
private property and his positive view of the institutional structures of Utopia that prompt 
his companions to seek out a cultural map of the place. Given this background, then, it is 
peculiar that he throws in rather nonchalantly his economic explanation of the lockless 
doors of Amaurot, after which he moves onto the description of Utopian garden-spaces 
and the peoples‟ love of gardening. The abundant “vines, fruits, herbs, and flowers” that 
occupy Amaurot‟s gardens are both “useful (and) pleasant to the citizens” (35). 
Explaining the cultural benefits of the garden competitions held throughout Utopia, 
wherein “different streets … challenge one another to produce the best gardens” (35), 
Hythloday expresses his appreciation for the foresight of Utopus the founder, who 
recognized the importance of such “natural” spaces and preoccupations.  
In his recognition of the function of gardens and nature within urban culture, 
Hythloday (and More) anticipate the theorists such as Lefebvre, who in The Urban 
Revolution notes the prominent place of gardens within the metropolitan geographies of 
“Paris, London, Tokyo, and New York.” Lefebvre observes that “[t]here is no city, no 
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urban space without a garden or park, without the simulation of nature, without 
labyrinths, the evocation of the ocean or forest, without trees tormented into strange 
human and inhuman shapes” (26). The philosopher asks whether such an organized 
presence of nature is meant to “provide an essential reference point against which urban 
reality can situate and perceive itself,” and if it is a “visible re-presentation of an 
elsewhere, the utopia of nature?” (26). That is, is the city-garden a symbol of man‟s 
removal from nature? This question that leads to Lefebvre‟s complex theories of “blind 
fields” finds in Utopia an interesting answer. The organization of space represents the 
organized mindset of Utopians, a mindset that is invested in futurity. The leader clearly 
thought about the future of his land and his people when he instated specific policies that 
would erase the differences among them or even produce multiplicities within each 
citizen. 
This idea of the leader‟s (writer‟s) thoughts about the future stand in direction 
opposition to recent theories that caution against utopianism. Antonis Balasopoulos 
explains a couple of reasons that the politics of utopianism is attacked in poststructuralist 
thought. He suggests that critics, such as Foucault, reduce utopian constructions to 
positivistic, ahistorical forms, without paying due attention to the complexities of history 
that are embedded in the genre, and that interweave multiple theories of “„filiation, 
supercession, predecession, complementarity, antagonism, parallelism, and even 
complete independence‟” (Holstun qtd. in Balasopoulos 123). In addition, the temporal 
density of utopias often is misinterpreted, Balasopoulos notes, in so far as critics overlook 
the “tension between the static temporality of description and the countermanding 
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motility of processes of narrative figuration” that is essential to all utopian 
constructions (123). Thus decontextualized as texts about static perfection—taken out of 
history and placed outside of time—utopian literature is rendered as a source that vacates 
conflicts and complexities.  
In fact literary utopias possess not only specific historical and temporal context, 
they also are defined by their intrinsic instability. Far from being fixed or perfect, they 
are marked by “semiotic rupture and political deterritorialization,” by “disjunction” 
(Balasopoulos 124, 126). Focusing especially on Utopia, Balasopoulos explains: 
More‟s work confronts us with simultaneous yet mutually canceling choices of 
perspective: the division between the two books redoubles as one between 
England and Utopia, narrative and description, historical analysis and utopian 
projection, earnest critique and jocular play, laborious realism and self-conscious 
antirealism, the personas of More‟s political pragmatism and of (Hythloday‟s) 
uncompromising defiance of political expediency.   (126-127)    
This disjunction is perhaps best represented in Utopia by the island‟s push and pull 
between land and water, specifically in the unfixity or malleability of both. The island, 
which “was not always an island” (More 31), is in itself a break or rhizomatic rupture 
away from the segmentations of the mainland. The sea/bay that surrounds the new-
formed land is also a paradoxical body; at once “quiet and smooth … like a big lake” and 
“very dangerous to navigation” (31), it offers “a glimpse at the utopic potential of spaces 
whose apparent lack of authoritative inscription … makes them fertile grounds for the 
growth of fantasies of a different kind of existence …” (Balasopoulos 141). Unlike 
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“More” who, at the end of Book Two, assigns to Hythloday a quality of exhaustion 
that might not be able to withstand “contradiction” (84), More presents through Utopia a 
site that mobilizes and is energized by paradoxical becomings. Not surprisingly, then, 
“More‟s” final thoughts about the Commonwealth of Utopia are infused with paradoxical 
language,
13
 which is the marker of futurity: leading his friend by his hand to supper, he 
“hopes” such “an opportunity will present itself some day” as will enable him to ponder 
the contradictions of the foreign or other land that is Utopia. Like Orlando in As You Like 
It, who simultaneously is doubtful and hopeful of Ganymede‟s magical capacities to alter 
futures, “More” too wishes, though he does not “really expect,” that the future course of 
his “own country would imitate” that of Utopia (85).      
 
                                                 
13
 Marin notes the paradoxes that abound within (and are crucial to) discourses of utopia: 
Utopia signifies “[n]either yes nor no, true nor false, one nor the other” but rather is “the 
neutral.” But this neutral, Marin clarifies, is not to be confused with “neutrality, the 
ideological trick played by institutions propped up by class rule.” Instead, this neutral “is 
the span between true and false, opening within discourse a space” prompted by the 
“limitless force” of becoming (Marin 7).   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
“NOW I WILL BELIEVE IN UNICORNS”: DISRUPTIVE VISIONS AND 
POLITICAL FUTURITY IN SHAKESPEARE‟S ROMANCES 
All actions and thoughts take place in time; moral actions and thoughts are no 
exception. One could even argue that, in so far as they are moral or meaningful, 
individuals are evaluated in the context of their consciousness of the passage of time, 
specifically of the strong relationship between their past, present, and the future actions.  
In most cases, Shakespearean characters remain true to this principle as they engage with 
their past while performing present actions that will in turn influence the future. (Young 
Hamlet is an obvious but good example of this principle; Cordelia is a less obvious but 
perhaps even better example than the brooding prince.
1
) While scholars have been 
attentive to the topic of time in Shakespeare, much hasn‟t been said about the temporal 
breakdowns that take place in his plays.
2
 In this chapter, I want to initiate a discussion of 
                                                 
1
 I am thinking specifically of Cordelia‟s ability to contextualize her own and her father‟s 
actions in time or history: “We are not the first / Who with best meaning have incurred 
the worst” (5.3.3-4).   
 
2
 Wolfgang Clemen‟s lecture and Clifford Leech‟s essay on temporality in Shakespeare 
are early examples of scholarship that focuses on the influence of the past on characters‟ 
present and future actions. Phyllis Rackin‟s work on anachronism, on the other hand, 
analyzes the misrepresentation of the time during which Shakespearean action unfolds. 
These and other scholars‟ important observations, however, do not account for the 
occasional ruptures of the experience of time in characters‟ minds that affects their 
action. For details, see Clemen, Wolgang. “Past and Future in Shakespeare‟s Drama.” 
Proceedings of the British Academy. LII (1966): 231-52. See also Leech, Clifford. 
“Shakespeare and the Idea of the Future.” University of Toronto Quarterly 35 (1966): 
213-228; and Rackin, Phyllis. “Temporality, Anachronism and Presence in Shakespeare‟s 
English Histories.” Renaissance Drama 17 (1986): 101-23. 
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the actions of several Shakespearean characters that disrupt the regular passage of 
time. My readings focus especially on the role played by the ideology but also ethics of 
memory and futurity as embodied in the actions of characters such as Polixenes and 
Leontes in The Winter‟s Tale and Prospero and Gonzalo in The Tempest.  
Before moving into a discussion of the plays, and in an effort to foreground the 
literature, I want to present some points regarding memory and temporality that I will use 
throughout and that are raised in the works of Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari. Their 
ideas, when studied in conjunction, provide new possibilities for a discussion of 
Shakespearean temporality and consciousness (the characters‟ moral actions being part of 
this). 
3
 In Matter and Memory Bergson states that the fundamental purpose of memory “is 
to evoke all those past perceptions which are analogous to the present perception, to 
recall to us what preceded and followed them, and so to suggest to us that decision which 
is the most useful” (228). But memory, he declares, also has a more sophisticated 
function: 
By allowing us to grasp in a single intuition multiple moments of duration, 
[memory] frees us from the movement of the flow of things, that is to say, the 
rhythm of necessity. The more of these moments memory can contract into one, 
the firmer is the hold which it gives to us on matter: so the memory of a living 
being appears indeed to measure, above all, its powers of action upon things and 
to be only the intellectual reverberation of this power. (Matter and Memory 228) 
                                                 
3
 I realize that in addressing only Bergsonian and Deleuzian ideas of temporality, I am 
leaving out the theories of many other important thinkers, quite notably Heidegger. For 
my project, however, I am interested in the ideas of becoming, which I feel is best 
defined in the works of Deleuze and, to a lesser degree, Bergson.  
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Bergson‟s use of the word “frees” in this passage is troubling; Deleuze too would 
have struggled to accommodate it. The problem with memory is that it doesn‟t 
necessarily free the individual but can shackle her to her state of being by determining the 
direction of the flow of her experiences (either as forward or backward movement). In 
other words, memory, as defined here by Bergson, can dictate and thus limit an 
individual‟s course of action.4  
Deleuze and Guattari‟s work, on the other hand, encourages anti-memory as the 
site of “becoming,” which is not a fixed state of being but rather “constitutes ... a non-
localizable relation” that “sweeps up” the seemingly isolated structures or bodies that 
lock power within their beings (A Thousand Plateaus 293). By destabilizing and unfixing 
beings, becoming forces connections to form between them through ungoverned flows of 
energy or desire. It is these ungoverned flows that, the philosophers suggest, can 
transgress the limits of temporal sequence, of history, and thus free up human 
consciousness in ways that Bergson‟s memory can‟t:  
[Becoming] is the opposite of macropolitics, and even of History, in which it is a 
question of knowing how to win or obtain a majority. … Unlike history, 
becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of past or future. ... [A]historical 
societies set themselves outside history, not because they are content to reproduce 
                                                 
4
 Bergson‟s later work revises his reading of the influence of memory, which, in The 
Creative Mind, he subordinates to the future. His revised interpretation allows Bergson to 
recognize that, owing to its essentially unforeseeable nature, the future is the most potent 
experience of time. For an analysis of Bergson‟s development of this theories on memory 
and the future see Constantin Boundas‟ “Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual.” 
Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Ed. Paul Patton. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 81-106.   
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immutable models or are governed by a fixed structure, but because they are 
societies of becoming.    (A Thousand Plateaus 291-92)    
Becoming works in conjunction with “deterritorialization,” another Deleuzian 
term that I brought up in the earlier chapters. Deterritorialization is a movement that 
“indicates the creative potential of an assemblage” or structured body, and attempts to 
“free up the fixed relations that contain” it (Parr 67). Invariably the deterritorialized 
bodies are once again reterritorialized, when they formulate alternative bases of 
structuring power and energy. But it is the moment of flux that is the site of becoming. 
This moment, Deleuze asserts in an earlier work, “does not tolerate the separation or the 
distinction of before and after, or of past and future”; rather, “the essence of becoming … 
move(s) and … pull(s) in both directions at once” (The Logic of Sense 1). Thus becoming 
is paradoxical because it encompasses “the infinite identity of both directions or senses at 
the same time—of future and past, of the day before and the day after, of more and less, 
of two [sic] much and not enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect” (2). 
That the Bergsonian past is appropriated in Deleuzian becoming is clear; the result of the 
appropriation being that, in becoming, the hold of the past does not determine the 
“infinite identity” of the future.5 What is of interest to me in this interplay of philosophies 
is the possibility of generating new ways of reading the mistimed, timely, and untimely 
actions performed by Shakespeare‟s characters.  
                                                 
5
 Many scholars have analyzed the relationship of Bergson‟s and Deleuze‟s philosophies 
of time; Deleuze himself made the connection explicit in Bergsonism and later in Cinema 
2: The Time-Image. 
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I will begin with The Winter‟s Tale, which centers around the body of Queen 
Hermione. Indeed Hermione draws attention to it, placing herself between Leontes and 
Polixenes‟ friendship in the opening act of the play, prompting both men to participate in 
a rhetoric of loss that is burdened, as Janet Adelman notes, with “the imagery of 
pregnancy” (147). On a broader scale, her state of pregnancy is particularly revealing of 
the play‟s uneasy temporality; being pregnant, the queen bears the physical signs of a 
past action that will, after a gestation period, cause a drastic shift in the future. Quite 
simply, Hermione‟s body at once represents the past, present, and future of Sicilia. But 
she also enables a connection with the past that is only shared by the two kings. 
Hermione‟s excessively feminine presence forces both men to relive the experience of 
their initial separation, one triggered by the intervention of wives whose mere presence 
asserted the fundamental responsibility of patriarchs: biological propagation (1.2.79). Her 
pregnant body, then, serves as a bitter reminder to the men of their powerlessness to 
control their own future, emphasizing simultaneously their inability to sustain the 
youthful terms of their fantasies of a presentist life wherein “…there (is) no more behind 
/ But such a day tomorrow as today” (1.2.64-66).          
This early scene in The Winter‟s Tale diagrams the collision of multiple desires 
and limits and is riddled with the conflicts of memory and becoming. We learn from 
Polixenes that as unformed beings the young princes experienced their friendship beyond 
the scope of temporal regimentation. The past and the future were not matters that 
concerned their animalistic frolicking, and the natural flow of their energies was not 
governed by organized structures that work to limit desire. Consequently, in that stage of 
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becoming, the boys Leontes and Polixenes were “[n]ot guilty” of culture, of being 
fixed (1.2.76). But the children were soon territorialized by events that curbed their 
desires, and they were forced into the realms of temporality to inherit the royal 
responsibilities of governance in addition to the adult responsibility of propagation.  
The boys‟ encounter with the dominant culture of heteronormativity represents 
dramatically Deleuze and Guattari‟s theory of the territorialization of the child. They 
claim that organized social structures like the family or the State “steal” the child‟s body 
(A Thousand Plateaus 276), which, if left to its own devices, will “continually undergo 
becomings” (259). The structures, on the other hand, affix to the stolen child a sexual 
identity, one that is accompanied by fixed social responsibilities and codes. Accordingly, 
the girl, whose body is the first to be stolen and organized, is trained not to be “a little girl 
anymore” or “a tomboy,” but rather to be a woman who will serve the purposes of 
patriarchal ideology. The boy is similarly trained to define himself in contrast to the girl, 
whom he must view as an “opposed organism” but also “as an object of his desire.” Thus 
both boy and girl come to be defined “in the ... organic sense” and a “history, or 
prehistory” of identity is imposed upon them (276). 
Owing to the normative drive of history, Polixenes recalls nostalgically that his 
“fall” to adulthood was prompted by the “[t]emptations … born to” him in the form of his 
wife (1.2.79). His subscription to memory marks the point of his reterritorialization. 
While “[b]ecoming is an antimemory,” we learn from Deleuze that memory always 
(serves) a reterritorialization function (A Thousand Plateaus 294; original emphasis). 
That is, while the child, yet untouched by molarity, is outside of time and perspective, in 
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constant flux, the memory of childhood operates distinctly within the limits of 
temporality, which roots (fixes) childhood as a past state of being. The memory of 
childhood thus affirms that one can never again become a child. The same memory 
narrativizes the child‟s future as an adult. Polixenes is the Bergsonian (or molar, to define 
him via Deleuze‟s terminology) adult par excellence; he fondly remembers his youthful 
days even as he distances himself from the possibility of becoming-child. His memory 
enables him to maintain a firm hold on adulthood and, echoing Bergson‟s understanding 
of the term, is a representation of his “intellectual reverberation of ... power” (Matter and 
Memory 228). 
Peter Lindenbaum suggests that although it is Polixenes who articulates a 
yearning “for an existence unaffected by time‟s movement” (13), the two friends share 
their memory of and desire for Edenic, pre-sexual intimacy. Certainly Leontes desires a 
connection with others that is not affected by sexual difference or obligation. But he does 
not rely on memory the way that Polixenes does to assert melancholically the 
irretrievable nature of his past.
6
 This precisely is the difference between the two men; for 
Polixenes childhood is a state that he has long transcended, and while he may—in the 
manner of a courtier—muse over his lost innocence, he is also certain that his adult life is 
one of “higher” import (1.2.72), one that is superior to the pastoral identity that he applies 
to the condition of childhood. Thus he is not, as Lindenbaum believes, resentful of his 
                                                 
6
 Lindenbaum argues that the play‟s parallel structure emphasizes the similarities 
between Leontes and Polixenes. Foremost among their shared qualities is the kings‟ 
aversion for heterosexual intimacy. While Leontes expresses this sentiment through his 
violent rhetoric of jealousy, Polixenes adopts violence late in the play, when he threatens 
the lusty pastoral world, especially Perdita, with death, defacement, and a stout rejection 
of procreative ceremonies.    
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adult experiences or obligations, but is securely rooted in the ideologies of patriarchy 
and monarchy, both of which empower his being and which he wishes to pass on to his 
son. (If anything, later in the play he is furious that Florizel, who at his age should behave 
in a manner befitting an aristocratic adult, is caught up in a frolicking pastoral world that 
is excessively natural, overflowing with images of pure procreation as opposed to careful 
hybridity, which Polixenes professes to Perdita is the superior state.)        
Leontes‟ silence during much of the scene indicates his refusal to submit to 
adulthood and share his friend‟s rhetoric of memory. Instead he becomes the petulant 
child. For the rest of the scene, indeed for much of the play, he distances himself from the 
adult couple—Polixenes and Hermione—and proximates himself to the boy Mamillius.  
In the child‟s company Leontes “recoil(s) / Twenty-three years” to become as he “then 
was to this kernel” (1.2.156-61). Critically, Leontes stresses it is he who, twenty-three 
years earlier, looked like Mamillius, and not the other way around. This rupture of the 
temporal scheme and logic marks the king‟s shift away from the molar state of being 
adult. His is not a memory of childhood but a new experience of becoming-child. But this 
becoming is almost immediately reterritorialized onto the patriarchal ideology of futurity. 
His anxiety regarding his “honest friend” Mamillius‟ bloodlines reinserts Leontes into the 
realms of patriarchy and temporality.  
Addressing the untimely and illogical nature of becomings, Deleuze and Guattari 
state that “a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin 
nor destination” (A Thousand Plateaus 293). Indeed Leontes‟ becoming-child comes 
from nowhere and it goes nowhere. Likewise, his becoming-jealous does not have any 
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basis or roots. But once Leontes reterritorializes, he immediately wants to achieve a 
specific goal or end: revenge. To this end, he follows predetermined procedures, such as 
court hearings, and inserts himself into the schema of jealous patriarch, a schema well 
recognized by Polixenes and others who are familiar with the History of jealousy. What I 
refer to as Leontes‟ experience of becoming and his eventual reterritorialization is 
interpreted by David Houston Wood in his essay as the king‟s complex symptomatization 
of his melancholia. According to Wood, Leontes is Shakespeare‟s most thorough 
examination of “time‟s role as an internalized, subjective agent in bringing about the 
catastrophic” and transformative experience of melancholy. Leontes, Wood argues, is 
uniquely melancholic because he undergoes a conversion: his condition moves from a 
“dominance by the diffuse, dilatory psychology associated with „natural‟ humoral 
melancholy into the frantic, posthaste mind frame that appends to melancholy in its 
„unnatural‟ state” (186). Wood suggests that Leontes‟ melancholic transformation is 
triggered by his “emotions of nostalgic loss that stem from a troubled moment of intense 
self-reflection” (186; emphasis added). Certainly the play makes a strong connection 
between self-reflexivity and temporal disjunction. But nostalgia need not be a product of 
“intense self-reflection,” as Wood assumes it is, but could very well be the result of 
socio-cultural assimilation, of molarity and reterritorialization. Given this, it is Polixenes‟ 
affectionate backward gaze upon his childhood friendship that is nostalgic. His fond 
recollections situate him as Deleuze‟s molar adult, as I have discussed above, but also 
within Bloch‟s construction of the adult: Bohemia‟s king is a grown man who is fully 
conscious of his maturity, his “ego and its responsibility” (37). Indeed, early in the play, 
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it is Polixenes, not Leontes, who experiences melancholy, a symptom that, as Bloch 
states, “is in fact customary during the transition into … manhood, where the good old 
student days vanish, embourgeoisement begins” (37).  
As opposed to Polixenes‟ nostalgic gaze, Leontes‟ vision of himself in or as his 
son is dangerous precisely because it is not nostalgic but is a radical collapsing of 
temporal experience and subjectivity; past and future combine within him to form a 
heady mix that pulls him in both directions at once—the result is his experience of 
becoming. In becoming-child, “„a‟ child coexists with (Leontes), in a zone of proximity 
or a block of becoming, on a line of deterritorialization that carries … (him) off” beyond 
the linear flow of temporality (A Thousand Plateaus 294). While Wood recognizes the 
temporal paradox of Leontes‟ “nostalgic pursuit” (193), reading through a Lacanian lens 
he interprets it as a byproduct of narcissism and melancholy. Thus Wood states it is 
because the king is caught between “[n]arcissism and narcissistic shame that he is 
dissatisfied with his state of being and lashes out with violence (194). Wood asserts that 
Shakespeare‟s portrayal of Leontes‟ melancholia is a “case study in the dangers of … a 
shift in temporalities,” but I would argue that a more provocative reading of play unfolds 
when the jealous king‟s discontinuous experience of time is juxtaposed with the 
constancy and linear schema of the characters that surround him. What emerges upon 
such a reading is not so much a text that is Shakespeare‟s dramatic warning to “his early 
modern audience” about the instability of melancholics as it is a complex questioning of 
the temporal means by which all human experiences are categorized (Wood 186). In 
other words, the play questions not only Leontes‟ disruptive temporality but also the 
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linear logic of characters such as Camillo and Polixenes who readily observe the rules 
of time and subscribe to predetermined codes of royal or secure futurity.   
When Leontes reterritorializes onto the adult world, it is specifically to punish 
Hermione for exercising a disruptive power over him and the other male characters, and 
for enabling his consciousness to experience a temporal breakdown. Whereas Polixenes 
only suggests that she and his wife “are devils” (1.2.84), Leontes conjoins Hermione‟s 
generative capabilities with her ability to cuckold him and declares his wife to be “an 
adultress” who has compromised the royal lineage or future of Sicilia (2.1.79). But even 
in this accusation, Leontes gestures toward his recent experience of becoming, one that 
he may not remember but the effects of which he cannot undo; his speech is marked by 
confusion: 
‟Tis pity she‟s not honest. Honorable; 
Praise her but for this her without-door form, 
Which on my faith deserves high speech, and straight  
The shrug, the hum or ha, these pretty brands 
That calumny doth use—O, I am out! 
That mercy does, for calumny will sear 
Virtue itself—these shrugs, these hums and has, 
When you have said she‟s goodly, come between  
Ere you can say she‟s honest.   (2.1.68-76) 
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Much has been made of this peculiar scene in recent criticism. Reading it as one of 
the play‟s chief metatheatrical moments wherein the tyrant simultaneously identifies 
himself as the actor unveiling the truth and staging the history of Hermione‟s deception, 
some editors connect the king‟s “I am out” to Coriolanus‟ lines late in the eponymous 
play: “Like a dull actor now / I have forgot my part, and I am out” (5.3.40-41).7 But 
unlike Coriolanus, who, on seeing his wife, son, and his mother kneel before him, forgets 
himself yet cannot forget their power over him, and is therefore “tempted to infringe (his) 
vow / In the same time ‟tis made” (5.3.20-21), Leontes is more resolute and is determined 
to have his way in spite of his forgetting. His momentary forgetfulness, however, is 
important because it is marked by a becoming that once again dissociates him from linear 
temporality and its accompanying logic. In becoming-jealous and becoming-tyrant, 
Leontes severs all ties from social logic or past experience; thus his refusal to be swayed 
by the seemingly unanimous counsel of his lords and servants regarding Hermione‟s 
innocence.
8
  
                                                 
7
 For more details on this connection, see Susan Snyder‟s note in her edition of The 
Winter‟s Tale.  
 
8
 In his study of temporality and melancholia in The Winter‟s Tale, David Wood suggests 
that “the frantic formulation of jealousy is … best represented dramatically as a specific 
form of temporally lived experience, as a psychological state characterized by a 
subjective form of temporality” (200). Wood‟s argument is that the subject‟s 
identification with time is directly related to his ability to interpret and express outwardly 
his internal condition or humors; in Leontes‟ case, the expression of his melancholy 
perforce disrupts his experience of time. For details, see Wood, David. “„He Something 
Seems Unsettled‟: Melancholy, Jealousy, and Subjective Temporality in The Winter‟s 
Tale.” My argument with Wood is that he offers a rather prescriptive view of temporality 
as something that may become unsettled but can also be resettled by an adjustment of the 
humors. His suggestion is that the unstable king suffers from an unstable or “unnatural” 
humor, owing to which his experience of time is unsteady. The piling-up of negatives 
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Those who protest on behalf of the queen seek reason and temperance in 
Leontes, who, they argue, has been given no cause to suspect his wife or his best friend. 
For Leontes, however, the cause is irrelevant. His becoming spirals out of the context of 
his historical experiences of marriage, friendship, or even supernatural authority; in a 
word, it is insensible. But as he reterritorializes onto the schema of monarchical practice, 
he realizes that his sense—or imagination—of Hermione‟s adultery will need to be 
analyzed through systematic and conventional methods. He first turns to history to 
contextualize his cuckolded being: 
There have been 
(Or I am much deceiv‟d) cuckolds ere now, 
And many a man there is (even at this present, 
Now, while I speak this) holds his wife by th‟ arm, 
That little thinks she has been sluic‟d in ‟s absence, 
And his pond fish‟d by his next neighbor—by 
Sir Smile, his neighbor.   (1.2.190-96)    
David Wood and Katherine Maus study this scene as a crucial example of 
Leontes‟ consciousness of the politics of patriarchal jealousy. In her impressive reading 
of early modern cuckoldry, Maus states, “[t]he analogue to the cuckold‟s marginality is 
the exclusion of the spectator from the action of the play, an exclusion ambiguous in 
                                                                                                                                                 
makes Shakespeare‟s point in the play a didactic one: instability must be avoided. But an 
alternative reading of instability leads to a questioning of the very means by which 
experiences are categorized and narrativized. This latter reading is more profitable to our 
understanding of playwright‟s complex engagement with the often-troubling conjunction 
of subjectivity and temporality. 
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precisely the same ways. Like the cuckold, the spectators in the theater see but are 
themselves unseen” (572). Whereas Maus alerts her readers to the various ways in which 
the cuckold problematizes his relationship with the audience and characters alike, 
specifically by drawing attention to his own feminized status that makes him a “spectacle 
at which others point mocking, phallic fingers” (572), Wood argues that, in The Winter‟s 
Tale, Leontes breaks down any distinction there is between himself and the audience, 
between self and other, by emphasizing that he is not the first cuckold and that there are 
many who, in the present, are naïvely happy in the company of their wives, ignorant of 
their own feminized status as cuckolds. Moreover, Wood claims that by directly 
addressing his “play‟s audience” Leontes “blurs (their) sense of comfort,” one that is 
generally “assumed,” owing to their sense of exclusivity from the stage-world (199).  
But both Maus and Wood overlook Leontes‟ insistence on his superiority to the 
other cuckolds; his words suggest that he alone is the cuckold in the know, his 
unhappiness a symptom of his wisdom. The reterritorialized Leontes is not only keenly 
aware of the politics of patriarchal anxiety or jealousy, but he is also familiar with the 
nuances of monarchical responsibility and the body politic. Thus even as he worries that 
his “plight” will become “public,” an anxious stage that Maus traces as inevitable to the 
consciousness of the jealous cuckold (572), the king manages to insulate his experience 
from that of the lowly cuckold. Although he “loses his peculiar privilege as unseen 
witness” to his own cuckoldry, he ensures that he raises himself above his audience or 
“confederates” by claiming a comprehensive knowledge of the situation—as both insider 
and critic (571). It is his consciousness of monarchical authority and duty that eventually 
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leads Leontes to announce to his bewildered lords that he has sent for word from the 
oracle in order to “[g]ive rest to th‟minds of others … [w]hose ignorant credulity will not 
/ Come up to th‟truth” that he has recognized (2.1.191-93). With this declaration, he 
reestablishes himself at the heart of the public domain as a leader whose keen eye for “the 
truth” spurs him into patriarchal and protective action.  
Once the reterritorialized Leontes reacquaints himself with the logic and practice 
of contemporary patriarchy and monrarchy, he realigns himself with the ideologies with 
which Polixenes has always been familiar. A comparison of Leontes‟ above-mentioned 
lines with Polixenes‟ earlier exchange with Camillo that leads to the Bohemian‟s 
discovery of his friend‟s unfounded suspicions emphasizes the kings‟ shared thought 
processes: 
Camillo  I am appointed him to murder you. 
 
Polixenes  By whom, Camillo? 
 
Camillo  By the King. 
 
Polixenes  For what? 
 
Camillo  He thinks, nay, with all confidence he swears, 
   As he had seen‟t, or been an instrument  
To vice you to‟t, that you have touched his queen 
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   Forbiddenly. 
 
Polixenes  O then my best blood turn 
   To an infected jelly, and my name 
   Be yoked with his that did betray the best! 
   Turn then my freshest reputation to 
   A savour that may strike the dullest nostril 
   Where I arrive, and my approach be shunned, 
   Nay, hated too, worse than the great‟st infection 
   That e‟er was heard or read.    
         (1.2) 
Polixenes‟ initial questions to Camillo are notably logical and to the point. Even upon 
hearing that his own dear friend and host has bid Camillo murder Polixenes, the king 
remains calm and undaunted; he asks for the cause or reason for Leontes‟ murderous 
command. When Camillo reveals all, Polixenes does not turn mad with anger or hatred, 
but follows through with a highly sophisticated “if-then” rhetorical construction. He notes 
that, if indeed he has cuckolded Leontes, then his blood ought to “turn to an infected 
jelly,” that his crime should be compared to the betrayal of Christ, and that he should 
rightly be ostracized. Nowhere in his speech does Polixenes articulate his shock at 
Leontes‟ sudden conviction. Rather, it is Camillo who emphasizes the absurdity of his 
king‟s stubborn decision; he suggests that it might even be easier for him to “[f]orbid the 
sea for to obey the moon” than to return Leontes to his senses (1.2.422). In spite of this 
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announcement Polixenes persists in his line of rational inquiry: “How should this 
grow?” (1.2.427), he asks Camillo. To which Camillo responds that, given the urgency of 
the situation, it is wiser for Polixenes to stop seeking the cause or source of the problem 
and hasten instead to avoid its effects.
9
 Polixenes understands immediately, makes plans 
to escape from Sicilia, and promises to provide for and “respect” Camillo on the 
condition that the counselor assists and accompanies him to Bohemia (1.2.456). Even as 
he ruminates and goes over his future course of action, Polixenes cannot help but 
rationalize his former friend‟s jealous rage. After all, states Polixenes, Leontes‟ “jealousy 
/ Is for a precious creature” (1.2.446-47), once again offering ways in which to 
understand the Sicilian‟s point of view. Moreover, Polixenes acknowledges that Leontes‟ 
anger and insecurity would need to be articulated in a manner fitting his status as absolute 
monarch of his kingdom; a lukewarm expression of jealousy simply does not become the 
(or any) king. 
 It is not altogether surprising, then, that even when confronted with the horror of 
his friend‟s murderous desire Polixenes attempts to map out the overall situation; the 
irrationality of the child has long been extricated from Bohemia‟s adult identity, which 
now allocates to childhood the remote space of memory. Although Leontes‟ rational logic 
applies not to his friendship or his own jealousy but rather to his position within the 
respective historical contexts of cuckoldry and monarchy, his deductive method is quite 
like Polixenes‟, as is his reliance on contemporary social norms. Being all too familiar 
                                                 
9
 Later in the chapter I will offer an analysis of Camillo‟s pragmatic logic, one that 
reflects his dedication to the ideology of royal futurity.  
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with and therefore wary of the maternal influence,
10
 Leontes forces a physical 
separation between mother and son,
11
 thereby initiating a bit too hastily Mamillius‟ 
breeching or, in Deleuzian terms, the child‟s social and sexual coding as male. To further 
ensure that Hermione does not spread her infection to others, Leontes later punishes her 
labor-tired body by exposing it to the “open air” of contagion.  
The lords‟ reactions to Hermione and her women‟s departure to prison juxtapose 
two ways in which the pregnant queen‟s health and safety are important to the men of 
Sicilia. An unnamed lord urgently requests Leontes to recall the queen from 
imprisonment; he swears that Hermione “is spotless / I‟th‟eyes of heaven” and that he 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed discussion of patriarchal anxiety regarding maternal impression and 
maternal influence, see my earlier chapter on biological futurity. 
 
11
 The connection between mother and son in The Winter‟s Tale is an issue to which 
many critics have duly paid attention. Notable among recent studies of the boy-prince is 
“Mamillius and Gender Polarization.” Significantly, where Leontes initiates his exchange 
with Mamillius with a show of affection and anxiously clings to even the smallest detail 
that would bind their two bloods and bodies as one, Hermione wishes to create, at least 
for a brief period of time, a physical distance between mother and child, her first words 
about her son being those of disapproval (2.1.1). As opposed to the father, who fawns 
over the son using a language and manner that infantalizes the prince, Hermione and her 
women create a space wherein Mamillius can perform adulthood. Here his nose need not 
be attended to (1.2.120), his “welkin eye” marveled at (1.2.135), but he may banter 
flirtatiously with young women about the qualities of their beauty, or use his discretion to 
offer the ladies a “tale” that, in his judgment, is “best for winter” (2.1.25). Indeed 
Mamillius seems not only to enjoy the company of women and be comfortable in their 
presence, but with them he also successfully performs a masculine code that, in 
Deleuzian terms, anticipates the boy‟s acceptance of a dominant history that fabricates 
male and female beings as “opposable organisms” (A Thousand Plateaus 276). It is not 
surprising, then, that, among women, Mamillius readily states his resentment of being 
spoken to “as if (he) were a baby still” (2.1.5), when earlier, in the company of his father, 
he has no choice but to be spoken to and treated as an “unbreeched” boy (1.2.154). 
Leontes‟ premature breeching of the boy leaves Mamillius without a community or a 
structure to which he can cling—the result is disastrous for the child but also for larger 
society.      
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readily would “lay down” his own life so that his king will “accept” the truth 
(2.1.130-32). Antigonus, on the other hand, thinks on a less abstract level. After asking 
Leontes to “be certain” of his judgment, he presents the king with various scenarios that 
construe Hermione as representative of universal female virtue but also vice. Thus his 
declaration that “every inch of woman in the world, / Ay, every dram of woman‟s flesh, 
is false / If she be” (2.1.137-39). That both the Lord and Antigonus believe Hermione to 
be chaste is clear. The important difference between their respective expressions is that, 
while the Lord does not turn to social logic but rather to divine faith in order to vouch for 
his queen, Antigonus firmly situates his judgment in the social realm. The queen, the 
king, and their son the prince represent for Paulina‟s husband the earthly trinity whose 
actions reverberate among their subjects. Not surprisingly, he echoes his king‟s fear of 
infectious female bodies when he promises to take prophylactic measures against his 
daughters before they too can spread the disease of unchastity and patriarchal corruption. 
Just as it is no surprise that the Lord‟s faith-based words are abruptly cut short by the 
newly reformed, socio-logically inclined Leontes, who, pointing to his royal 
“prerogative” (2.1.163), announces that he “need no more of (the lord‟s) advice” 
(2.1.168). At the same time, his recognition of the social value of negotiation prompts 
Leontes to offer the Lord a supernatural solution. And, fully conscious of his position as 
the supreme earthly power, Leontes initiates Hermione‟s trial scene with his performance 
of the role of a grieving but just king, one who must set aside his affection for his queen 
in order to pursue truth. Leontes‟ performance does two things: it establishes his 
reterritorialized being as one that is familiar with protocol; but it also emphasizes the pre-
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determined quality of the “truth” that Leontes seeks. To his mind, Hermione is an 
infected woman whose disease he must publicly identify and isolate in order to preserve 
the health of the state and its various ideological apparatuses. This contagion that remains 
but a threat to the mother‟s life becomes real in the experience of her son, who, despite 
resembling his father, remains fatally related to the maternal world. Leontes‟ fantasy of 
punishing the disruptive female bodies (mother and infant) leads to his inadvertent 
disruption of his patriarchal line and to the near voidance of his futurity.  
The term futurity that has come up on several occasions in my discussion of the 
play and which is directly related to the characters‟ investment in their bloodlines is in 
this case a result of successful reterritorialization. This is not to suggest that futurity is 
always to be seen within the context of molarity or reterritorialization. Radical futurity, a 
discussion of which will emerge in my discussion of Paulina and in my analysis of The 
Tempest, opposes the ideology of temporal continuity and doesn‟t rely on biology for the 
re/production of ideas or culture. But in the case of Leontes and The Winter‟s Tale more 
generally, biology is crucial to the spread of moral and social codes from present to future 
times. Reinvested in a temporal scheme that entails a linear logic of continuity, Leontes 
seeks to destroy even the remotest of threats to his adult and royal being; thus his desire 
to have the infant Perdita murdered. Whereas Paulina hopes that “the sight o‟th‟child” 
will stir the king to a softness that will enable his forgiving both the mother and babe 
(2.2.39), Leontes embraces aggression and grows impatient for vengeance, eager to 
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punish the offender nearest to him and easiest to reach.
12
 So determined is he in his 
trajectory of securing patriarchal futurity that not even supernatural intervention can deter 
him; although Apollo‟s oracle declares Hermione to be chaste and confirms the 
innocence of Polixenes and Camillo, Leontes disregards the authoritarian message and 
pursues his violent desires. As a king who claims to “so openly / Proceed in justice” 
(3.2.5-6), and who warns his wife that, when found guilty, she must “[l]ook for no less 
than death” (3.2.89), Leontes also recognizes that he must—despite divine opposition—
uphold those codes of patriarchy that prompted him in the first place to embrace socially 
recognized expressions of jealousy: Hermione must be put to death, for he has 
bloodthirstily declared that “[w]hile she lives, / (His) heart will be a burden to (him) 
(2.3.204-05). 
Notably, the play offers more than one male character that is capable of 
murderous thoughts that justify his desire for futurity. Antigonus, Leontes‟ loyal servant 
and Paulina‟s husband, is all too ready to sacrifice the three fruits of his wife‟s labor, if 
such an action would convince Leontes of Hermione‟s chastity. He claims: 
… Be she [Hermione] honour-flawed— 
I have three daughters: the eldest is eleven; 
The second and the third nine and some five; 
If this prove true, they‟ll pay for‟t. By mine honour, 
I‟ll geld ‟em all. Fourteen they shall not see, 
                                                 
12
 Although Leontes‟ impatience is sensed throughout the play, his urgent quest for 
vengeance is nowhere more disturbing than in his sleep-deprived speech in 2.3, lines 19 
through 23: “The very thought of my revenges that way / Recoil upon me … For present 
vengeance, / Take it on her.”   
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To bring false generations. They are co-heirs, 
And I had rather glib myself than they 
Should not produce fair issue.                                      (2.1.145-152) 
Antigonus‟ speech is striking not simply because it suggests a knowledge about 
Hermione‟s chastity that cannot empirically be determined by him; more importantly, it 
homogenizes female bodies and experiences: his argument seems to be that should the 
queen be unchaste, so too are all women, including his own daughters. And he swears to 
Leontes that, along with Hermione, they too shall bear the punishment for female sexual 
transgression, real or potential. With his statement he situates Hermione—the self-
declared molar woman who establishes her identity as the object of exchange between 
men—as the very theme of molarity, the standard by which all women‟s capabilities 
within patriarchy are to be judged.  
Certainly Antigonus is faced with a difficult moral situation, in that he has to 
choose between two structural codes or modes of being that in this instance are opposed 
to each other. As servant to Leontes, he is duty bound to the king. As a patriarch, he is 
dependent on the female body for propagating his bloodlines and ideology. Struggling to 
negotiate his dual citizenship in the coded communities of monarchy and patriarchy, 
Antigonus strides on their cusp, which leads to fatal results. At the same time that he 
opposes Leontes the monarch by emphasizing Hermione‟s chastity, he supports Leontes 
the patriarch and the fundamental structure of patriarchal futurity by promising to weed 
out even the potential for women‟s unchastity in future times. He dwells on the details of 
his daughters‟ anatomies as also that of his own, promising to strip both children and 
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parent of their sexual organs, the necessary mediums of biological futurity. 
Antigonus‟ violent imagination of disemboweled female bodies represents what Gail 
Paster recognizes as the early modern period‟s dominant “male fantasy of escape from 
the condition of being born of woman” and being simultaneously liberated “from infant 
suckling, from dependency on the breast” (Body Embarrassed 220). The reterritorialized 
Leontes, who shares his servant‟s grim fantasy of a secure, patriarchal futurity that is 
independent of the female body, can afford, owing to his status as king, to have it realized 
without literally bloodying his hands: he orders Antigonus to execute Hermione‟s new-
born girl and bring him some bodily token as proof of the murder. When this prospect is 
refused as all too horrible to act upon an infant who hasn‟t yet been socially or sexually 
coded and is not even as old as Antigonus‟ youngest child (who, at five or so years of 
age, may be treated with a misogyny appropriate to her female form), he charges his 
servant to see to the babe‟s abandonment and isolation—a more indirect form of 
execution. So far having only threatened the futurity principle on a microcosmic level, 
Antigonus now has to bear the burden of extinguishing the political future of the state; 
left with no choice but to fulfill his king‟s wishes, he leaves Sicilia, carrying with him the 
infant load that he must discard. Wife-beaten and feminized, he suffers the ultimate 
punishment when he is the one that dies in the wilderness, violently disemboweled by a 
bear: a fitting if horrible punishment for threatening not only his own bloodlines, but also 
royal futurity.  
But not all servants in The Winter‟s Tale end as badly as Antigonus; Camillo‟s 
service to his masters and to the general cause of royal futurity takes a remarkably 
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different turn. Perhaps one of the only Shakespearean servants who claims a written 
recommendation from the gods, Camillo holds a unique position in The Winter‟s Tale as 
counselor to both Leontes and Polixenes. While he does not possess Antigonus‟ ready wit 
or glib tongue, he also is inflexible in his commitment to royal futurity. In the opening 
scene of the play he tells Archidamus that Sicilia‟s hope in Mamillius is so great that it 
could fill “old hearts” such as his own with a “desire to live” long enough so as “to see 
him a man” (1.1.33-37). His optimism is disturbing specifically because it seems 
desperate to see the future of the kingdom secured through proper lineage; he confesses 
to his Bohemian friend that “[i]f the King had no son,” the Sicilians “would desire to live 
on crutches till he had one” (1.1.39-40; emphasis added). It is to such a future that 
Camillo remains loyal throughout. Unlike Antigonus, who caves under the pressure of 
oppositional codes of being, Camillo experiences no ideological conflict: he readily and 
fully adopts the role of protector of the future of Sicilia. His commitment emboldens him 
to chastise Leontes for suspecting Hermione of adultery:  
I would not be a stander-by to hear 
My sovereign mistress clouded so without 
My present vengeance taken. ‟Shrew my heart, 
You never spoke what did become you less 
Than this, which to reiterate were sin 
As deep as that, though true.   (1.2.276-81)  
 Unlike Leontes, who seeks vengeance for imagined wrongs done to him in the 
past, Camillo swears vengeance in order to secure the future. But when he realizes that 
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his king‟s disease is far more serious than can be cured through reason, he proposes to 
escort Polixenes out of Sicilia on the condition that, once they leave, Leontes “[w]ill take 
again (his) queen as (his) at first, / Even for (his) son‟s sake …” (1.2.332-334). His 
willingness to sacrifice his initial wish to see the young prince grow to be a man is 
representative of his still greater desire political stability and continuity. The loyal servant 
of monarchy, Camillo embraces a politics that is not unlike the one that Ernst Bloch in 
The Principle of Hope ascribes to medical practitioners and healers. He states: 
The general practitioner essentially contents himself with forcing back the end of 
the disease, i.e. death, he fights against the acquired weakness of the flesh, not 
against the innate one. His medicine does not yet undertake to assume the high 
office of being an improver of the body on the same scale as the rebuilding and 
improving of society and the vast bold changes of inorganic technology. This is a 
powerful distinction between medical wishes, in so far as they are individual and 
practical, and those of the more far-reaching attempt to change the world. Thus, 
however bold the operations and changes may be, in the consciousness of most 
doctors the goal itself is a stationary one: namely the restoration of the status quo 
ante.           (463)    
Bloch‟s discussion of the reactionary culture of medical practice may seem at first glance 
to be irrelevant to my discussion of Camillo‟s service. However, closer analysis of the 
Renaissance play reveals interesting parallels. Camillo‟s language and imagination 
consistently rely on metaphors of disease and healing: from delaying the deaths of old 
men on crutches and advising Leontes to “be cured / Of … diseased opinion” that has led 
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the king to believe Polixenes “does infect” Hermione to sacrificing despite “break-
neck” pain his own future in Sicilia, a place that is abundant in an unnamable “sickness,” 
the servant‟s speeches seem almost to run the gamut of a medical glossary! Critically, 
and quite like Bloch‟s physician, Camillo does not care to find or uproot the cause of 
Leontes‟ dangerous malady; he tells Polixenes that it is “safer to / Avoid what‟s grown 
than question how ‟tis born” (1.2.427-28). With this remark, he places himself squarely 
alongside Bloch‟s general practitioner, whose only desire is to delay change (death) by 
prolonging stasis (life). The “innate” condition of Leontes‟ becoming does not concern 
Camillo, who would much rather see the state restored to its earlier state of being. The 
changes that he brings about, then, are not radical even though they may be interpreted as 
insubordinate. Camillo is first and foremost a servant to royal futurity; his switching of 
masters from Leontes to Polixenes solidifies his ideology of service as one that is 
dedicated to the perpetuation of monarchical politics.  
Thus, sixteen years after he leaves homeland, the aged Camillo still craves with 
desperate optimism a royal future for Sicilia. Not surprisingly, he manipulates Florizel to 
elope with Perdita to Sicilia and make a marriage bed of the hitherto estranged space. The 
vision that Camillo conjures is one that is invested in a linear and unproblematic futurity: 
with a son forgiving the crimes committed upon his father, with forgiveness and love 
taking over from unkindness and division; with fruitful marriage replacing barrenness. 
And all this is to take place at a pace “[f]aster than thought or time” (4.4.533). At play‟s 
end, Camillo the preserver of royal futurity is himself is promised in marriage to Paulina, 
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effectively to replace Antigonus, the loyal servant who suffers fatal punishment for 
inadvertently threatening royal futurity. 
Despite the characters‟ near-magical reuniting and the many marriages that ensue, 
the conclusion of the play, with its speedy settlements and inexplicable silences, is 
infamously problematic. The problems have to do with the generic instability created by 
the play, which is neither wholesomely comic nor satisfyingly tragic. Addressing this 
issue in A Theater of Envy, René Girard points to the glaring absence of either hero or 
villain in The Winter‟s Tale. “The standard form of drama,” Girard states, “is the hero-
versus-villain dichotomy” (317). For the dichotomy to be effective, the villain must 
“interact with the hero on equal terms, … must be sufficiently like him and yet, to quality 
(sic) as a villain, he must be strikingly different” (Girard 317). The Winter‟s Tale stands 
out in Girard‟s view as Shakespeare‟s rejection of the popular dramatic scheme (317-18). 
The point Girard makes about the hero-villain interlock is interesting especially because 
in The Winter‟s Tale we do find something similar. Leontes may not, like Troilus, 
articulate the schizophrenic nature of heroism and villainy; indeed, he does not feel the 
confusion of his wife‟s or friend‟s identities in the way that the young Trojan does when 
he claims of his pawned lover, “[t]his is, and is not, Cressid” (5.2.149). Yet, like Troilus, 
who swears that (he) will not be (himself), nor have cognition / Of what (he) feel(s) 
(5.2.64-65), Leontes becomes other to himself when he is faced with the horror of 
betrayal. In becoming-jealous he is both hero and villain at once. And later, in being 
penitent, he is fully conscious of the results of his past villainy.  
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 The villain, then, that Girard finds lacking in the play is present in the form of 
the Leontes who is unforgivable even to himself, whose reterritorialization is 
accompanied by a sharpened memory that in turn rekindles self-hatred: “Whilst I 
remember / Her and her virtues, I cannot forget / My blemishes in them, and so still think 
of / The wrong I did myself: which was so much / That heirless it hath made my kingdom 
…” (5.1.7-10). Leontes‟ self-loathing is unique not because it is tied to his recognition of 
his unfounded jealousy and the hazardous results thereof (Othello is by far a more self-
conscious archivist of his own crimes and prejudices).
13
 Rather, the king‟s agony stands 
apart from other hero-villains in Shakespeare specifically because he is conscious of his 
self-division and the suffering that he has inflicted upon himself. More importantly, 
unlike most Shakespearean tragic hero-villains who bravely face their deaths, Leontes is 
left alive, altogether aware of the passage of time and of the burden of living on without a 
glimpse into the future. The memory of the “wrong” he has done himself weighs so 
heavily on him that Leontes swears soon after driving his wife to her “death” that he 
deserves “[a]ll tongues to talk their bitt‟rest” about and to him (3.2.213); none exceeds 
the abuse that he hurls upon himself. He perpetuates his shame by routinely visiting the 
site of his villainy: the graves of Hermione and Mamillius. Sixteen years into their deaths, 
although Cleomenes and other lords at court plead with Leontes to acknowledge his 
“saint-like” sorrow and “[d]o as the heavens have done” and, in forgiving himself, 
“forget (his) evil” (5.1.2-6), the mournful king refuses to forget his individual crime. Yet 
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 There is nothing in the body of Leontes‟ guilt-ridden speeches that surpasses Othello‟s 
“O cursed, cursed slave! / Whip me, ye devils, / From the possession of this heavenly 
sight! / Blow me about in winds, roast me in sulphur, / Wash me in steep-down gulfs of 
liquid fire!” (5.2.274-78). 
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he forgets, as Dion pragmatically declares, his royal duty of repairing Sicilia by 
finding another “sweet fellow” who would “bless the bed of majesty again” and produce 
fair “issue” (5.1.27-33). Despite Sicilia‟s calling for royal futurity in the shape of 
Leontes‟ biological issue, it is fairly clear that loyal subjects such as Dion and Camillo 
will die without the hope of seeing a male heir blossom into king. Although Perdita is 
eventually found and passed on through marriage to Bohemia, between the death of the 
boy Mamillius early in the play and “the wide gap of time since first” Leontes and his 
wife “were dissevered” (5.3.154-55), the future of Sicilia has only wrinkles to claim as 
fruits of royal labor.  
 The problematic conclusion, then, has not so much to do with the play‟s uneasy 
treatment of protagonist and genre; rather it has to do with its precarious approach to 
futurity. Paulina, who plays a fundamental role in problematizing the future of Sicilia, is 
popularly considered a passionate advocate of Hermione‟s innocence and is central to the 
play‟s sense of strategic goodness. Without taking away from such interpretations, I want 
to consider Paulina‟s role in the play as a disruptor of royal futurity and the instigator of 
political transformation. That Paulina may be held responsible for destabilizing Leontes‟ 
lineage is clear. She is responsible, after all, first for the separation of mother and infant 
and then, indirectly, for Perdita‟s abandonment in the woods. Doubtless when Paulina 
leaves the prison cell in Act two with the new born child with her, she is confident of her 
ability to safeguard the princess against any harm, return the babe to her mother, and 
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perhaps restore both to freedom.
14
 Given this, it is no surprise that Hermione readily 
lends her offspring to Paulina in hopes that together the two forms of female virtue—one 
silently innocent and the other defiantly articulate—will clear Leontes‟ dangerous 
misconception regarding his wife‟s unchastity. And it is shocking when, in the following 
scene, Paulina, who repeatedly uses the infant as a visual tool or device that will benefit 
her argument against the king, leaves her behind in Leontes‟ bedchamber. Notably, 
Leontes time and again orders Antigonus in Paulina‟s presence to “take up the bastard” 
and “give‟t to [t]he crone” (2.3.75-76). He even threatens to “commit” the child “to the 
fire” (2.3.94) and later Paulina herself (2.3.112), whom he accuses of witchcraft. When 
Paulina finally leaves Leontes‟ bedchamber, it is clear that the king‟s violent hatred for 
Perdita has not transformed into pity or affection. Although Paulina appeals to him to 
“look to (his) babe” for better and divine guidance (2.3.125), Leontes‟ mind remains keen 
on violent ends: he once again orders Antigonus to take the child “hence / And see it 
instantly consumed with fire” (2.3.132-33). 
 If, by leaving the infant in Leontes‟ care, Paulina intends to kindle paternal 
affection within the tyrant, surely she is also aware of the risks involved in her scheme. 
By her own admission, Antigonus and the lords who surround Leontes are unable to “do 
him good” or offer true advice (2.3.128). In the sense, then, that she leaves the child 
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 Although Paulina states nothing to the effect that she will protect the infant Perdita 
with her life, we are given ample clues in this scene to gather that she will be guardian to 
all innocent subjects. The jailer‟s first words to Paulina establish her as a woman well 
known in the land for her honorable nature. Even the queen trusts Paulina‟s qualities as 
she seems to have indicated to Emilia that “there is no (other) lady living” who can 
persuade Leontes to be just (2.2.44). Most importantly, Paulina‟s final words to the jailer 
assert that she “[w]ill stand betwixt (justice) and danger” as a protector of the former 
(2.2.65). 
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unguarded with a bloodthirsty, absolutist king whose temper rages like a storm, it is 
Paulina who initiates Perdita‟s history of abandonment, the bedchamber scene almost 
anticipating the babe‟s literal abandonment in the forest amidst a horrible storm, 
surrounded by carnivorous animals. Although Paulina claims throughout to have the 
benefit of royal futurity in mind, her actions against Perdita cause more damage to Sicilia 
than she imagines the king‟s tyranny will (2.3.114-119).  
Of course Paulina‟s threat to monarchic futurity is not limited to her abandonment 
of Perdita. Once Mamillius—Sicilia‟s “hopeful prince”—is dead, Paulina conceals 
Hermione, only to retrieve her to the king once the political future of the state has 
radically changed. And in the sixteen-year hiatus, she refuses to let Leontes forget 
Hermione and remarry. The ticking of Sicilia‟s clock rings doom in the ears of subjects 
like Dion, who frantically calls Leontes‟ attention to his public responsibility of 
reproduction: 
  If you would not so, 
   You pity not the state, nor the remembrance 
   Of his most sovereign name; consider little 
   What dangers by his highness‟ fail of issue 
   May drop upon his kingdom and devour  
   Incertain lookers-on. What were more holy 
   Than to rejoice the former Queen is well? 
   What holier than, for royalty‟s repair, 
   For present comfort, and for future good, 
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   To bless the bed of majesty again 
   With a sweet fellow to‟t?   (5.1.24-33) 
To all this Paulina flatly responds: “Care not for issue; / The crown will find an heir” 
(5.1.46-47). Her statement, which embraces a politics of unpredictability, represents what 
Elizabeth Grosz applauds in her essay as a radical futurity that is wrested from “the tired 
discourses and ritualized practices” that secure the dominant structures of state 
(“Thinking the New” 29).  
In spite of the various ways in which she halts or stunts Leontes‟ bloodline, then, 
Paulina is not merely a proponent of counterfuturity. The future she vehiculates is in 
keeping with Gonzalo‟s dream vision in The Tempest of political difference; hers too is a 
utopian vision. But unlike Gonzalo whose becoming is cut short,
15
 Paulina possibly finds 
the Deleuzian line of flight, as her becoming stretches across decades and enables her to 
make connections between individuals through her flows of energy and desire. Her 
actions, speech, and her craft all work as the tools that liken her to what Bloch would 
refer to as the “non-bourgeois dreamer” (35). Bloch states that, although such an 
individual may desire “many things that the others have,” her essential focus is on the 
achievement of “a life without exploitation” (35). This dreamer does not “wait for what 
chance brings to” her, but rather she “overhauls the given world, both in actions and in 
dreams” (Bloch 35). Even when she does not articulate her fantasy of and desire for a 
radically altered future, one that does not have to submit to the whim of monarchy, 
Paulina acts out her desires by disrupting the royal bed and waiting until after Florizel 
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 My analysis of Gonzalo‟s experience of becoming in the following section of this 
chapter. 
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and Perdita are wed before conjuring Hermione. By preventing for sixteen years a 
sexual or organic connection between the king and queen, Paulina forces Sicilia to 
become what Deleuze would call “the offspring of (its) own events, to have one more 
birth, and to break with (its) carnal birth” (Logic of Sense 149-50).   
 The fact that Paulina practically hands off the future to Florizel and Perdita 
indicates her ushering in of a new kind of tomorrow. Granted, Perdita turns out to be of 
royal birth. However, Florizel‟s readiness to marry a base shepherd‟s daughter and to 
overthrow the inheritance of his father‟s enmity indicates that he is a new kind of king, 
one that may not declare his “prerogative” the way that Leontes does early in the play. 
How Florizel will turn out is left open, our knowledge of him is so limited to his affairs 
of the heart that his political course seems uncertain. Just as the political future of Sicilia 
is stripped of secured futurity. This insecurity that Paulina instigates is directly related to 
her desire to construct a new politics, the likes of which are analyzed by Elizabeth Grosz 
in Becomings:  
The concept of the new raises many anxieties. While it is clear that newness, 
creativity, innovation, and progress are all terms designated as social positives, 
the more disconcerting notion of unpredictable, disordered, or uncontainable 
change, which lurks within the very concept of the new, seems to disconcert 
scientific, philosophical, and cultural ideals of stability and control. Predictable, 
measurable, regulated transformation seems a social prerequisite; but upheaval, 
the eruption of the event, the emergence of new alignments unpredicted within 
old networks seem to threaten to reverse all gains, to position progress on the 
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edge of an abyss, to place chaos and disorder at the heart of regulation and 
orderly progress.     (“Thinking the New” 28)            
Strangely enough, Shakespeare assigns to yet another servant the important task 
of a deliberate attack on secured futurity and the imagining of a new uncertain and 
disorderly politics. Like Camillo, Gonzalo in The Tempest also performs loyalty to 
multiple masters, but for different reasons and with very different results. I will focus 
mostly on his speech on the commonwealth that obviously echoes Montaigne‟s essay “Of 
the Cannibals.” Amidst constant disruptions and ridicule, Gonzalo articulates his vision 
of the future as follows: 
I‟th‟ commonwealth I would by contraries 
   Execute all things. For no kind of traffic 
   Would I admit; no name of magistrate; 
   Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,  
   And use of service, none; contract, succession, 
   Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none; 
   No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil; 
   No occupation, all men idle, all; 
   And women too, but innocent and pure; 
   No sovereignty— 
        (2.1.143-52) 
Gonzalo‟s imagination is triggered by his sense that the island on which they are 
marooned has in fact “everything advantageous to life” (2.1.49). Instead of pocketing his 
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vision to “give it his son” as a token of his memory of a bizarre past, the old man 
promises to sow the “kernels” of futurity and generate political transformation (2.1.86-
88).
16
 He refuses to sacrifice his perception of the island to memory, which would only 
lead to inertia, but chooses in its place to experience a political becoming by means of 
radical futurity. 
To emphasize the newness of Gonzalo‟s project, David Norbrook in his essay on 
The Tempest cites Jurgen Habemas and recalls that for the philosopher “[l]anguage and 
utopia still go together” in so far the “„utopian perspective of reconciliation and freedom 
… is built into the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction of the species‟” (Habermas 
qtd. Norbrook 23). Clearly, Leontes and Antigonus‟ utopian imagination is Habermasian, 
in that it involves an appropriated patriarchy that relies on the “reproduction of the 
species” without depending on the female body as the medium that will secure the 
connections between the past, present, and future. Even Caliban‟s vision of an island 
people first with his own monstrous progeny and later with that of Stephano‟s offspring 
alludes of Habermas‟ logic of propagation. However, Gonzalo‟s utopia, which 
undoubtedly is of prime importance in the play, is freed from the labor or responsibility 
of sex: the natural abundance ensures that practices such as marriage will be needless. 
The strategic un-reliance on reproduction separates Gonzalo‟s futurity from those 
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 Key here is Shakespeare‟s use of the term “kernel,” which appears in both Leontes‟ 
speech to Mamillius that I have discussed above and also in this early scene in The 
Tempest, wherein Gonzalo agrees with Antonio‟s analysis of the old man‟s desire to 
“bring forth more islands” (1.2.88-89). The kernel of course is an important metaphor of 
futurity: in The Winter‟s Tale, it functions within the biological context of reproduction 
and impression; in The Tempest it allows for the birth and construction in the human 
imagination of radical newness, of political difference.   
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discussed earlier in this chapter; his vision of the future requires an entirely new 
system of politics.     
 It is crucial to note that Gonzalo is not simply ahistorical but rather has a sound 
appreciation for the past; his knowledge of Tunis‟ ancient history suggests as much. Yet 
in his construction of a happy future he does not fall prey to nostalgia wherein he 
fetishizes the past, but instead promises a time that would “excel the golden age” 
(2.1.163). His avoidance of the political reproduction of the past likens him to More‟s 
Rapahel Hythloday, who in Book One of Utopia expresses a similar contempt for the 
culture of intellectual and political passivity that camouflages as respect for preexisting 
systems and procedures. The example that Hythloday uses to draw attention to the 
temporal stasis implied by intellectuals‟ opposition to change is particularly useful to my 
reading of Gonzalo. The hypothetical “counsellor” that Hythloday constructs “seize[s] 
the excuse of reverence for times past” as his justification for the avoidance of structural 
improvements for present and future societies (More 8-9). By contrast, Gonzalo the 
“honest old councillor” risks shaping the future in ways that are shockingly new, even 
absurd. So shocking is his concept of political futurity that King Alonso shakes off his 
otherwise overwhelming parental sorrow and puts an end to Gonzalo‟s audacious and 
insubordinate imagination by telling him that he “dost talk nothing” (2.1.167). With that 
statement the king forces the old man to reterritorialize onto the established structure of 
monarchy. Gonzalo hurriedly suggests that he only meant to grab royalty‟s attention and 
get a few laughs out of Antonio and Sebastian in the process. While his implication 
seems to be that he wouldn‟t dream (with hope) of a radically altered future society and 
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that his loyalty to Alonso and to monarchy are absolute, he opens up the possibility of 
and desire for political change. Consequently, even as the “councillor” returns to his 
fixed identity of faithful subject, he initiates various actions of betrayal on the island, near 
becomings that share elements of Gonzalo‟s vision.  
Infected by Gonzalo‟s becoming or counseling, various “citizens” of the island 
plan for a politically transformed future: Antonio and Sebastian immediately appropriate 
and contain the old man‟s vision by pondering the benefits of usurpation; soon after, 
Caliban, a servant who had at one point been loyal to his master Prospero, recruits 
Stephano and (to a lesser degree) Trinculo to help him in his project of overthrowing and 
replacing his master. Even Miranda dares to disobey her father; mad with love for 
Ferdinand, she breaks her promise to her father and tells the young prince her name, 
swearing to him that even if she isn‟t able to wed him, she will at least “be (his) servant” 
(3.1.85). Gonzalo‟s experience of futurity, then, does indeed “bring forth more islands” 
some of which might “in good time” bring about radical change (2.1.89, 91). Sebastian‟s 
and Antonio‟s political ambition is the most obvious spin-off from the old man‟s vision 
of change. I will next address their preoccupation with futurity.  
Soon after Alonso and his exhausted shipwrecked crew falls into a magically 
induced sleep, the two younger brothers of the party awaken their political desires. 
Standing guard over their king, Antonio the experienced usurper ponders the possibilities 
that accompany his and Sebastian‟s present experience:   
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What might, 
  Worthy Sebastian, O, what might?—No more. 
  And yet methinks I see it in thy face, 
  What thou shouldst be. Th‟ occasion speaks thee, and 
  My strong imagination sees a crown 
  Dropping upon thy head. 
        (2.1.200-204) 
Sebastian, the subject of Antonio‟s “strong imagination,” responds to his friend at first by 
questioning his consciousness. Indeed to him Antonio‟s is a “sleepy language” (2.1.207), 
his friend‟s ability to daydream making him more like Gonzalo than either man would 
care to admit. However, the contents of Antonio‟s dream are not as new or absurd as the 
old man‟s, even if they are shocking. Surely most members of an early modern audience, 
who were well exposed to the foul play entailed in much of dynastic or historical drama, 
will quickly have recognized the dangerous potential in this scene for usurpation. After a 
brief moment of puzzlement or confusion, Sebastian too catches on:  
Prithee say on. 
  The setting of thine eye and cheek proclaim 
  A matter from thee; and a birth, indeed, 
  Which throes thee much to yield.    
(2.1.224-227) 
That Sebastian compares Antonio‟s imagination to childbirth is not merely a matter of 
linguistic style. Rather, Sebastian sees his friend‟s imagination as a device that is capable 
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of generating the future. To express his imagination, Antonio must experience, in 
Sebastian‟s mind, the torments of labor, the unsupervised (or natural) progress of which 
is marked by pain. The end result of Antonio‟s speech of course is that the two men agree 
to “perform an act / Whereof what‟s past is prologue, what to come / In (their) discharge” 
(2.1.248-50). Death and birth are inextricably related in the men‟s proposal for regime 
change.  
I use the term regime change in place of political change because the latter is 
dreamed of only by Gonzalo. In the old councillor‟s imagination contradictions not only 
abound, as he himself admits (2.1.143), but they also thrive together miraculously in the 
form of a monarchical commonwealth. Death does not have a place in Gonzalo‟s 
imagination of a future of limitless transformation or becoming. Consequently, the 
“[s]word, pike, knife, gun, or … engine” of the present are replaced by “all foison, all 
abundance” (2.1.157-59), that is, by what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the uncoded 
flows of desire. By contrast, the two young usurpers rely on the molar lines of systematic 
and precalculated violence in order to realize their fantasy of royal authority. Thus their 
pondering the “real” and potential deaths of their shipmates. Not surprisingly, their 
attention first moves to imagining the death of Gonzalo and next to Ferdinand, the two 
most potent kernels or providers of change and futurity: 
Antonio: Although this lord of weak remembrance, this, 
  Who shall be of as little memory 
  When he is earthed, hath here almost persuaded 
  (For he‟s a spirit of persuasion, only 
  
176 
  Professes to persuade) the King his son‟s alive. 
  ‟Tis as impossible that he‟s undrowned 
  As he that sleeps here swims.   (2.1.228-234) 
In this speech Antonio doubly distances Gonzalo from “memory” and “remembrance,” 
the most effective devices of reterritorialization. Instead he associates the old man with 
“impossible” and death-defying hope, the one trigger that is necessary for bringing about 
political revolution. It is not surprising, therefore, that Antonio wants Gonzalo—the 
“ancient morsel” of hope and revolutionary futurity—dead and out of the way (2.1.282). 
For Gonzalo, as Antonio quickly recognizes, is capable of “upbraiding” their “course” 
toward a future of appropriated monarchy. It is only once they have imagined Gonzalo‟s 
demise that Antonio and Sebastian move on to discuss the political ramifications of the 
young prince‟s death. To Sebastian‟s “I have no hope / That (Ferdinand‟s) undrowned,” 
Antonio responds, O, out of that no hope / What great hope have you! No hope that way 
is / Another way so high a hope that even / Ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond, / But 
doubt discovery there” (2.1.234-38).  
The repeated play on the idea of “no hope” or death leading to a highly specific 
kind of hope—the collaborative if painful birth of the two younger brothers‟ logic of 
futurity—is important for our understanding of the kinds of imagination that are at work 
here. Whereas Gonzalo embodies the spirit of a ridiculous and fantastical imagination, 
Antonio‟ futurity is based on familiar, logical deduction and application. First he 
carefully deduces that Ferdinand, despite Gonzalo and Francisco‟s optimism, has 
drowned at sea; next he painstakingly renders Claribel‟s ascendancy to the throne of 
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Naples to be a geographical impossibility. Through a calculated appropriation, he 
manages finally to kindle in Sebastian the spirit of murder and usurpation. Having been 
perfectly logical so far, he employs the rhetoric of logic to seal the deal that would strike 
fatal blows to the slumbering monarch and his entourage: “Say this were death / That 
now hath seized them: why, they were no worse / Than now they are” (2.1.256-58). 
Almost as if it were an infection, Sebastian adopts logic as his ally when he states that his 
“dear friend” will “be (his) precedent”, and that just as Antonio “got‟st Milan,” / (He‟ll) 
come by Naples. Empowered by their logic-driven imagination, the two men envision a 
future of absolute power, a state wherein they could just as easily determine their 
citizens‟ conception of right and wrong as they could manipulate their “clocks” (2.1.285-
86). 
But it is their very reliance on logic that strips Antonio and Sebastian‟s political 
imagination of any radical potential. Brian Massumi states that “an exploratory politics of 
change is philosophy pursued by other means—a radical politics equal to the „radicality‟ 
of the expanded empirical field itself” (243). Massumi explains at length: 
Radical politics is an inherently risky undertaking because it cannot predict the 
outcome of its actions with certainty. If it could, it wouldn‟t be radical but 
reactive, a movement dedicated to capture and containment, operating entirely in 
the realm of the already possible, in a priori refusal of the new. Radical politics 
must tweak and wait: for the coming, collective determination of the community. 
Its role is to catalyze or induce a global self-reorganization: tweak locally to 
induce globally (to modulate a slogan). Speaking of slogans, repeat this one: „be 
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realistic, demand the impossible.‟ Under what circumstances could that be a 
formula for a political empiricism?  
         (243-44) 
Doubtless, the political movement initiated by Gonzalo‟s imagination is echoed by most 
other characters in the play, including Antonio and Sebastian. But as is the case with 
echoes, the radical quality of the old man‟s original call grows increasingly muffled as it 
travels through the minds of the other islanders. Whereas Gonzalo‟s vision can be 
considered an “exploratory politics of change,” the others do not experience becomings 
even when they are brought close to the possibilities of finding the Deleuzian lines of 
flight that would enable radical transformations. Theirs aren‟t the fairy tale imaginings, 
which, Ernst Bloch argues, are alone capable of triggering revolutionary changes in our 
vision of society. “[O]nly the fairy tale,” Bloch claims, “which is always instructive, and 
the fairytale of an ideal state can tell us about the Magic Table, and the Land of 
Cockaigne” (472). The Land of Cockaigne seeks out social wishful images of equality 
and prosperity, not unlike those of Gonzalo‟s fantasy island: 
All human beings are equal there, i.e. well off, there is neither effort nor work. … 
Thus those in Cockaigne lead a pleasant life, they are no longer prepared to let the 
rich tell them how unenviable riches are. How unhealthy a lot of sleep is, how 
deadly leisure is, how much we need deprivation so that all life does not come to 
a standstill. The people have merrily embroidered on their own most nourishing 
fairytale, their most obvious utopian model, and even caricatured it: vines are tied 
together with sausages, the mountains have turned into cheese, the streams are 
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flowing with the best muscatel. The Magic Table and Indian magic meadows 
here exist as a public institution, as a state of happiness per se. 
 (Bloch 472-73) 
Just as in Cockaigne, where there is no dearth of materials, the people of 
Gonzalo‟s imaginary land reap the benefits of an inherently abundant Nature without 
“effort” or “work.” Interestingly, Bloch‟s point about Cockaigne being such a land where 
everyone is happy and where “they are no longer prepared to let the rich tell them how 
unenviable riches are” brings to mind the situation that immediately precedes, perhaps 
even contributes to, Gonzalo‟s utopian vision. Alonso is chastised by Sebastian, who 
accuses the sovereign of poor judgment, owing to which the shipwrecked crew is now 
marooned on foreign territory, far removed from their homelands and forcefully 
separated from their public and filial responsibilities. Sebastian tactlessly drives home his 
point that Alonso‟s decision to marry his daughter Claribel to the dark-skinned King of 
Tunis has led to many more inconsolable “widows” in Naples and Milan than there are 
men at home to correct the situation. In response to Sebastian‟s cruel but truthful 
accusation that the ultimate “fault” lies in the king, Alonso claims that he also suffers 
“the dearest o‟ th‟ loss” (2.1.131). Alonso‟s point is that his loss (of son and land) is far 
greater than that which can possibly be experienced by anyone else of lesser status. The 
implicit message in Alonso‟s response is that the absolute nature of his power—as 
monarch and father to the future of Naples—intensifies his experience of pain, his sorrow 
being, to use Bloch‟s terms, “unenviable,” and which cannot be shared even by the many 
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widows in their homeland, who are bereft of their spouses because of the king‟s 
ambitious act of arranging the royal marriage of Claribel to the king of Tunis. 
Almost as if he were responding to the pessimism of Sebastian‟s and Alonso‟s 
aristocratic crisis, one that is embedded in thoughts of death and lineage, Gonzalo 
shatters the moment with his line of flight and experiences a becoming. His experience, 
Bloch would argue, which is akin to “the very awakening of (the) majority is (an) utterly 
unusual occurrence, the rare event in history” (475). But such an event or moment of 
becoming does not always lead to successful revolutions, which are rarer still: “[f]or a 
thousand wars there are not even ten revolutions; so difficult is walking upright” (Bloch 
475). In their place, more often we experience regime change, the kind that on the island 
is envisioned by Antonio and Sebastian, Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo, and, of course, 
by Prospero. As Bloch points out, “[e]ven where they (succeed), as a rule the oppressors 
(turn) out to be exchanged rather than abolished. An end of deprivation: … only as a 
waking dream (does) it enter the field of vision” (475).  
David Norbrook also recognizes the play‟s failure to present its audience with a 
complete vision of change or utopia. He states that “all of the play‟s utopian ideals … 
come up for ironic scrutiny … precisely because they tend to an idealism that refuses to 
recognize the material constraints of existing structures of power and discourse” (25). 
Norbrook focuses on Gonzalo‟s vision to make his point about the play‟s inability to 
imagine radical difference. His words are significant enough to be quoted at length: 
The scene in which Gonzalo outlines his utopia parallels Montaigne in illustrating 
the process of ideological forgetting … He is so used to commanding that his own 
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social status is simply invisible to him, and he can see himself as a king of an 
egalitarian society. The scene builds up a very complex interaction between a 
generalizing aspiration and a reminder of the limits of specific social contexts, 
and in particular of courtly discourse. The context of Gonzalo‟s utopian speech 
resembles the situation imagined by More, where a Senecan prophecy of a golden 
age is recited at court. Gonzalo imagines a world with no letter, „no name of 
magistrate.‟ … But the speech-act he is performing in evoking this utopia is 
strongly hierarchical, its aim is to console the king, and Gonzalo‟s soft 
primitivism bears the stamp of someone used to euphemizing awkward social 
realities”         (Norbrook 30) 
Norbrook‟s point about Gonzalo‟s forgetfulness is noteworthy specifically 
because in it he establishes memory as a positive virtue that stands in opposition to the 
ideology of “forgetting” (30). Moreover, he assigns to Gonzalo considerable authority 
and status, both of which undermine his utopian vision. While Norbrook‟s points are 
interesting, it seems to me that he overlooks the fact that Gonzalo, despite possessing 
limited authority as counselor, is only presented in the play as a man who serves figures 
of authority and is often placed by them in situations wherein he has to perform tasks that 
don‟t necessarily represent his individual morality. If anything, Gonzalo wields more 
authority owing to his age than to his position! Thus he manages to convince King 
Alonso to take a break from his search for the prince by pleading on behalf of his “old 
bones” that “ache” and therefore must be rested. Clearly, in this case Gonzalo uses the 
medium (or authority, albeit a perverse one) that he knows will yield positive results. Not 
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surprisingly, he chooses to appeal for his mater‟s pity and not to exercise officious 
authority.  
Furthermore, my argument with Norbrook is that he falls in line with the scholars 
whom he repudiates as being narrowly historical. Earlier in his essay when he discusses 
the impact of Montaigne‟s essay “Of the Cannibals” on the Renaissance and the political 
activists of the 1640s, notably on the Leveller Willaim Walwyn, Norbrook acknowledges 
that several decades separated the works of Montaigne and Shakespeare (specifically The 
Tempest) and the political rebels. But he suggests that scholars “need to allow more 
generous intellectual horizons” for understanding Shakespeare and his contemporaries 
“than some critics have been prepared to grant” (30). Why may not such a generosity be 
extended to an informed critical reading of Gonzalo, who, as Norbrook acknowledges, is 
the initiator of strong imaginations among the play‟s various characters? “Utopian 
discourse pervades the play,” claims Norbrook, but “most notably in Gonzalo‟s vision of 
a world where nature would produce all in common and „[l]etters should not be known.‟” 
Norbrook is quick to add quite rightly that “every figure on the island has some kind of 
vision of a society that would transcend existing codes and signs: „Thought is free,‟ sing 
Stephano and Trinculo (3.2.121)” (21). 
The radical energy of Gonzalo‟s dream vision is interpreted as music by Stephano 
and Trinculo in their song of freedom. Although Norbrook‟s analysis provides a detailed 
overview of the utopian and political emphasis of the play, it overlooks important 
differences among the characters‟ investments in their imagination. Not all of the figures 
think alike, after all; Gonzalo‟s radical politics, as I have argued above, is nothing like 
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Stephano‟s imperial imagination, which continues to accommodate hierarchy and 
punishment. And it is even lesser like Antonio and Sebastian‟s political imagination that 
can only stretch so far as to imagine usurpation or what I have called regime change. 
Only Gonzalo‟s politics manages to break from or “transcend” the established “codes and 
signs” (Norbrook 21), in other words the limits of molarity. The others exhibit what 
Deleuze identifies in A Thousand Plateaus as molecular moments that, though they may 
lead to becomings and to lines of flight, can just as easily lead to experiences of 
reterritorialization. Like the others Gonzalo, at play‟s end, is a reterritorialized being. But 
he returns to the structural codes only after he has articulated the possibilities of escaping, 
forgetting, and therefore becoming. In other words, he returns to the accepted 
monarchical system of politics only after he has imagined radical political futurity.  
In the sense that Gonzalo may be taken as a representative of the larger 
citizenship of Milan and Naples, he is also an Everyman type. For all his life he has been 
a servant and loyal citizen, his affiliation being to not any particular ruler, but to rulers in 
general.
17
 The ruler whose authority ultimately determines the future course of all the 
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 While it may be argued that Gonzalo is loyal to Prospero throughout, it is vital that we 
remeber that the old man did comply with Antonio‟s wishes and successfully carried out 
his responsibilities as “Master of (the) design” to exile Prospero and Miranda. Although 
he took pity on the Duke and his infant daughter and furnished them with “[r]ich 
garments, linens, stuffs, and necessaries” for their trip, his generosity is complicated by 
the fact that Gonzalo also saw to their boarding an unrigged “rotten carcass of a butt,” a 
vessel that almost certainly would have dashed the father and child to their deaths at sea 
(1.2.145-164), a fate intended for them by the usurping ruler. Remarkably, Gonzalo is 
given the responsibility to oversee an indirect murder of royalty, just as Antigonus in The 
Winter‟s Tale is charged with the task to do away with Perdita. Of course, through the 
intervention of appropriative parenting and magic, respectively, all exiled parties in both 
plays survive the murderous intentions of Nature and corrupt royalty. However, the fact 
that Antigonus is punished with death for performing his duty whereas Gonzalo is 
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characters in the play is Prospero. I will now turn to a discussion of the magus‟ 
unique and appropriative engagement with futurity.       
Likening Prospero to the tragic teenager Romeo, in so far as the two share a 
contempt for the state of exile, Janet Kingsley-Smith argues that the old magician spends 
all his time on the island “yearning for the past” (225; emphasis added). Undoubtedly 
Prospero holds his memory of the past close to his heart and it even fuels the vast 
majority of his actions within the play‟s world. But I would suggest that, far from 
yearning for the return of the bygone years, Prospero conjures an elaborate scenario to 
usher in a future that will bear the markings of his past experiences (of magic and 
usurpation) and bear the fruits of his exiled labor. He does not crave his Milanese past but 
anticipates a future of retirement, a condition wherein “every third thought” of his meek 
and non-magical existence without his true subjects Ariel, Caliban, and Miranda will 
bring him closer to his “grave” (5.1.311). This Prospero who foresees his own end or his 
future is certainly not the same as the man who presents his daughter with a picture of his 
past when he assumed that all his “temporal royalties” were everlasting (1.2.110). At the 
play‟s conclusion he is also not the same political figure who was at one point both “a 
prince of power” and a practitioner of “secret studies” (1.2.54, 77). On the contrary, as he 
speaks the Epilogue, Prospero claims that he has neither occult power nor material 
strength with which to impress his onlookers. After twelve long years of preparation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
rewarded with affection begs our analysis of the differences between the two servants. I 
would argue that Gonzalo remains alive at play‟s end to “rejoice / Beyond a common 
joy” specifically because he experiences a becoming, one that despite being 
reterritorialized almost immediately onto the codes of service and hierarchy, enables a 
truly revolutionary or utopian vision of political difference in the future. 
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planning, he places his future at the “mercy” and “indulgence” of altogether new 
subjects (Epilogue 18-20).  
Kingsley-Smith proposes that Prospero undertakes all the struggles, strifes, and 
risks of life on the island specifically in order to exhibit his “humanity” to the original 
banishers, “Antonio, Sebastian, Alonso” (225). Moreover, she suggests that the 
magician‟s continued investment in the liberal arts is triggered by his desire to perform “a 
civilizing function by confronting his enemies with the evil they have perpetrated” (226). 
But it is key to note here that in order for Prospero to be the arch educator of civility, he 
needs to embrace a contrary state and be uncivil, cruel, even inhuman. In this sense, his 
enslavement of Ariel and Caliban may be understood in terms of a molecular line, which, 
as Deleuze and Guattari claim, marks the intersections of experiences within an 
individual, the physical or emotional responses to stimuli. While molecular lines are 
relatively free from social control and therefore are capable of expressing the individual‟s 
desire, they may also provide an occasion for reterritorialization or re-entry into coded 
structures. To this effect, Norbrook argues that “it is not so much that the play is a 
romance as that it stages, and in the process distances itself from, the romance scenario of 
dynastic redemption that Prospero is staging” (26). At the same time, “the play also 
recognizes a certain congruence between a narrowly aristocratic romantic impulse and a 
broader utopian project” (Norbrook 26). It is this congruence to which various critics 
have pointed, suggesting that the characters‟ imagination of alternative systems or 
communities “may be an essential mode” of imagining an altered, even improved, but not 
drastically different politics (Norbrook 26). 
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This precisely is Prospero‟s case. His project of educating Caliban, Miranda, 
and, to a lesser degree, Ariel, is in effect a rehearsal routine that prepares him for the 
ultimate civilizing of the disempowered Alonso and his aristocratic posse. Remarkably, 
Prospero‟s exhibition of a boundless “humanity” toward them that is rewarded with his 
banishers‟ new-found sense of “guilt” (Kingsley-Smith 226), also results in his 
reinserting himself into civilized society as a true and noble Milanese. The molecular 
lines of magic and education that were symptoms of Prospero‟s exiled condition are in 
the end reterritorialized onto the organized state of citizenship. His departure from the 
magical island that “is full of (incomprehensible) noises” (3.3.133), and his return to the 
familiar society of Milan, whose culture we may assume is similar to the England that 
Trinculo describes (2.2.26-32), also repositions him temporally. And back in the sway of 
things, he must prepare himself for the cultured course of aging and the event of death 
that accompanies the process and culminates the linear experience of time.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
“IF WISHES WERE HORSES, BEGGARS WOULD RIDE”: DESIRE, 
ARTICULATION, AND MOVEMENT IN EVERYDAY PERFORMANCES OF 
FUTURITY 
The previous chapters have focused mainly on biological and political futurity, 
the two principal categories that influence early modern temporal consciousness. In this 
final section of the text, I will turn to the application of futurity in the context of the 
everyday lives of characters in the drama of the period. In other words, I will consider 
such phenomena of early modern culture as put futurity into practice. It is in everyday 
practice that the theories about the future are most tested and challenged, but it is also 
here that the same principles come to be the most absorbed, even naturalized. As 
discussed in the Introduction, the everyday applications of early modern futurity are 
discernible in various cultural spheres that Louis Althusser identifies as superstructural 
elements of society: in bureaucracy, in education, in modes of entertainment, among 
others. But futurity also is identifiable in the various points of intersection between 
peoples and economies, and is at the core of rhetorical exchanges between the characters 
who weave in and out of borderline spaces: the cusps of market and home, foreign and 
native soil, country and city, outdoors and indoors. Much like Althusserian 
superstructural institutions that have a lingering effect on the future of any given society, 
these borderline spaces also cross temporal borders and become venues for the seemingly 
innocuous, everyday performances of futurity that have far-reaching consequences. 
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Without consciously engaging in the theoretical construction of the ways in which the 
future might be effected or imagined, the rhetorical, physical, and economic practices of 
characters located at the points of early modern intersection apply and appropriate those 
principles of futurity that they have absorbed from the base of society.
1
 It is to these latter 
reflectors of futurity that I will now turn my attention. I will trace the diverse everyday 
applications of futurity through an analysis of two groupings of Renaissance texts, each 
group comprising two plays. The groups share a fundamental schematic structure: while 
one play symptomatizes the methods and effectiveness of futurity through the uneasy 
engagement with the supernatural (magic and witchcraft), the other displays these using 
the dynamic of mobility (physical and social movement). The unlikely juxtaposition in 
the plays‟ worlds of unearthly and all too earthly cultures enables the representation of 
futurity as a consolidating sweep that mobilizes and interweaves characters‟ divergent 
desires. Moreover, it is through the plays‟ traversing of multiple spaces and temporalities 
                                                 
1
 In the preceding chapters I have discussed the influence of characters such as Faustus 
and Beatrice-Joanna, Gonzalo and Paulina, and More and Lanyer, who attack the basic 
foundations of futurity and attempt to bring about fundamental changes to the ways in 
which the future may be imagined or envisioned. Faustus and Beatrice-Joanna theorize 
alternative futures for the body and the means through which biological transformation 
may impact their futures and lineage. Gonzalo and Paulina, on the other hand, construct 
models of collective political change and unpredictability that may successfully dismantle 
monarchical state formations. Also political in their endeavors, More and Lanyer situate 
the future in utopian geographies that bring about radical transformations of the nature of 
citizenship. The efforts and the effects of these characters (in the drama) and authors (in 
the case of the prose and poetry) remain intellectual, theoretical, and somewhat untested. 
The testing grounds of their theories are the very borderline spaces where the everyday 
practices of and exchanges between people represent the seepage of futurity into early 
modern culture.   
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that we arrive at what Jonathan Gil Harris identifies in the early modern period as a 
“pleated notion of time.”  
Early modern drama is dotted with points of intersection. Geographical as much 
as they are ideological, these intersections mark the locations of characters‟ everyday 
concerns and dealings with futurity. Not surprisingly, these spaces are also situated on 
temporal fault lines, the cusps of the past and future, the old and new. When characters 
cross each others‟ paths as they do in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream and A Chaste Maid in 
Cheapside or when they wander nomadically through streets that are the sites of 
exchange, as in the case of The Roaring Girl and The Witch of Edmonton, they engage in 
the momentary politics of Deleuzian becoming. This politics, as has been explained in 
chapters two and four, impacts the temporal scheme by disengaging it—with varying 
degrees of success—from the sedentary practices of nostalgia and associating instead 
with the radical practices of unpredictability and unforseeability. Although becoming 
invariably is followed by the event of reterritorialization, the instability caused by the 
former cannot entirely be forgotten or undone. 
 Constructing Experiences and Charting Narratives: Imagined Futures in 
A Midsummer Night‟s Dream and A Chaste Maid in Cheapside 
Futurity—which Derrida defines as “the condition of all promises or of all hope, 
of all awaiting, of all performativity, of all opening towards the future” (68)—is a play of 
multiple desires that exist simultaneously within our present beings. Simply put, it is that 
condition of our present experience in which we want, need, wish, hope, and plan for 
190 
 
 
 
diverse objects and states to be realized in our future. A Midsummer Night‟s Dream and A 
Chaste Maid in Cheapside essentially are plays about futurity, texts in which characters‟ 
processes of constructing their desire are scrutinized and, at certain points, transformed 
into their realities. The exercising of their desires (or dreams) leads these characters to 
conflicts within or between organized spaces of their bodies, kingdoms, and territories. 
Moreover, their imagination of the future collides with cultural sites of their memory, 
resulting in a powerful if transient stage of “becoming,” which emerges at the spatio-
temporal borderlines of the plays.  
A Midsummer Night‟s Dream hurriedly dislocates the dramatic center of the play 
from the urban geography of Athens to the surrounding wooded fairy realm where 
Oberon and Titania wage a war that is not merry but rather a cause for global concern. 
Titania believes that the couple‟s battle over “a little changeling boy” has resulted in 
complete natural and social chaos on earth (2.1.120). In a speech conjuring images that 
eerily anticipate twenty-first century horrors of global climate change, the queen of 
fairies claims joint responsibility with Oberon for the various sea storms and floods that 
have ruined the crop and rendered useless the agrarian economy, which depends on the 
systematic notion of seasons, the climatic representation of the passage of time: 
But with thy brawls thou hast disturbed our sport. 
Therefore the winds, piping to us in vain, 
As in revenge, have sucked up from the sea 
Contagious fogs which, falling in the land, 
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Hath every pelting river made so proud 
That they have overborne their continents. 
The ox hath therefore stretched his yoke in vain, 
The plowman lost his sweat, and the green corn 
Hath rotted ere his youth attained a beard; 
The fold stands empty in the drownèd field, 
And crows are fatted with the murrain flock; 
The nine-man‟s morris is filled up with mud, 
And the quaint mazes in the wanton green 
For lack of tread are indistinguishable. 
The human mortals want their winter here; 
No night is now with hymn or carol blessed. 
Therefore the moon, the governess of floods, 
Pale in her anger, washes all the air, 
That rheumatic diseases do abound. 
And thorough this distemperature we see 
The seasons alter: hoary-headed frosts  
Fall in the fresh lap of the crimson rose, 
And on old Hiems‟ thin and icy crown  
An odorous chaplet of sweet summer buds 
Is, as in mockery, set. The spring, the summer, 
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The childing autumn, angry winter, change 
Their wonted liveries, and the mazèd world 
By their increase now knows not which is which.   
       (2.1.87-114)  
It seems the clockwork that oversees the efficacy of the seasons and, more 
importantly, of farming, is dismantled by the violent tempers of the unearthly creatures. 
The result, claims Titania, is that “[t]he spring, the summer, / The childing autumn, angry 
winter, change / Their wonted liveries, and the mazèd world / By their increase now 
knows not which is which” (2.1.111-14). Titania‟s speech ponders the eccentricity of the 
mundane, everyday sites of futurity. The farm and the village that, in the past, epitomized 
pastoral productivity and generation were also hosts to cultures of predictability. But, 
owing to the feuding fairies, these spaces now are defiled locations disconnected from 
their past and from the systematic if cyclical logic of agriculture. Their future 
unforeseeable, they are the directionless “progeny of evils” (2.1.115). Indeed, Titania‟s 
repeated stress on the word “therefore” in her speech presents the horrific transformation 
of the earth as direct and undeniable consequence of untimely fairy intervention. Just as 
important, her speech suggests that the human experiences of temporality are in fact the 
result of unearthly agency. Her implication is important because it discloses not only the 
power of the creatures such as herself, Oberon, and Puck, but it also emphasizes the folly 
of characters like Lysander and Hermia, who, despite believing that they can successfully 
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manipulate their futures by taking action against the fate to which Athenian patriarchy 
has doomed them, are controlled by the eccentricities of atemporal agents.  
The intersections of the mundane (everyday activities that comprise human life) 
and the spectacular (fairy dispute) mark the many points or locations that, in the play, 
become the sites of contestation. The fairies articulate their mutual discontent not in a 
private fairy realm that is inaccessible to human beings, but rather in “the palace wood, a 
mile without the town” (1.2.78-79), in a place that is frequented by the human subjects 
whose lives are the very matter that is at stake in the fight between Titania and Oberon. 
Moreover, the Indian boy who, in the play, functions almost in the manner of territory 
over which the royal fairies dispute, forces the intermingling of supernatural and human 
futures. But even the prehistory of the child is not without the traces of futurity that 
emerge at borderline spaces. Refusing to surrender the child to Oberon‟s patriarchal 
desire for dominance and continuity, Titania‟s claim to the boy is rooted in social and 
cultural history and a sense of inheritance—secured futurity:  
His mother was a vot‟ress of my order, 
And in the spicèd Indian air by night 
Full often hath she gossiped by my side 
And sat with me on Neptune‟s yellow sands, 
Marking th‟ embarkèd traders on the flood, 
When we have laughed to see the sails conceive 
And grow big-bellied with the wanton wind; 
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Which she, with pretty and with swimming gait, 
Following—her womb then rich with my young squire— 
Would imitate, and sail upon the land 
To fetch me trifles, and return again 
As from a voyage, rich with merchandise. 
But she, being mortal, of that boy did die; 
And for her sake do I rear up her boy, 
And for her sake I will not part with him.  
(2.1.121-37; emphasis added) 
Titania‟s speech is an important one that has been widely discussed by post colonial and 
feminist scholars alike.
2
 In “The Changeling in A Dream” William Slights argues that the 
Indian boy, a figure of great mystery but little matter, is an object interpreted variedly by 
those characters within the play that desire him. Whereas Oberon boldly claims his 
entitlement based on his desire for a “henchman” (2.1.121), Titania clings to the child 
based on her sense of loyalty to her dead friend and her inheritance of the properties left 
                                                 
2
 For recent scholarship on the play that focuses on this speech, see Thomas Frosch‟s 
“The Missing Child in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream,” Jill Ehnenn‟s “„An Attractive, 
Dramatic Exhibition‟?: Female Friendship, Shakespeare‟s Women, and Female 
Performativity in 19
th
-Century Britain.” For postcolonial and materialist readings of this 
scene, see especially Margo Hendricks‟ “„Obscured By Dreams‟: Race, Empire, and 
Shakespeare‟s A Midsummer Night‟s Dream” and Ania Loomba‟s “The Great Indian 
Vanishing Trick—Colonialism, Property, and the Family in A Midsummer Night‟s 
Dream.”  
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behind by her Indian votaress.
3
 Thus, in “Titania‟s eyes,” Slight states, “the fact that [the 
boy] straddles the border between human and fairy in no way obviates his need for 
mothering” (261). Stevie Davies and Regina Buccola also focus on the borderlines or 
liminal spaces that mark Titania‟s speech and her recollection of her Indian companion. 
However, while Davies remarks on the impossibility of the women‟s friendship (126), 
and Buccola points to the liminality that is essential to fairies and to fairy lore (77), 
Slights insists on the “deep understanding and trust” between the women that allows 
them to transcend the limits of human and fairy. Border spaces are key also to Margo 
Hendricks‟ analysis of A Midsummer Night‟s Dream. Hendricks emphasizes the ideology 
of race in the play that is often overlooked by readers and viewers alike but is nonetheless 
crucial to the development of its spatial and cultural logic. In her interpretation of its 
function in the play, race is “visible only when its boundaries are violated” (Hendricks 
42). This site of violation, Hendricks argues, is evident in the fairy world‟s engagement 
                                                 
3
 As critics have noted, Titania‟s nostalgic speech about her time spent in the company of 
the votaress is inundated with metaphors of pregnancy and mercantilism. Caroline Bicks, 
among others, suggests that, in keeping with the early modern female interactions of 
gossips and pregnant women, the two women share a friendship that transcends the 
barriers of social class and evokes a sense of egalitarian homosociality. Also focusing on 
their friendship, Slights notes the near conflation of the images and rhetoric of pregnancy 
and mercantilism that presents the women‟s relationship in terms of mirthful empathy. 
The two states of pregnancy and mercantilism most obviously share the sense of 
investment and productivity, but they also possess distinct elements of risk: merchants‟ 
ships easily foundered at sea, and pregnant women often died in childbirth; in both cases 
the future is vehicultated through uncertain and unreliable mediums.  
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with the Indian boy specifically, but with Indian-ness more generally.
4
 But while, with 
Steven Mullaney, she emphasizes the physical and localizable aspects of Renaissance 
England‟s imagination of India, she overlooks the temporal significance of the same.  
A point that needs to be emphasized in the fairies‟ relationships with the Indian 
mortals that are all founded on principles of liminality and located on “the narrow margin 
between sea and land” is that they are defined by transience (Davies 126). Quite like 
pregnancy, which is both a condition—a state of being—and a stage, the relationship 
between the votaress and the queen of the fairies is premised on impermanence and 
opportunity. The votaress is a vehicle of futurity for Titania. Much like the ships whose 
movements she imitates, the Indian woman brings goods or “trifles” back with her from 
her travels and gives them to Titania. And like the ships, she is also a vessel that carries 
within her “rich … merchandise” in the shape of the “young squire” whom she may only 
keep for the duration of her pregnancy but must invariably give up to the Indian king or 
                                                 
4
 Hendricks‟ study of A Midsummer Night‟s Dream focuses on Oberon‟s Indian heritage, 
which she traces back to the medieval romance Huon of Bordeaux, a text that also was a 
source for Spenser‟s Faerie Queene and Greene‟s Scottish Historie of James the Fourth. 
She also evaluates the ideological fabric of two sixteenth century travel narratives that 
construct the English readers‟ sociological fantasies of India. The “Indian boy” that 
proves to be an occasion for the fairy feud and the earthly discord in Shakespeare‟s play 
is a product of the literary imagination that fetishizes the geographical, cultural, and 
sexual otherness of India. Hendricks‟ chief point in the essay is to draw attention to such 
fetishization, a phenomenon that she notes was not only an early modern one, but which 
she identifies in modern performances and interpretations of the play. For details, see 
“„Obscured by dreams‟: Race, Empire, and Shakespeare‟s A Midsummer Night‟s 
Dream,” especially sections I, II, and III.    
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the Fairy queen, in short, surrender to someone of greater status or power.
5
 The politics of 
trade that she playfully mimics prior to her death on the Indian shores anticipates the 
multiple and mutable trades that take place upon her death between the members of fairy 
royalty. The transformation of the woman‟s jovial simulation of trade into a tragically 
real transaction in which she loses her life and the child also anticipates Titania‟s bizarre 
transformation from the lyrical protector of the Indian boy to the foolish beast lover who 
loses both the child and her dignity to Oberon. The liminality to which the critics point, 
then, must be studied in conjunction with the temporal flux that defines the fairies‟ 
relationships with the votaress and her “lovely” offspring (2.1.22).   
The fairies‟ relationships with the Indian mortals, which are all founded on 
principles of liminality and located on “the narrow margin between sea and land,” are 
defined by transience (Davies 26).  Titania and Bottom‟s erotic entanglement is similarly 
suspended in space and time.  Seeking vengeance and cheap laughs, Oberon punishes his 
wife by casting a problematic spell upon her.  For his magic to yield the results he 
desires, Titania must give in to a monstrous appetite and, blinded by her desire for the 
deformed Bottom, surrender the pretty boy to the king of the fairies.  Much has been 
made of Titania‟s desire for the base human.  For instance, Jan Kott, who famously 
visualizes the transformed Titania as “a very tall, flat, and fair girl” of Scandinavian 
                                                 
5
 Titania‟s emphasis on the word “rich” in her speech about her votaress‟ wealth is 
crucial to our understanding of her investment in the Indian woman. This sense of 
investment is only heightened when it is coupled with the queen‟s indication of her 
entitlement to the Indian boy: her votaress‟ womb, Titania claims, is “rich” not with the 
mortal‟s own child, but rather with the fairy queen‟s “young squire” (2.1.131). 
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origin, insists that she forces Bottom to bed with her because “[t]his is the lover she 
wanted and dreamed of,” although “she never wanted to admit it, even to herself” (118-
19).  In claiming that her actions are a direct product of her sexual appetite, Kott 
overlooks the fact that Titania‟s love and judgment have been perverted by none other 
than her husband and it is precisely because Oberon wills it so that Titania hankers after 
the ass-headed Bottom.  While Kott sees in Titania‟s goblin train all the potent 
ingredients of “the pharmacy of the witches” (118), it is only Oberon who has access to 
the magical power contained within things such as the petals of love-in-idleness.  
Moreover, it is Oberon, not Titania, who winds up a dangerous if musical charm 
while squeezing pansy juice onto his wife‟s eyelids: 
What thou seest when thou dost wake, 
Do it for thy true love take; 
Love and languish for his sake. 
Be it ounce, or cat, or bear, 
Pard, or boar with bristled hair, 
In thy eye that shall appear 
When thou wak‟st, it is thy dear. 
Wake when some vile thing is near.  (2.2.33-40) 
Notably, Titania‟s train is wary of the negative effects of such charms as the one uttered 
by Oberon.  Thus, in the lullaby for their queen intended as a prophylactic to protect her 
from perilous magic, they pray “[n]ever harm / Nor spell nor charm / Come (their) lovely 
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lady nigh” (2.2.16-18).  But their song is powerless and fails to safeguard Titania against 
Oberon‟s more ominous spell. 
  If, as Kott suggests, the various animals listed in Oberon‟s spell “represent 
abundant sexual potency, and some of them play an important part in sexual 
demonology” (118), it is also perfectly clear that it is the fairy king who wishes to 
conjure up the deviant logic of desire and smear it upon Titania‟s eyes.  Of course, where 
he wishes his wife only to suffer humiliation and ridicule, the fairy queen experiences a 
marvelous becoming before reterritorializing onto her position within the culture of royal 
patriarchy. What I identify here as a becoming, Philippa Berry calls “a highly potent, 
combustible combination of phantasy and desire,” which “produces the midsummer 
night‟s dreaming,” one that first “reverses and then reorders the erotic preferences of the 
male lovers” (138).  Berry is right to point to magic‟s connection with masculine fantasy 
and to the eventual return of all characters‟ individual desire to the familiar coded 
locations of hierarchical heternormativity.  But the nuances of some of the characters‟ 
desires remain secret. Chief among these is Oberon‟s, whose wish to debase his wife by 
animalizing her erotic exchanges at the same time implicates him in his own cuckoldry 
through his participation in a voyeuristic bestial sexuality.    
In their chapter on the diversity of the experience of becomings, Deleuze and 
Guattari give particular importance to the connection between the human and animal, 
which they term “becoming animal.”  Their explanation of the phenomenon is important 
enough to be quoted at length: 
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A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in 
short, a multiplicity. … One may retain or extract from the animal certain 
characteristics: species and genera, forms and functions, etc. Society and the State 
need animal characteristics to use for classifying people; … But we are not 
interested in characteristics; what interests us are modes of expansion, 
propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling. … We do not wish to say that 
certain animals live in packs. … What we are saying is that every animal is 
fundamentally a band, a pack. That it has pack modes, rather than characteristics, 
even if further distinctions within these modes are called for. It is at this point that 
the human being encounters the animal. We do not become animal without a 
fascination for the pack, for multiplicity.     (239-40) 
In this difficult yet fascinating passage, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that becomings in 
general but becoming-animal in particular entails multiple, complex networks of desire. 
The socially simplified and categorized being (the animal or the human) is bereft of its 
potential to articulate its multifaceted desires, until it liberates itself from the limiting 
structures of State and initiates hitherto unthought-of collaborations.  
The theorists go on to define becoming-animal in terms of “unnatural 
participations” or “unnatural nuptials” of human and animal.  They ask: “[w]ho has not 
known the violence of … animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for 
an instant, making one scrape at one‟s bread like a rodent or giving one the yellow eyes 
of a feline? A fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings” (239-40).  
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The spread of unnatural nuptials does not result in production, reproduction, or filiation; 
rather it results in “contagion” and “epidemic.”  Human and animal “bands,” they argue, 
are like “hybrids,” which, “being born of a sexual union that will not reproduce itself,” 
are sterile.  As a result, becoming-animal (banding through non reproductive means) 
constantly confronts the newness of unions and “begins over again every time, gaining 
that much more ground” (Deleuze and Guattari 241).  Such a phenomenon “is a far cry 
from filiative production or hereditary reproduction, in which the only differences 
retained are a simple duality between sexes within the same species, and small 
modifications across generations” (242). 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s philosophy may at first glance seem farfetched in 
connection with the transformations triggered by Oberon in A Midsummer Night‟s 
Dream.  However, their theories of unnatural participation echo the thoughts of several 
Renaissance scholars, particularly that of Ambroise Paré, who, in On Monsters and 
Marvels, presents the various (horrible) transformations that result from the combination 
of human and animal.  
First published in 1573, Ambroise Paré‟s On Monsters and Marvels provides an 
intriguing catalog of monsters born of diverse unnatural causes.  In a section on the birth 
of those monsters that result from the unnatural sexual union between human beings and 
beasts (the “mixture or mingling of seed”), Paré writes that such creatures “bring great 
shame to those who look at them or speak of them.”  Although he hurries to inform his 
readers that the horror “lies in the deed and not in the words” that narrate or the eyes that 
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witness the details of the monstrous result of bestiality, his self-conscious articulation of 
guiltlessness betrays an urgent desire to justify his curiosity about what he presents to his 
readers as deviant sexuality (67).
6
  In fact, at the conclusion of the chapter he promises to 
“refrain from writing … about several other monsters … which are so hideous and 
abominable, not only to see but also to hear tell of, that, due to their abominable 
loathsomeness I have neither wanted to relate them nor to have them portrayed” (73).  
Ironically, before reaching his conclusion, Paré provides his readers with six detailed 
illustrations of monsters that resulted from inter-species copulation; his brief chapter 
covers nothing short of nine cases of monstrosity.  
Paré‟s declaration resonates through the speech and actions of Oberon and Puck, 
who maintain their grim fascination for the monster Bottom‟s exchanges with Titania 
even as they judge her fairy bed to be a corrupt space.  As discussed earlier, Oberon‟s 
spell articulates his wish to make his wife “languish for … a vile thing.”  But he also 
wishes to imagine his wife‟s monstrous dotage: “I wonder if Titania be awaked; / Then 
what it was that next came in her eye, / Which she must dote on in extremity” (3.2.1-3). 
Puck too takes delight in announcing to Oberon that his “mistress with a monster is in 
                                                 
6
 Janis Pallister points to the sixteenth century French medical community‟s opposition to 
Paré‟s publications. The faculty of medicine was in part appalled by Paré‟s unification in 
his writing of the fields of medicine and surgery.  But they were also concerned that his 
books, published in French and not Latin or Greek, made medical secrets cheap, readily 
“available to anyone and everyone who could read” (Paré, On Monsters and Marvels, 
trans. Pallister, p. xxiv). Whereas Pallister clearly interprets Paré‟s cataloguing of 
monsters as conducted in “the spirit of critical investigation” (xxv), his contemporaries 
and even some of his early translators (notably Malgaigne) identified a carnivalesque 
delight in his work.       
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love” (3.2.6).  In fact, it is by means of their respective imaginations of the conjunction of 
Titania and a beast that Oberon and Puck experience their becomings.  By magically 
imposing on his wife his own desire for an animal connection, the fairy king becomes 
quite like the sorcerer that Paré describes in his work:   
…[N]o one can deny, and one should not deny, that there be sorcerers … who 
through subtle, diabolic and unknown means corrupt the body, intelligence, and 
health of men and of other creatures, [such] as animals, trees, grasses, air, earth, 
and waters. (85, emphasis added)      
Paré‟s words find a parallel early in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream, when Titania accuses 
her estranged husband of similar sorcery, of creating through his ill will an imbalance in 
nature.  
 Oberon‟s sorcery also finds parallels in Deleuze and Guattari.  But unlike the 
early modern surgeon who views sorcery as merely a step away from the diabolical, 
Deleuze and Guattari celebrate the figure of the sorcerer as a fundamental agent of 
becoming.  Indeed, to them the “sorcerer” is the “exceptional” or “anomalous” individual 
with whom “an alliance must be made in order to become-animal” (Deleuze and Guattari 
243).  Such sorcerers, they claim, are located “at the edge of the fields or woods. They 
haunt the fringes.  They are at the borderline of the village, or between villages” (246).  
The theorists‟ description of sorcerers fits with Gail Paster and Skiles Howard‟s 
evaluation of Oberon‟s hybrid activity.  They propose that “Oberon, when he alters 
Titania‟s imagination and causes her quasi-amorous, quasi-maternal dotage upon the 
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monstrous baby Bottom, may be said to participate in both traditions … of science and … 
of fairy lore” (301).  Not surprisingly, Oberon also is located on the geographical cusp of 
the city and the forest.  His proximity to the human and the fairy is what enables him to 
work his magic equally on them.  
While what Oberon ultimately wants is his wife‟s disempowerment, humiliation, 
and subservience, at the same time in exercising his magical desires he problematizes the 
future of matrimony.  Titania‟s loss of control and will can only come about if Oberon 
endangers his own patriarchal hold over his marriage bed.  The deformation wrought by 
his spell, then, not only plays a cruel trick upon his wife and the Athenian weaver, but it 
also transforms—albeit tentatively—the sexual conventions of monogamist patriarchy. 
Eventually, conventional order is restored: Oberon acquires the Indian boy for whom he 
risked cuckoldry; Titania, having suffered embarrassment for her gross misjudgment, 
wishes only to separate herself from the mortals and dance the night away with her 
husband, whom she once again recognizes as her “lord” (4.1.98).  In effect all characters 
reterritorialize onto the contemporary modes of patriarchal and hierarchical being.  But 
through their inability completely to forget their suspended transactions with the other, 
and through their desire to narrate and expound upon their monstrous becomings or 
imaginations, they carry forward into the future remnants of their experiences.  That the 
play ends on a conventional comedic note, in marriage and laughter, in no way alleviates 
the audience‟s disturbing recognition that all the marital arrangements in the play have 
resulted from Oberon‟s unnatural desire for a human mortal, and that all corrections or 
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reformations of transgressive individuals have stemmed from not entirely forgotten 
intersections between human and fairy.  The uneasy laughter at play‟s conclusion, then, is 
as much a result of potential for the resurrection of deformity as it is a product of the re-
establishment of form (norm) in the present.  But this uneasiness of comedy marks the 
entire play, not just its conclusion.  Indeed in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream Shakespeare 
consistently unravels the murkiness of deviant laughter.   
 Andrew Stott‟s analysis of early modern representations of deformity is rooted in 
the period‟s theoretical preoccupations with genre, specifically comedy, but also in its 
ethical engagement with laughter. Stott combines the influence of Sidney‟s 
discouragement in Defence of Poetry of the use of vulgar elements in comedy, those that 
do not produce a sophisticated sense of delight in readers or the audience but merely a 
raucous laughter, with the growing early modern appreciation for Hobbesian ethical 
objections to laughing at the deformed, in order to suggest that Renaissance intellectuals 
strove to reconfigure the terms of comic laughter.  The politics of such a reconfiguration 
are represented in Shakespeare‟s shifting appeals to laughter in A Midsummer Night‟s 
Dream.  The play prominently situates the rude mechanicals as worthy of “loud laughter” 
(5.1.70).  But it simultaneously positions them in the eyes of a few as pitiable subjects 
whose “wretchedness” must not be “o‟ercharged” by the demands of pleasure-seeking 
aristocrats (5.1.85).  This polarity of response that plays itself out in Philostrate‟s and 
Hippolyta‟s respective anticipations of the players‟ comic performance is remarkable 
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especially because it is foreshadowed early in the play, both in the earthly and fairy 
realms.  
Bottom‟s transformation into a deformed creature in Act Three, scene one, 
produces a laughter that is at the heart of what David Cressy recognizes as the social 
power of ridicule.  Indeed, Oberon expects and desires the production of merriment 
among those subjects who condemn the deformed body as one that is unworthy of 
dignity, much less romantic or erotic pursuit.  The ass-headed Bottom becomes funny 
specifically to those observers (Oberon, Puck, the audience) who expect the undrugged 
Titania to have better taste and sense than to fawn over a shallow “thickskin” (3.2.13).  In 
the earthly realm Philostrate and the aristocratic men of Athens mimic Oberon‟s 
dominant ideology of laughter when they welcome as comic performance the 
“simpleness” of the “hardhanded” Athenian labourers (5.1.83, 72).  The “tragical mirth” 
of the play of Pyramus and Thisbe brings “merry tears” to Philostrate (5.1.57, 69).  For 
Theseus, Demetrius, and Lysander the mechanicals‟ drama becomes the occasion for the 
witty offstage performance of their repartee about the beastliness of the actors.  (Notable 
among these are Demetrius‟s reference to the actors as “asses” and Theseus‟s suggestion 
that the poor men are all “beasts,” fox-like and goose-like in their performance.) But this 
is only half the story.  While popular early modern responses to disability and deformity 
combined social contempt with laughter, a powerful minority pressed for a revision of the 
terms of merriment.  In A Midsummer Night‟s Dream, Hippolyta presents the minority 
position among the mortals; her objection to the comedy of the rude mechanicals is as 
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much to the production of laughter at them as it is to their inadequate sense of theatrical 
production.  
The most immediate result of this shift in the dynamic of laughter is the inversion 
of the perception of the laugher.  That is, the hitherto secure position of the individual 
laughing at the lowly or deformed body begins to be challenged when the object of 
contempt is relocated from the physically monstrous to the morally pitiless.  In short, it 
now is the turn of the scorner to be the scorned.  This is best exemplified by the 
transformed Bottom‟s initial exchange with his fairy mistress.  As opposed to Oberon and 
Puck‟s contemptuous laughter at their reshaping of Bottom, Titania‟s erotic longing and 
love for the deformed creature problematizes the earlier comic moment by injecting into 
it a mesmerizing lyricism that counters the vulgar if alliterative sounds of laughter.  In 
place of Puck‟s “hempen homespuns” (3.1.72), Titania presents an alternative vision of 
the mechanical whose “fair virtue‟s force” moves the queen of the fairies “to swear” that 
she loves Bottom (3.1.133-34).  Moreover, instead of inflicting fear on the lowly humans 
and extracting a cruel laugh at the expense of their physical terror—Puck‟s “I‟ll be … a 
headless bear, sometimes a fire” speech comes to mind (3.1.103-04)—, Titania appeals to 
Bottom‟s desire for both material fulfillment and absolute immateriality: 
I am a spirit of no common rate. 
The summer still doth tend upon my state, 
And I do love thee. Therefore, go with me. 
I‟ll give thee fairies to attend on thee, 
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And they shall fetch thee jewels from the deep, 
And sing while thou on pressèd flowers dost sleep. 
And I will purge thy mortal grossness so 
That thou shalt like an airy spirit go.   (3.1.145-52) 
Titania enacts Oberon‟s wishes by playing the fool in love; indeed, she takes Bottom for 
her “true love,” just as her husband wishes her to when he casts a spell upon her eye, and 
she languishes for the beastly creature‟s “sake” (2.2.34-35).  Through the monstrous 
appropriation of Bottom, Oberon successfully acquires a child—the sweet Indian boy—
whom he doubtless will tailor to suit his own principles of futurity.  
It is important to note that Oberon (and Puck, who is the king‟s spritely minion 
and representative) and Titania are interested in dominating their relationships with the 
human.  But where the male fairies choose the established—if jaded—methods of comic 
scorn to control Bottom, Titania relies on mystical seduction to do the same. 
Consequently, her command to her minions to “[t]ie up [her] lover‟s tongue” and “bring 
him silently” to her “bower” resembles the erotic violence that accompanies the 
sadomasochistic dynamic which (3.1.191, 187), Deleuze would argue, may be interpreted 
as a “path of mutation precipitated through the actualisation of connections among bodies 
that were previously only implicit” and which unravel “new powers in the capacities of 
those bodies to act and respond (Parr 145).  
On one level, the image of a tied-up Bottom feeds into the carnivalesque violence 
of charivari, which often involved crude reenactments of the inversion of gender and 
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power within matrimony. That the bossy Titania manages to silence two male figures in 
the play, one of them her husband and the other her proposed lover, surely makes her a 
ripe candidate for social punishment; an early modern audience may well have been 
aware of this potential as they watched the fairy queen order her minions to disempower 
Bottom.  But the tongue-tied Bottom also conjures up the Deleuzean image of the 
masochist who relies on a “„cold‟ oral mother” to provide “an alternative source of 
psychosexual authority to the father” and thus expels “the phallic power of the paternal” 
from his universe (Mansfield 70).  Titania‟s quasi-sadistic silencing of Bottom, then, “is 
in reality a transmutation of cruelty from which the new man emerges” (Deleuze 
Masochism 12). (Thus their sadism and masochism are respectively invested in the 
invention of “new ways of feeling and thinking,” even though they act in fundamentally 
different ways.) Bottom‟s enslavement to Titania, if it can be called that, leads to his 
experience of becoming. In his transformative stage not only is he freed from the scornful 
interventions of the likes of Puck and Oberon, actions that resemble the early modern 
social devices of shaming, but while with Titania and her train of fairies Bottom is also 
capable of transcending the limits of temporality.  
When he awakens at the end of Act Four, scene one, Bottom‟s speech suggests 
that he has not skipped a beat in the mechanicals‟ rehearsal of Pyramus and Thisbe. 
Finding himself alone in the woods, abandoned by his friends, Bottom confronts what he 
can at best construe as his dream-like experience.  He tries in vain to articulate it to/for 
himself and soon defers the task of narration to an unimaginable or “bottomless” future: 
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Man is but an ass if he go about to expound this dream. Methought I was — there 
is no man can tell what Methought I was—and methought I had—but man is but a 
patched fool if he will offer to say what methought I had. The eye of man hath not 
heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man‟s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to 
conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was. I will get Peter Quince to 
write a ballad of this dream. It shall be called “Bottom‟s Dream,” because it hath 
no bottom.      (4.1.203-12; emphasis added) 
His promise is obviously funny. It is also disturbing because of its impossibility; for how 
is Peter Quince to give artistic salience to his friend‟s becoming when Bottom himself 
cannot intelligently articulate it?  When he is reunited with his friends in the city, Bottom 
is unable to give words to his wondrous experience, even though he promises his 
companions that he is “to discourse wonders” (4.1.26).  The alternation between his 
recognition of the impossibility of narrative to explain becoming and his desire to “tell … 
everything” is best understood through Deleuze‟s explanation in The Logic of Sense of 
Alice‟s experience of becoming when in Wonderland (4.2.28): 
It is language which fixes the limits …, but it is language as well which 
transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited 
becoming. Hence the reversals which constitute Alice‟s adventures: the reversal 
of becoming larger and smaller …; the reversal of the day before and the day after 
…; the reversal of more and less …; the reversal of cause and effect. (Deleuze 
Logic 2-3) 
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Narration cannot contain Bottom‟s experience, thereby rendering “unlimited” his 
becoming. However much he struggles to articulate his experience, it is clear that he has 
not forgotten it, just like the young lovers, who recall in a haze their experiences within 
the fairy-laden forest.  
 Demetrius first attempts to give some shape to his experiences of becoming by 
referring to them as “these things” that “seem small and undistinguishable, / Like far off 
mountains turnèd into clouds” (4.1.186-87).  Hermia, on the other hand, believes that, 
owing to her transformed vision, “everything seems double” (4.1.189).  As with 
Deleuze‟s Alice, who cannot determine “which way to turn because her travels take her 
“always in both directions at the same time,” so it is with the Athenian lovers, whose 
efforts at narrativizing their respective becomings fail because of the paradoxical tension 
within the experiences. But unlike Bottom, who hopes in future to transcend through art 
(specifically “a ballad”) the limitations of language and express the “infinite equivalence 
of an unlimited becoming” (Deleuze Logic 3), the young couples, on returning to the 
organized space of the city, quickly reterritorialize onto the established codes of 
marriage. Their refusal to question the process of the renewal of their romantic 
entanglements, which has once again enabled the lovers to partake of the socioeconomic 
fruits of Egeus and Theseus‟s approval of their marriages, makes them subjects of 
“regulated transformation,” which, as Elizabeth Grosz explains in Becomings, is in direct 
opposition to the truly new experiences of identity:  
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Predictable, measurable, regulated transformation seems a social prerequisite; but 
upheaval, the eruption of the event, the emergence of new alignments unpredicted 
within old networks seem to threaten to reverse all gains, … to place chaos and 
disorder at the heart of regulation and orderly progress.    (28) 
Keen to gain predictable social acceptance through their revised relationships, 
then, the Athenian lovers discard even the hazy recollections of their wild (culturally 
new) experiences. Their burden of inexplicable waking dreams is taken up by Bottom, 
who alone refuses to let go of his wild experiences but promises to share them with 
others. Although Theseus claims to the “fair lovers” that he of their “discourse … more 
will hear anon” (4.1.176-77), he makes it perfectly clear to Hippolyta that he does not 
want to engage in such “forms of things unknown” that only a “poet‟s pen” can translate 
or “name” (5.1.15-17).  Similarly, after their initial confusion regarding their own 
consciousness, the lovers agree that they “are awake” and will nostalgically “recount” 
their past “dreams” to each other en route to the temple.  However, when they speak 
again, the lovers do not mention their experiences in the woods, but, along with Theseus 
the Duke, ridicule the mechanicals‟ performance of Pyramus and Thisbe.  Notably, we 
only hear from Demetrius and Lysander, even though Hermia and Helena are present at 
the performance. Doubly reterritorialized, the two female friends seem not only to have 
left behind their twinned experience of childhood friendship when they were “[l]ike to a 
double cherry, seeming parted, / But yet an union in partition” (3.2.209-10), but, being 
married, they also embrace a chaste silence that distances them from their hitherto 
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autonomous identities as mobile and articulate lovers. Ironically, the women‟s earlier 
state of mobility coincided with their willingness to explore fearlessly new realms of 
identity.  When Demetrius finds himself plagued by Helena, he warns her against rape, 
the necessary consequence of her romantic exploration and wandering:  
You do impeach your modesty too much 
To leave the city and commit yourself 
Into the hands of one that loves you not, 
To trust the opportunity of night 
And the ill counsel of a desert place 
With the rich worth of your virginity.   
   (2.1.214-19; emphasis added) 
But the as yet unmarried Helena is unfazed by the Athenian‟s beastly threat of rape or 
death at the hands of “wild beasts” (2.1.228).  Instead, she embraces the opportunity to 
shift contemporary politics and the rhetoric of erotic chase. “The story shall be changed” 
(2.1.230), she informs Demetrius, when she will successfully rewrite the dynamic 
between Apollo and Daphne to cast the nymph in the body of the pursuer, the Greek god 
as the object of her pursuit.  The myth that Helena chooses to appropriate in her “story” is 
central to her physical location at the moment of her utterance—in the woods outside 
Athens.  
In Ovid‟s first book of Metamorphoses, Apollo, cursed by Cupid‟s arrow, follows 
Daphne through the woods in hope that she will reciprocate his love.  But the young 
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god‟s desire for the nymph is quickly frustrated, as he learns that the object of his love 
has an untamable, independent spirit that is far removed from patriarchal heternormative 
modes of being: 
In woods and forrests is hir joy, the savage beasts to chase, 
      … 
Unwedded Phebe doth she haunt and follow as hir guide, 
      … 
Full many a wooer sought hir love, she lothing all the rout, 
Impacient and without a man walkes all the woods about. 
And as for Hymen, or for love, and wedlock often sought 
She tooke no care, they were the furthest end of all hir thought. 
 (Book I 573-80, emphasis added)  
Penaeus, the river god and father to Daphne, reminds his daughter of her duty to the 
patriarch of marrying and bearing him male heirs to carry forward his lineage (Ovid, 
Book I, 584). But the nymph, “hating as a haynous crime the bonde of bridely bed” 
(Ovid, Book I, 585), pleads with her father to grant her a wish that would secure her 
maidenhood.  Penaeus reluctantly gives in to Daphne‟s transgressive desire, but 
simultaneously warns his child that her chastity will eventually be threatened by her 
beauty, the limit of her own form. Penaeus‟s words come true all too soon.  Driven by his 
desire for the beautiful lover of woods, Apollo catches up with Daphne and courts the 
maiden by assuring her that he is neither “Carle nor countrie Clowne” but the son of 
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“[t]he king of Gods” (Ovid, Book I, 623, 630-31).  Daphne, however, is not charmed by 
Apollo‟s bloodlines or even his divine powers, and sneaks away from the scene, 
famously leaving the young lover in midsentence.  Unfortunately for her, the violent god 
chases her down, “even as when the greedie Grewnde doth course the sielie Hare” (Ovid, 
Book I, 649).  Exhausted and unable to withstand Apollo‟s gaze or his erotic pursuit, 
Daphne seeks her father‟s help and prays to him to transform her shape, so she may 
escape possession.  Peneaeus once again gives in to his daughter‟s wish and transforms 
her into a tree that, even while its leaves and branches adorn Apollo‟s “golden lockes” or 
“[q]uyver” (Ovid, Book I, 685-86), remains sexually impervious to the bellicose god.            
  Helena‟s reimagination of Daphne‟s transformation is consistent with her 
overarching desire to effect a change in the politics within the play.  As early as Act One, 
scene one, she wishes to “to be … translated” so as to experience Demetrius‟s love 
through her friend Hermia‟s eyes (1.1.191).  Recognizing the power of love, which can 
“transpose” monstrous objects to “form and dignity” (1.1.233), she plans accordingly to 
alter the future course of her romantic career.  Helena divulges to Demetrius the secret of 
Hermia and Lysander‟s elopement, and, confident that he will pursue the object of his 
love into the woods, decides to “transpose” contemporary gender roles by adopting the 
role of pursuer and feasting her eyes upon her own lover, chasing him “thither and back 
again” (1.1.251).  Her willful mobility is astonishing, specifically because she hopes as 
author to document the means through which she will bring about a change in women‟s 
position in the arena of romantic courtship.  Despite changing the roles of Apollo and 
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Daphne in her appropriated tale, Helena retains the sexual dynamic of the mythical 
figures; Daphne remains female, even as she hunts down her lover.  Thus, in her vision of 
the future of all her “sex,” women will actively “fight for love as men may do” (2.1.240-
41).  Propelled by her authorial intent, Helena traps her lover “within the wood” outside 
the realms of civil, patriarchal society (2.1.192), just so she may “speed to catch” him 
(2.1. 233).  In the process, the woods, the site where Demetrius earlier states he “shall do 
… mischief” to Helena, suddenly become the space where the young woman may 
experiment with her dangerous and subversive desire, in short the location of her 
becoming.  But as with all other moments of becoming in the play, this one too is 
reterritorialized.  Promised Demetrius as reward for her return to the city (and its 
accompanying order of subservience), Helena promptly falls into line with patriarchal 
ideology, happily and silently following the figures of authority to the temple, the site of 
reterritorialization.  
While Titania‟s return to her marriage is not accompanied by a perfect silence, her 
language is meek, her verse finally humbled to a recitation defanged of aggression and 
pride, the very qualities that marked her early speeches in the play.  Although she retains 
her musicality, a characteristic that, as I have suggested above, the queen mobilized 
effectively to woo Bottom, her much abbreviated verse is now merely a part of Oberon‟s 
general magical scheme, her words sandwiched between the fairy king‟s authorial chant 
(5.1. 382-413).  The patriarchs of the earthly and fairy realms manage to assert through 
their respective articulations the direction of their subjects‟ futures.  With an “iron 
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tongue” Theseus sends off the newly married couples “to bed” (5.1.354-55); Oberon 
orders “every fairy” to “bless” the marriage beds of the mortals so that “Never mole, 
harelip, nor scar / Nor mark prodigious such as are / Despisèd in nativity / Shall upon 
their children be” (5.1.402-07).  Clearly, the leaders are eager to pave the way for 
heternormativity and patriarchally secured reproduction, to establish biological futurity as 
the fundamental means of imprinting the self onto the future.  In fact, Oberon‟s spell 
specifically targets the prevention of such monstrous births as are “the blots of nature‟s 
hand” (5.1.400).  Instead he certifies the future as a time of “sweet peace” in a space of 
“safety” (5.1.409, 411).  
In spite of his organizing chant, there is some unfinished business at the 
conclusion of A Midsummer Night‟s Dream.  Bottom‟s troublesome memory that he 
wishes to eternalize in song, Titania‟s eagerness to learn about her recent experiences 
with the other, and the Athenian lovers‟ enchanted marriages are all remnants of 
becoming, aspects of uncertainty that even Puck‟s magic broom cannot sweep under the 
carpet.  To varying degrees, the characters‟ “demand to remember … aspires to define the 
present and prescribe the future” in ways that cannot be determined or controlled by 
Theseus and Oberon (Sullivan 10).  Their reordering of characters‟ desires, then, may all 
come to naught.  That the last words of the play, spoken by the troublemaker Puck, offer 
no resolution but instead plunge us into the vagaries of equivocation anticipates the 
ungovernable and unpredictable movement that is integral to the experience of becoming. 
With the prospect of further becomings lurking in the shadows and applying a 
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paradoxical force to the seemingly stabilized relations in the play, the future in A 
Midsummer Night‟s Dream is as uncertain and unassuring as Puck‟s honesty.   
While at first glance, A Midsummer Night‟s Dream and A Chaste Maid in 
Cheapside seem to share no common boundaries, closer analysis reveals important 
similarities between the plays. For instance, the fairy king Oberon and the city-smart 
Allwit both manipulate the desire of others in order to sustain their own interests; in the 
process they willfully embrace cuckoldry and reconstruct the logic of power within 
patriarchy. Quite like his sorcerer counterpart in Shakespeare‟s early comedy, Allwit in 
Middleton‟s play engages in unnatural Deleuzean nuptials by replacing himself in his 
marriage with Sir Walter Whorehound, the jealous lover of Mistress Allwit. The 
Londoner recognizes the geography of the marriage bed “as the location of direct 
experience, a sensuous swirl of emotions and perceptions and myths, which (his) … 
analysis can only ignore or destroy” (Rose 71). But even as he tosses aside the social 
“perceptions and myths,” in short, ideologies, attached to marriage, Allwit remains fully 
conscious of its economic potential. Thus, in his analysis of matrimony, he expounds on 
the material benefits that accompany his reimagination of his role as husband:  
I am like a man 
Finding a table furnished to his hand, 
As mine is still to me, prays for the founder: 
 „Bless the right worshipful the good founder‟s life.‟ 
I thank him, he‟s maintained my house this ten years, 
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Not only keeps my wife, but a keeps me 
And all my family. I am at his table; 
He gets me all my children, and pays the nurse 
Monthly or weekly; puts me to nothing, 
Rent, nor church-duties, not so much as the scavenger: 
The happiest state that ever man was born to! 
… 
I have the name, and in his gold I shine; 
And where some merchants would in soul kiss hell 
To buy a paradise for their wives, and dye 
Their conscience in the bloods of prodigal heirs  
To deck their night-piece, yet all this being done, 
Eaten with jealousy to the inmost bone— 
As what affliction nature more constrains 
Than feed the wife for another‟s veins?— 
These torments stand I free of; I am as clear 
From jealousy of a wife as from the charge.   (1.2.12-50) 
For Allwit marriage is a doorway that conveniently straddles the two marketable 
spaces of street and home, providing him with ample opportunity to simulate the logic of 
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production and exercise the logic of consumption.
7
 At the same time, marriage allows 
him to construct a future that is fundamentally performative; his recognition that he 
“must fit all … times, or there‟s no music” is symptomatic of his greater awareness of the 
theatrical nature of domesticity. Having assigned to Whorehound the normative functions 
of biological futurity, he performs a perverse or monstrous fatherhood that stands in 
direct opposition to the early modern anxiety regarding paternal imprinting. Like Oberon, 
whose desire for a “henchman” is not obstructed by the limits of his vision of the future 
of patriarchy, Allwit too embraces a futurity that is “labyrinthine” in its ability to engage 
with and problematize multiple systems of commercial exchange (Wells). Quite unlike 
the “Ovidian wittol” who fails to “grasp the extent to which his wittolry effeminizes its 
subject” (Boehrer 180), Allwit becomes the strategic wittol who disinherits conventional 
performances of gender and production. Indeed the “Rabelaisian poetics of the 
consuming and leaking body” that John Jowett regards as peculiar to Middleton‟s canon 
is nowhere more prominent than in his characterization of Allwit in A Chaste Maid (508).  
While Sir Walter Whorehound may also to a certain degree be seen as a 
participant in carnivalesque eroticism, his adulterous festivity is limited by his guilt and 
                                                 
7
 While Alizon Brunning interprets Allwit‟s self-determined and self-directed cuckoldry 
as a symptom of his removal “from the cycle of production and consumption” (14), I 
would argue his separation is purely performative. Allwit is fully invested in the cycle of 
his wife‟s and Whorehound‟s material production and consumption. As one who can 
stand between the two (as promoter but also as prohibitor), Allwit embraces the ideology 
of exchange by performing the role of connector.   
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its accompanying recognition of negative repercussions.
8
 In a speech that parodies both 
Claudius‟ confession soliloquy and Faustus‟ many speeches about his unrepentant soul, 
the injured Whorehound cries:  
O how my offences wrestle with my repentance, 
It hath scarce breath, 
Still my adulterous guilt hovers aloft, 
And with her blacke Wings beats downe all my prayers, 
Ere they be halfe way up, what‟s he knows now, 
How long I have to live? O what comes then, 
My tast growes bitter, the round World, all Gall now, 
Her pleasing pleasure now hath poyson‟d me, 
Which I exchang‟d my Soule for, 
Make way a hundred sighes at once for me.   (5.1.83-92)  
 Critics have often been troubled by this scene, which Derek Alwes considers to be 
among the most “notorious” in Middleton‟s dramatic canon (101). The fundamental 
division between scholars‟ interpretations of the pseudo death-bed scene is telling; while 
one group presents Whorehound as a nasty “villain” who “fully deserves” his 
“punishment” (Gill 35), the other finds his expression to be sincerely painful, the scene 
“one of the cruelest… in all of Renaissance drama” (Rowe 137). Neither extreme, as 
                                                 
8
 In keeping with the tradition of carnival, Whorehound‟s adultery is always-already 
contained by his knowledge that his affair with Mistress Allwit will necessarily come to a 
close and be replaced by a legitimate marriage, ideally to Moll Yellowhammer. 
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Alwes astutely points out, provides a satisfactory moral explanation for Whorehound‟s 
outburst. Rather, his character must be evaluated within the context of the contradictions 
that it presents (Rowe 101-02).  
But Whorehound‟s morality is not the only matter here that is riddled with 
contradictions. His fear of death and afterlife notwithstanding, Whorehound‟s primary 
cause for concern is future life, specifically his loss to Touchwood Junior of Moll, their 
vehicle of secured futurity. Where earlier he imagined a future endowed with the wealthy 
goldsmith Yellowhammer‟s fortune and young daughter (and, presumably legitimate 
offspring through her), he now has nothing substantial to look upon but his bastard 
children whose lives hardly secure his economic future or lineage. Faced with dire 
material consequences in his lifetime, he ponders his fate after death and panics at the 
thought of “what comes then.” 
 Allwit too panics at the prospect of his benefactor‟s death, declaring to his wife 
and Davy Dahumma that Whorehound‟s mortality may very well bring about his own 
(5.1.5-8). But even as he thinks of death, what lies beyond the earthly realm is of no 
interest to him. Unlike Whorehound, who transfers onto his immaterial soul the quandary 
of his material future, Allwit is horrified by the moment at which he must give up his 
innovative and seamless adaptations of matrimony to reterritorialize onto the conventions 
of patriarchy. Thus resigned to his fate as husband and master of his house, he admits to 
his wife that he is “done” with his playful or adaptive ways that let him have his “Nose 
… in everie thing” (5.1.197-98). Instead, the future that Allwit now imagines entails the 
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couple renting out their “Lodgings,” not his wife (5.1.187);9 along with his humbled 
return to economic sensibility, the hitherto gamester acknowledges the systematic power 
of institutions such as marriage and the state: “There‟s no Gamster like a politike sinner, / 
For who e‟re games, the Box is sure a winner” (5.1.200-01). 
 Despite his reterritorialization and promise of reformation, the spirit of 
performative domesticity continues in the play; what Allwit must perforce give up, the 
Touchwoods enthusiastically embrace. An effective insemination device, Touchwood 
Senior is “the comic avatar of Eros” who holds the biological key to multiple, intertwined 
futures (Marotti 67). Importantly, he is also an embodiment of the paradoxes straddled by 
the play; at once “too fruitful” and of “barren fortunes” (2.1.9), Touchwood Senior trades 
in his insolvency for the strategic redistribution of his productivity. While in the past his 
hyper-potency may have jeopardized not only his own fortunes but also that of others, he 
articulates his determination to mend his ways and, in the process, acquire material 
wealth. His self-amendment, however, stems from his continued ability to destabilize the 
patriarchal bloodlines in Cheapside. The only difference is that the bastard children that 
are his “workemanship” and owing to whom he had spent all his wealth (either to 
“tender” husbands to the women he impregnated or else to purchase their silence) will 
now be transformed into valuable sources of investments (2.1.69, 84). The Kixes, who 
would readily “give a thousand pound to purchase fruitfulness” (2.1.154), are so driven 
                                                 
9
 Notably, even when Allwit has to give up his hitherto happy identity as consumer of his 
wife‟s labor, he does not abandon the ideology of exchange. As landlord, he simply 
means to switch the item that he will exchange for wealth and material security.  
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by the desire for biological futurity that they are willing to simulate its course and 
willfully corrupt their bloodlines in order to “keepe” the children that are got for them 
(5.4.88). Released from one form of patriarchal anxiety—cuckoldry—they are consumed 
by another, namely their “dry barrenness,” which threatens to famish them and “fat (the) 
fortunes” of others who will have a secure material future thanks to the steady inflow of 
dowries and inheritance (2.1.169-72). In their ability to recognize and embrace the 
paradoxes that inform contemporary patriarchy, the Kixes along with Allwit and 
Whorehound echo Oberon‟s appropriative genius.   
 The paradoxical means by which patriarchy operates in A Chaste Maid is most 
keenly drawn out by Tim‟s and the tutor‟s multiple plays on faulty logic. “In the 
university” and therefore “ne‟er trained up to women‟s company” (3.2.116-17), Tim and 
his tutor come to Cheapside donning academic sterility on their sleeves. “In league with 
logic” (3.2.144), and armed with rhetoric, the men swear they can erase the common 
perception of fools and whores and instead render them “reasonable” and “honest” 
(4.1.36-41), respectively. As Tim‟s arranged wooing of and marriage to the Welsh 
Gentlewoman becomes an occasion for crafty wordplay, what becomes increasingly clear 
is the “monstrous absurdity” of matrimonial alliances (3.2.137), which link mysterious 
but vehemently material goods to human bodies:  
They say she has mountains to her marriage; 
She‟s full of cattle, some two thousand runts: 
Now what the meaning of these runts should be, 
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My tutor cannot tell me. 
I have looked in Rider‟s Dictionary for the letter R, and 
There I can hear no tidings of these runts neither … (4.1.93-98)  
Aside from the meaning of nonexistent “runts,” the chief irony here of course is that the 
Welshwoman is a doubly material being, far removed from Tim‟s fantasy of the well-
versed and well-traveled female scholar he would enjoy marrying. A prostitute whose 
body is literally an item for sale, she is also the bait that Whorehound hopes the 
Yellowhammers will bite on and, in so doing, allow for a lasting transference of the 
goldsmiths‟ fortunes to him. She is to function, in other words, as a passageway for the 
unequal exchange of wealth.  
But as Whorehound‟s plans are foiled by the appropriative patriarchal practices of 
Allwit, the Kixes and the Touchwoods, the union of Tim and the Welsh Gentlewoman, 
epitomized by the seemingly nonsense word “runt,” becomes a spectacular display of that 
“thing called marriage,” which, in the play‟s world, is a giant “trick beyond … logic” or 
learning  (5.4.111-12). Never particularly keen on the company of women, Tim hardly is 
even disappointed that his wife was a whore. He settles on the marriage, promising to 
love the absurd wit of the situation. Indeed Middleton‟s drama distills the qualities of 
material futurity that inform matrimony and discards the surrounding ideology of love for 
the demise of which Tim and the tutor compose their ridiculous epitaphs. Not 
surprisingly, in his mock description to his parents of Moll‟s waning health, Tim 
compares the melancholy lover‟s transformation to the “change” of “[g]old into white 
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money” (5.2.17). Even love‟s disappointment, it seems, cannot be explained without the 
rhetoric of currency and cash flow. Well grounded in their economy, then, the various 
couples in the play reterritorialize onto marriage, specifically “two marriages” for which 
“[o]ne feast will serve” (5.4.118-20).              
 The Rhetoric of Capital: Market and Movement in The Roaring Girl and 
The Witch of Edmonton 
Unruly women and men litter the London streets of Middleton and Dekker‟s The 
Roaring Girl, just as they populate the Edmonton of Dekker, Rowley, and Ford‟s The 
Witch of Edmonton. Their unruliness is the product of the changing face of the English 
economy that, moving away from a feudal structure towards early capitalism, by force 
destabilizes all personal relations in the communities, including those of gender. The 
effects of the instability are felt most clearly within the microcosmic organization of 
marriage, but they are tangible even in the larger social contexts. Significantly, the 
difference in the texts‟ representation of unruly characters, matrimony, and social codes 
also marks the difference in the genres‟ ability to negotiate the early modern experience 
of socio-economic flux. Despite the differences, the functioning of the everyday 
principles of futurity is at the center of both plays, and the generic distinctions between 
them serve to emphasize the flexibility of the social codes that determine the ways in 
which characters in the drama contextualize their past, present, and future actions and 
desires.  
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Being true to the conventions of comedy, The Roaring Girl, published first in 
1611, manages to tame—howsoever tentatively—the characters‟ unruliness through the 
all-subsuming medium of marriage. Indeed, marriage, which is the goal with which the 
play begins and that establishes the action in all plots, is in the end achieved; the lovers 
are united in the bond of matrimony, and marriages, even if they are threatened by 
adulterous interventions, are technically uncorrupted at play‟s end.  Unlike Valerie 
Forman, who suggests that in the play “the marriage plot itself is not the issue” (1550), I 
would argue that the opposite is true. While the play is not merely about the particular 
marriage plots that it sets up (of Sebastian and Mary, of the Gallipots and the Openworks, 
or even the potential marriage of Moll Cutpurse to a fitting man), it is about the 
construction of various institutions that rely on matrimony for securing their future. Of 
course Forman is right when she points out that “[t]he „economy‟ of (the) play is driven 
not by romantic desire …, but by the circulation of commodities and particularly the 
counterfeits with which that circulation is associated” (1551). But it is crucial to note that, 
in the play, marriage itself is presented as a commodity that is the primary medium of 
economic exchange between individuals, a vehicle for both sound and counterfeit 
investments.     
The Roaring Girl depicts an urban society that focuses on the reluctant 
conjunction of class mobility and appropriative gender roles. While the protagonists 
actively seek ways to secure themselves materially and emotionally, their vehicle of 
choice remains marriage and the forging of lucrative family relations. Of course, in the 
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play‟s market-savvy world, temporary “fixes,” such as sexual and romantic liaisons 
outside of marital confines, are popular alternatives because they are presented as 
avenues through which class ascendancy may be simulated. Thus we see young Sebastian 
feigning a love interest in Moll Cutpurse, so as to coerce his father Sir Alexander to give 
in to his desire to marry Mary Fitzallard, whose father seemingly can no longer afford a 
hefty enough dowry to satisfy the avaricious Justice of the Peace.
10
 Similarly, the pauper-
gallant Laxton strings along the tobacconist Mistress Gallipot in order to furnish himself 
with the conveniences offered to him through his illicit affairs with the married woman—
free tobacco, money, and the opportunity to engage in other fetishized relationships. 
Although it seems that we are to judge harshly the unstable marriage bed and corrupt 
marital arrangements, we are not offered a positive alternative that would reestablish 
matrimony safely within the realm of patriarchy. Instead we are left with a suggestion 
that if patriarchy‟s various apparatuses, including matrimony, are to survive into the 
future, they must undergo fundamental transformations in order to accommodate the 
economic changes brought about by the growth of capitalism. The most notable marriage 
in the play is that of the Gallipots, whose relationship destabilizes the patriarchal 
premises of matrimony. The prototypical scold, Mistress Gallipot not only cuckolds her 
naïve husband, she also manages successfully to extract money from him in order to 
                                                 
10
 For a useful discussion of Sir Alexander‟s socio-economic and political status and 
ambitions, see Paul Mulholland‟s introduction to his edition of The Roaring Girl, 
especially pp 25-26. Middleton, Thomas and Thomas Dekker. The Roaring Girl. Ed. Paul 
A. Mulholland. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1987. 
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maintain Laxton as her lover.
11
 Hippocrates Gallipot himself is presented as the noble-
hearted cuckold, as a man who, not unlike Othello, loves his wife too dearly. But unlike 
Othello, Gallipot is only too hasty to trust his wife. As he fawns over Mistress Gallipot, 
striving “to please her night and day” (3.2.36), going so far as to “wink at” the possibility 
of his wife thrusting his “soft pillow under another‟s head” (3.2115-16), the apothecary is 
doubly feminized: by his wife, who accuses him of being an “apron husband” (3.2.33), 
and also by himself.  
Unable to withstand the demands of a shifting economy, then, love is weak. Even 
when it is brought to its desirable (and conventional) goal of marriage, we can hardly 
imagine, given its consistently cynical portrayal, an unproblematic and successful future 
for the institution that is fundamental both to patriarchy and capitalism. The primary 
love-plot of Sebastian and Mary is no exception and also is inextricably linked to 
contemporary concerns regarding capital and investment. Although Sebastian claims to 
“have a free will” that “perfect shine[s] … in his will to love” (2.2.1-2), he makes it 
equally clear that he is not prepared to risk disinheritance by prioritizing the woman over 
the money. Consequently, he recognizes that he must “wildly in a labyrinth … go” 
(1.2.95), and must “counterfeit passion” in order to inherit from his father something 
more valuable than just “birth” (1.2.92)—“the keys of wealth” that would secure the 
                                                 
11
 While Mistress Gallipot never manages to fulfill her sexual desire for Laxton, her 
desire in itself may be read as an act of adultery. Moreover, it must be noted that she does 
not accomplish her adulterous goals only because Laxton, who “hate[s] her” but uses her 
facility “to keep (him) in fashion with the gallants” (2.1.90-91), does not oblige her with 
sexual gratification, but instead repeatedly postpones its possibility.  
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young man‟s material future and enable him to pursue a romantic career with Mary 
Fitzallard (5.2.200). Indeed, for Sebastian to secure himself economically and be united 
with his betrothed, he must offer his father the monstrous figure of the alternative 
daughter-in-law: mad Moll. A cross-dressing “creature” of dubious birth and income, 
who mocks not only “the sex of woman” (1.2.127-28), but, more importantly, also that of 
man, Moll Cutpurse stands in direct opposition to the ideologies of the old guard of 
patriarchal futurity. While her confusing physicality renders her a difficult site of 
biological futurity (for she is “woman more than man, / Man more than woman”), her 
status as single woman emphasizes the uncertainty of the sources of her income, thereby 
denying the pre-established economics of inheritance.
12
 Despite the cynical view of 
matrimony, the play retains it as its central component, establishing it as a necessary if 
troubling institution through which the culture of patriarchy and capital may be 
propagated in new ways toward newer, hitherto unimagined futures.   
                                                 
12
 As I have shown in chapter two, single women are a stock feature of early modern 
drama. One need only think of Portia in The Merchant of Venice, to recognize that single 
women occupy a central role in the Renaissance imagination. But unlike Moll Cutpurse 
in The Roaring Girl, Portia and most of the other single women have traceable sources of 
income. In fact, Shakespeare in The Merchant goes through pains to put on display the 
history of the women‟s acquisitions. Even the more problematic, self-employed female 
characters in the drama have verifiable incomes. For details, see chapter two, especially 
my discussion of Anne in A Fair Quarrel and Hecate in The Witch. Moll Cutpurse is 
exceptional because, while she is capable of making luxurious purchases at the 
marketplace, patronizing local taverns, and employing servants, there is no evidence 
whatsoever in the play regarding either her bloodlines (her inheritance) or the line of 
work that economically sustains her flamboyant lifestyle. (Although Moll is accused of 
prostitution, as her profession it hardly can account for her lavish purchases of fabric or 
tobacco.)   
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Unlike The Roaring Girl, however, The Witch of Edmonton, a tragicomedy 
“[w]ritten between the execution of Elizabeth Sawyer on April 19, 1621, and a Court 
performance later that year by the Prince‟s Company on December 29” (Champion 112), 
makes no effort to negotiate the contradictions that abound in a society that is faced with 
the problem of restructuring itself around the nascent ideals of capitalism, while 
maintaining through matrimony the notions of stability that are crucial to the success of 
patriarchy.
13
 Thus, while two of the three plots in The Witch of Edmonton end “not 
merely (with) a threatening possibility but the reality” of death (Champion 112), the third 
plot, involving Cuddy Banks, ends in frustration, as the economic, marital, and sexual 
aspirations of the young clown are inconclusively repressed. Although the play concludes 
with a marriage—that of Katherine and Somerton—the general future looks bleak, 
neither deaths nor marriage, that is, the two established mediums of reterritorialization, 
bring about a satisfactory (or convincing) resolution to the world of Edmonton. Indeed, as 
Champion notes, the playwrights‟ “emphasis on the festering social corruption and (their) 
                                                 
13
 Various scholars, notably William Alfred Harbage and M. L. Wine, consider The Witch 
of Edmonton to be a tragicomedy, while others, such as George Price and Lenora 
Brodwin, refer to it as a domestic tragedy (Champion 112). Larry Champion argues that 
the play cannot fit easily into the category of tragicomedy, because “[u]nlike the typically 
monolithic figures (of tragicomedy), Frank Thorney and Mother Sawyer are ambivalent 
individuals who simultaneously provoke sympathy and judgment,” thereby aligning 
themselves (and the play) with the tradition of the “English Renaissance tragedy” (113). 
For further details regarding the varied approaches to the play‟s generic structure, see 
Larry Champion‟s “Factions of Distempered Passions: The Development of John Ford‟s 
Tragic Vision in The Witch of Edmonton and The Lover‟s Melancholy.” “Concord in 
Discord”: The Plays of John Ford, 1586-1986. Ed. Donald K. Anderson, Jr. New York: 
AMS Press. 1986, 109-30. 
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refusal to provide a single convincing teleology for the stage world … convey a 
fundamentally pessimistic view of life in which man‟s challenge is not the heroic deed or 
the new horizon but the ambiguity of moral values constantly frustrating his search for a 
meaningful life” (111). This “ambiguity” betrays an anxious domestic futurity in an 
unfamiliar world that, having rendered meaningless the feudalistic ideology of the past, is 
incapable of constructing a reliable capitalist alternative.  
In light of the complications in its plot structure, it is clear that The Witch of 
Edmonton does not satisfy Fletcher‟s infamous definition of a tragicomedy: the play does 
not “want death”; and while it is “a representation of familiar people,” it seems also at 
pains to represent “a God” who is not “as lawfull …as in a tragedie” (qtd. in McMullan 
and Hope 3). However, it is through its generic nonconformity that the play expands the 
dramatic possibilities of imagining and representing the future. Refusing to accommodate 
convincingly the comedic conventions of marriage, conventions that may mollify the 
horror, excess, and tragedy of the multiple deaths, The Witch of Edmonton is a timely 
play that speaks as much to contemporary anxieties regarding unstable gender and class 
relations within an early capitalist milieu, as it represents the social crises that stem from 
the absence of right, or at least clear-cut, directions that its protagonists must pursue 
toward fruitful ends. In its unwillingness to commit to contemporary regulations of 
tragedy, comedy, or even Fletcherian tragicomedy, the play situates on the early modern 
stage a new brand of tragicomedy, one that represents effectively the contemporary sense 
of unsettlement.  
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Of course, in both The Roaring Girl and The Witch of Edmonton attempts are 
made to use the disciplinary rhetoric of gossip and law to uphold patriarchy and contain 
the unruly subjects, especially the women, whom these devices render as monstrous. 
Notably, the effects on their male counterparts are not as dire, in that the unruly men are 
allowed to retain their humanity, even while they are punished (disciplined) for their 
transgressions. Doubtless, The Roaring Girl manages more successfully than The Witch 
of Edmonton to negotiate the disciplinary tool of gossip, and, in so doing, averts tragedy. 
But the logic that leads to comedic resolution is forced and the future that is promised at 
play‟s end is tentative, quite like the Roaring girl herself, who addresses the possibility of 
her virtuous marriage at a future time (which, notably, Lord Noland thinks of as 
“doomsday”), while retaining her desire to “o‟both sides o‟th‟bed” with herself (2.2.37-
38). In The Witch of Edmonton the disciplinary tools are even less effective, at times 
functioning counterproductively: although they lead to the executions of a witch and a 
bigamist-murderer, neither gossip nor the law provides a semblance of stability, and both 
are therefore rendered incapable of reestablishing a sense of security within the 
community of Edmonton.  
As early as in the Prologue to The Roaring Girl, we are introduced to a news-
savvy culture, to a people whose “attention sets wide ope (their) gates / Of hearing” (13-
14).
14
 What they are keen to hear are the spectacular tales of women‟s and men‟s 
                                                 
14
 I use the term “news” as much in its early modern context of gossip or untrustworthy 
information, as in its modern sense, wherein it connotes “facts” that are of concern for 
members of a community.  
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unruliness. Sir Alexander, eager at once to display to the gallants the spoils of his 
accumulation, which “cost many a fair grey groat ere it came here” (1.2.12), and use their 
attention to narrate his concerns regarding his errant son, negotiates his “pretty tale” 
through the rhetoric of gossip (1.2.61). Transferring onto an imaginary “agèd man” his 
own anguish at Sebastian‟s alleged affair with Moll Cutpurse (1.2.64), Sir Alexander 
spins a story shrouded in namelessness and secrecy, piquing in the process his audience‟s 
interest. Significantly, the listeners are eager not simply to hear the tale, but also to be 
informed of the names of its “characters.” Hoping that his guests “shall pardon (him)” for 
deferring this vital piece of information (1.2.68), Sir Alexander builds up the gallants‟ 
curiosity, constructing his narrative through strategic pauses and elisions that leave the 
men craving more information. In so doing, he converts his aptly furnished parlor into a 
theatrical space wherein he is both performer and playwright.
15
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
15
 In the scene Sir Alexander gives his guests a tour of the “inner room” and parlor of his 
fashionable home, which is cluttered with luxurious furniture, fine tapestry, and 
expensive artwork (1.2.10-59). By dwelling on the material value of the objects that he 
has purchased, and demanding that his guests pay attention to his acquisitions, the old 
knight identifies the work of art as a commodity. But he also represents artistic 
production as a means of deception, wherein in the “[t]hronged heaps” may lose 
themselves to “[s]tories of men and women, mixed together/ Fair ones with foul, like 
sunshine in wet weather” (1.2.17-18), and in so doing risk being robbed of their 
belongings by “a cutpurse” who “thrusts and leers/ With hawk‟s eyes for his prey” 
(1.2.26-27). While Sir Alexander‟s comments target the visual dynamics of paintings, his 
“theory” can be applied just as easily to the dynamics of the early modern theatre: 
members of the audience often were absorbed by, and participated in, the “action” 
onstage; and pickpockets frequented the theatres, seeking easy and abundant targets. In 
another sense, this scene parallels nicely the form of The Roaring Girl: as the playwrights 
weave for their audience‟s pleasure Mad Moll‟s “character” (Prologue 26), they rely to 
some degree on the historical events of her trial, with which contemporary Londoners 
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The purpose of his playing unfurls along with his narration of the old man‟s tale. 
Having established his “old man” as an icon of wealth and generosity, as one who 
“spend[s]” his wealth yet has enough to give some of it away “to all that need it” 
(1.2.100-01), Sir Alexander introduces another character, the “cause” of his 
“protagonist‟s” sorrow (1.2.77): the son‟s love interest. The “flesh-fly” whom the knight 
conjures up through his narrative is none other than Moll Cutpurse (1.2.124). His 
description of the woman is important. In Sir Alexander‟s view, Moll is:  
   „A creature … nature hath brought forth 
   To mock the sex of woman.‟ It is a thing 
   One knows not how to name: her birth began 
   Ere she was all made. ‟Tis woman more than man, 
   Man more than woman, and—which to none can hap— 
   The sun gives her two shadows to one shape; 
   Nay, more, let this strange thing walk, stand, or sit, 
   No blazing star draws more eyes after it. 
       (1.2.127-133; emphasis added.)  
Sir Alexander deliberately constructs Moll in terms that problematize not only her gender 
but also her humanity. Not surprisingly, his guests assign her the title to which their host 
has cleverly pointed, even if he has refused to grant her a name: putting two and two 
                                                                                                                                                 
must have been familiar. But they use the interest that Moll‟s character generates to make 
their play more about the Londoners themselves, specifically the politics of their 
viewership.     
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together, the gallants identify Moll as “[a] monster!” (1.2.134). The gallants are the 
perfect audience and Sir Alexander is the perceptive architect who, knowing full well the 
social order within which his audience functions, offers up a body that they would readily 
identify and judge to be unruly and dangerous. Even before Moll has made her first 
appearance on stage, then, she has been made monstrous, or at least anomalous. At 
Sebastian‟s staged outburst at his father‟s vilification of Moll, Sir Alexander confesses to 
being the “wretched father” whose story he has just narrated (1.2.146). The townsmen, 
being characteristically updated with the town‟s rumor, inquire whether Sebastian is not 
to wed Sir Guy Fitzallard‟s daughter. While Sir Alexander initially welcomes this piece 
of gossip as true, when his son demands to have his father accept Mary (Moll) Fitzallard, 
the covetous Londoner steps back from the prospect, swearing that he would rather “give 
(his son) ratsbane” than have him marry a pauper (1.2.169). Upon hearing his father‟s 
verdict against his true love, Sebastian reverts to his “counterfeit passions” for the cross-
dressed, socially suspect Moll (1.1.102), claiming that he is “so bewitched, so bound to 
(his) desires” that “nothing can quench out (the) fires/ That burn within (him)” (1.2. 174-
76; emphasis added). It is crucial to note here that Sebastian too participates in the 
rhetoric of the Londoners that insists on identifying the unruly female form as monstrous 
or “witchy.” While in an earlier exchange with his betrothed Sebastian may only have 
represented Moll as a comic convenience that would facilitate his marriage to Mary 
Fitzallard, he now casts her decidedly in the figure of a dangerous, supernatural, being 
that is capable of creating familial discord and disrupting patriarchy through her mere 
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presence. Significantly, Sir Alexander responds (albeit in an aside) to his son‟s defiance 
by promising to murder Moll Cutpurse.  
The scene concludes on an ominous note. As the gallants and Sebastian take their 
leave, and as Sir Alexander instructs his new recruit and employee, Ralph Trapdoor, to 
ensnare Moll Cutpurse, we are introduced to the terrifying undertones of the comic plot. 
Quite likely a petty criminal, Trapdoor is invited by the nobleman to perform a social 
function: that of discipline.
16
 However, as the community‟s Justice of the Peace, Sir 
Alexander is also careful to write himself into the chief disciplinary position, stating that 
he will “play the shepherd,” and that, to protect his townsmen‟s lives and reputations and 
futures from the socially wayward Moll, he will magisterially “cut her” throat (1.2.235-
36). While the scene would have been a comic highpoint for a contemporary audience, it 
also brings us dangerously close to dramatic horror. Violence, both in desired action and 
in speech, inundates the scene between Sir Alexander and Trapdoor. Be it in their 
references to cutting Moll‟s comb (1.2.216), violating her chastity with the lure of wealth 
and sexually assaulting her in the process (1.2.219-20; 226-29), or plotting her murder 
through the appropriation of the law (1.2.232-34), the men rejoice in the prospect of 
punishing the unruly subject for her transgressions. While their verbal exchange could be 
seen to function within the realm of cultural fantasy (for Moll does not suffer death or 
                                                 
16
 In the scene Sir Alexander remarks that Trapdoor‟s palms are burnt. While the villain 
states that this is a result of an accident with respect to fireworks, it is likely that, in 
keeping with contemporary practices of punishment for petty crimes, Trapdoor may have 
been subject to the judicial system with which he seems familiar. 
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even shame at the hands of the men), nonetheless it is clear that the men charge their 
speech with a potent threat, one that, in a tragicomedy such as The Witch of Edmonton, 
leads to the execution of the transgressive female.
17
   
As with The Roaring Girl, The Witch of Edmonton too has multiple marriage 
plots—one of which involves both bigamy and paternal deception—that propagate the 
play‟s action. However, without transporting marriage to the background, the play also 
focuses on the material conditions of poverty and old age. Living by “her own hands” and 
struggling to survive, Mother Sawyer is a deformed presence whose age, gender, 
disability, and economic precariousness render her a prime target for victimization. In the 
throes of poverty, the citizens of Edmonton persecute any and all deviance from the norm 
and strike dead the antisocial dissenters who voice or make visible their opposition to 
patriarchal authority. Consequently, Mother Sawyer, who is hailed as a witch and 
charged with the crimes of spreading disease, poverty, and marital perversions (infidelity 
and murder) throughout her community, is executed. Her deformed body, one that 
possibly is no longer even of reproductive use to patriarchal futurity, is put to use 
anyway: framed as a supernatural-criminal being, it is held up by the authorities as an 
unruly form, as an external symbol that instigates the townspeople‟s fictionalization, 
consumption, and imaginary destruction of their own sufferings.  
                                                 
17
 For a provocative, materialist discussion of the term “cultural fantasy,” see Valerie 
Forman‟s “Marked Angels: Counterfeits, Commodities, and The Roaring Girl.” 
Renaissance Quarterly. 54.4 (Winter 2001): 1531-60.  
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A direct source for the playwrights‟ construction of their female protagonist, 
Henry Goodcole‟s The Wonderfull Discoverie of Elizabeth Sawyer, a Witch is 
representative of the multiple witchcraft tracts that were published in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. The tract embodies the contradictions that surrounded 
the identity of the early modern witch, contradictions that, ironically, it claims to resolve 
by presenting “nothing but matter of fact” (Goodcole qtd. in Onat 381). But even as 
Goodcole condemns the idle gossip and superstitions about witches, and is “ashamed to 
see and heare … ridiculous fictions of (Elizabeth Sawyer) that are “fitter for an Ale-bench 
then for a … Court of Justice” (382; emphasis added), he readily constructs the old 
woman as the stereotypical witch: “crooked and deformed, even bending together” (383). 
Moreover, he makes a point to note her “cursing, swearing, blaspheming and 
imprecating” speech (383). However, while the tract avoids focusing on the material 
circumstances that may have led to the accusations against the old woman, it 
inadvertently hints at Sawyer‟s socio-economic and cultural position within her 
community. Goodcole states that Sawyer cursed and verbally abused or threatened the 
citizens of Edmonton for the specific reason that they would not support her 
economically: they “would not buy broomes of her.” Of course, the chaplain “uses … 
(Sawyer‟s) poverty as proof of her malice towards her neighbors” (Stymeist 37), and goes 
on to extract from her the bizarre confession regarding her familiar—the dog who sucked 
on her blood. Contemporary readers may have concentrated on Sawyer‟s malice more 
than on the economic conditions that led to her hostility towards her community. But we 
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ought not to overlook this vital element of her confession, especially since Dekker, 
Rowley, and Ford make Sawyer‟s poverty, her age, her disability, and her gender a focal 
point of the plot in The Witch of Edmonton. While the playwrights subscribe both to the 
generic and social conventions regarding witches (by incorporating popular 
superstitions), they also write into the play a sense of representational ambivalence. 
Through its use of the parallel plots and the competing discourses reflected therein, the 
play situates the witch alongside the other residents of Edmonton: within the changing 
economic structure of early modern England.  
Even as it caters to contemporary stereotypes of witches, then, the play situates 
Mother Sawyer, and all the other characters, within a rural community that reels under 
the pressures of the Enclosure Acts. The Acts were passed in response to the growing 
demand for wool, which was the largest English export item of the early modern period. 
Keen to capitalize on the sheep-rearing business, many landowning farmers converted 
large sections of their land into pastures for grazing sheep, thereby putting a stop to the 
hitherto paternalistic structure of the agrarian economy that, prior to the passing of the 
acts, had sustained the poor, who “could gather domestic essentials, like firewood and 
building thatch, from the local common” (Stymeist 37). However, as Stymeist points out,  
“[w]ith early modern enclosure legislation, marginal members of rural communities 
became more dependent on their neighbors‟ charity, and many of them were forced to 
become petty beggars, slipping into the criminalized class of vagabonds and the 
underemployed” (37). While the Enclosure Acts may not have initiated agrarian 
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capitalism, they certainly sped up and solidified the phenomenon, uprooting in the 
process vast sections of the rural population of England.
18
 In conjunction with these acts, 
others legal enforcements (such as the Vagrancy Act) made survival increasingly difficult 
for those members of the community who did not fit into any fixed and recognizable 
demographic category. With the support of the shifting economic and legal system, then, 
the able-bodied poor were punished for begging without due license and permission from 
the authorities; and women and men could be thrown into prisons (such as Newgate) and 
mental institutions (Bedlam) if they were caught “out of service.” Although the Poor Law 
that was passed in 1601 was designed to provide relief to the poorer sections of England, 
it also limited the scope of charity, which in earlier times was a Church endorsed but 
private activity. Now local parishes were officially responsible for maintaining their poor, 
and also for controlling their own “poor problems.” Given this, it is not unthinkable that 
the local authorities and leaders worked hand in glove with the more prosperous members 
of the community to identify and persecute those residents whose poverty and inability or 
unwillingness to work rendered them altogether parasitic or at least a threat to the 
developing principles of economic futurity. Since poverty was beginning to be regarded 
as a menace, and the poor as a collective burden on their society‟s scarce resources, 
citizens no longer felt obliged to participate in the well-being or even survival of 
individuals such as Elizabeth Sawyer. Instead they were resentful toward such women 
                                                 
18
 It is crucial to note that the passing of the Enclosure Acts, and their renewals during the 
reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth indicates the state‟s endorsement of the economic 
shift from a feudal to a capitalist structure. 
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and held them up as scavengers, creatures whose futures did not coincide with or 
propagate the interests of larger society. These women‟s bodies became the loci of early 
modern anxieties regarding economic redistribution. Superstition and religious anxiety 
became convenient tools of social engineering that could be put to use, in order to rid 
early modern communities of the economic threat posed by elderly women.  
In The Witch of Edmonton Mother Sawyer‟s opening speech exemplifies her 
awareness of her marginalized status in Edmonton‟s community: as that of an old woman 
upon whom the “envious world/ Throw[s] … scandalous malice” (2.1.1-2), specifically 
because she is identifiable to them as “poor, deformed and ignorant” (2.1.3). Clearly 
Mother Sawyer is conscious of the systems of oppression and social injustice rampant in 
a changing world that marks her as a witch. Beaten by Old Banks for trespassing on his 
property, persecuted and ridiculed by the mindless youth of Edmonton, and abandoned by 
her community, which, in the past was “wont to wait on age” (4.1.122), Mother Sawyer 
spirals into acts of defiance. Desperate to seek relief from the constant vexation and 
torture that she suffers at the hands of the Edmontonians, the old woman wonders at the 
powers of witchcraft, powers of which she has heard tales, powers that she needs in order 
to sustain herself with basic dignity, but which she does not fully believe she can attain.
19
 
                                                 
19
 At the first sight of the Dog, Mother Sawyer is both amazed and frightened by his 
presence. In fact, when Tom claims to be nothing short of “the devil” (2.1.122), Mother 
Sawyer likely retracts from fear: in response to her “Bless me! The devil?” (2.1.123), the 
Dog responds promptly: “Come, do not fear, I love thee much too well/ To hurt or fright 
thee” (2.1.124-25). While there are no stage directions that indicate Sawyer‟s 
performance of fear, it seems clear from the Dog‟s lines that she is at least intimidated, if 
not horrified, by the diabolical presence. 
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Even after the dog manages to recruit Mother Sawyer‟s “soul and body” (2.1.134), the 
woman is not entirely convinced of her status as the witch of Edmonton. However, she 
soon begins to cherish (false) notions of her diabolical power, rejoicing in the idea that 
she is “an expert scholar” who can “[s]peak Latin, or … know not well what language, / 
As well as the best of  ‟em” (2.1.181-82). Accepting money from Young Banks in return 
for agreeing to cast a love-spell on Katherine Carter, Sawyer takes her first step away 
from her hitherto subordinate position, and, empowering herself both economically and 
socially, loses some credibility as a victim of her community‟s oppression.20 By the time 
the Edmontonians prosecute the unruly (delusional) woman for being a murderous witch, 
Sawyer has hardened into a cynical subject whose actions engage a counterfuturity that 
also defies the disciplinary aspects of language. At her initial hearing she refuses to 
confess to the alleged crime of witchcraft, swearing instead to “muzzle up (her) tongue 
from telling tales” (5.1.70). While she reverts to her earlier complaints about being 
“reviled, kicked, (and) beaten” each day by the “slaves” of Edmonton (4.1. 77-78), 
Sawyer no longer is convincing as a pitiful victim of the changing social milieu. Rather, 
as she becomes firmly rooted in her unruliness and resists the structures of legal 
authority, she loses her position in the play as sympathetic protagonist. Thus, even though 
she confesses in the end to her practice of witchcraft and regrets her subscription to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20
 It is significant to note that while she convinces Young Banks of her diabolical 
abilities, Sawyer herself is fully aware that she has no power to manipulate Katherine‟s 
emotions. In fact, even as she accepts Banks‟ money, she admits (in an aside) that she 
means to “have sport” at the young clown‟s expense (2.1.224).    
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devil‟s path, she does so hesitantly, complaining that the citizens want her to “spend” her 
final moments “bawling” out her repentance (5.3.48). The text‟s final judgment of 
Mother Sawyer is, of course, precarious. Even as it prioritizes the woman‟s socio-
economic position and perhaps offers it as a rationale for her transgressions, it does not 
allow her the privilege granted to tragic heroes: while almost all the other deaths in the 
play take place onstage, Elizabeth Sawyer‟s takes place offstage, and her absence is 
hardly noticeable at the end of the play, which turns its focus on Frank Thorney, the 
unruly young man who, in his dying speech, both repents and reverts to the patriarchal 
norm. 
Unlike Mother Sawyer‟s, Frank Thorney‟s social morality moves him in a 
disciplinary course from patriarchal and capital anxiety through panic-driven, anti-
patriarchal, action, to his dramatic climax, which is also his moment of “moral 
sensitivity” and due repentance for his prior actions, wherein he acknowledges the 
supremacy and validity of patriarchal ideologies (Champion 113). However, even in this 
plot multiple complications arise that lead to the play‟s skeptical representation of the 
hegemonic assimilation processes embodied in Frank Thorney‟s rites of passage. The 
play opens with a private exchange between Frank Thorney and his secret bride, 
Winifred. Much like his counterpart in The Roaring Girl, young Thorney is anxious to 
maintain his father‟s goodwill, which in turn would lead to a secure inheritance, while at 
the same time exercising his “free will” to marry a wife of his own choosing. The crucial 
difference between the two plays is the biological state in which we encounter the female 
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lovers: while the presumably virginal (certainly unpregnant) Mary Fitzallard in The 
Roaring Girl is camouflaged only in order to conceal her identity from Sir Alexander‟s 
greedy eyes, Winifred, being pregnant, needs to conceal her unruly body from larger 
society. Thus, within the first few lines of the play, Frank Thorney informs his wife of the 
careful arrangements he has made to transport Winifred from Edmonton—the center of 
the play‟s world—to a remote location “[n]ear Waltham Abbey (1.1.38), away from the 
potentially convicting speech of “the tattling gossips” who “can speak against (her) fame” 
(1.1.3-4), and, in so doing, divorce the young man from “th‟inheritance/ To which (he is) 
born heir” (1.1.28-29).21  
While the Frank Thorney-Winifred plot upholds what Walter Cohen identifies as 
the “love-and-honour code” that was rapidly being embraced by the early modern 
tragicomedies (128), and while the play even seems to represent a “toleration of 
premarital intercourse by the betrothed couple” (133), at the same time it suggests that 
“property in marriage” is necessary for the continued health and social acceptance of the 
matrimonial arrangement (133).
22
 Indeed, Frank Thorney speaks as the play‟s voice of 
                                                 
21
 Caroline Bicks notes that the early modern midwife‟s oath clearly indicated that it was 
the midwife who “determined which genealogical tale, with its attendant privileges or 
stigmas, would be delivered to a wider audience” (24). This emphasis on naming and 
exposing the true father reveals a “specifically male concern about the birth attendant‟s 
supposed proximity to what is true,” thereby signaling the increased attempts by men to 
control or regulate the “production and dissemination of a child‟s origins” (Bicks 24). 
 
22
 Although Winifred alludes repeatedly to her secret marriage to Frank Thorney, it is 
clear that the couple has not been recognized publicly—or legally—as man and wife. 
Consequently, the child born to Winifred would necessarily be condemned as a bastard, a 
“brand” that would automatically alienate him from his community. 
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reason when he announces to his forlorn wife that he is weaving the intricate mesh of 
deception only to be a good parent and ensure that their unborn child will not “feel/ The 
misery of beggary and want;/ Two devils that are occasions to enforce/ A shameful end” 
(1.1.17-20). The “shameful end,” however, is inescapable in The Witch of Edmonton. 
While Winifred, who may not even be carrying young Thorney‟s child but her employer 
Sir Arthur Clarington‟s, is confined to the “invisible” space of her uncle‟s home, the 
young hero is subjected to a lucrative marriage to Susan Carter, one that is arranged for 
him by his father.
23
 From this point on, Frank Thorney fluctuates between moral anxiety 
that stems from his emotional commitment to Winifred and material ambition, ambition 
that is fired by his awareness of the need to secure his socio-economic position. 
This conflict—which in The Roaring Girl is resolved painlessly through the 
characters‟ witty manipulation of town gossip, economic transactions, and the law—leads 
only to catastrophe in the tragicomedy. Gossip, which is only potentially malicious in the 
comedy, is elevated to the level of hysteria in The Witch of Edmonton; economic 
transactions between the resourceful (the young) and the wealthy (the elderly) that in the 
comedy lead to financial stability for the youth and moral education of the aged are 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
23
 Michael Roberts notes that in purely economic terms, women who were domestic 
servants or illegal inmates of houses ran the risk of increasing the town‟s population of 
illegitimate, dependent children (the implication being that as single women, they were 
prone to sexual encounters with male servants, other inmates, and/or employers). For 
greater details on the issues of illegitimacy in early modern England, see Keith 
Wrightson‟s English Society and Wrigley and Schofield‟s The Population History of 
England. 
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frustrated in the tragicomedy; and the law, which in the earlier play is rendered 
subservient to the moral dictates of love and honor, is actively defaced in the later play by 
authoritarian figures who embody lust and dishonorable conduct.   
Relating the generic innovations of the Stuart tragicomedy to the material realities 
of the period, Margot Heinemann suggests that in “a troubled, unstable, and divided 
society, the deeper changes taking place (very roughly, from a social order based on rank 
and status to one based on wealth and money) affected every social grouping and its 
„mentalities‟ in one way or another, so that dissent and conflict over political policy and 
social and moral codes can be discerned even within … plays intended for a privileged 
and fashionable audience” (151). The Witch of Edmonton represents precisely the 
destabilizing effects of the social economy that Heinemann‟s essay identifies as being 
specific to a “prerevolutionary situation,” wherein “no single ideology is capable of 
holding the society at large effectively together” (151).    
 Heinemann notes that, in the plays produced during the prerevolutionary period in 
England, there is a sense of “the world turned upside-down to right injustices and resolve 
social conflict” (153). While this may be true of the city comedies of which The Roaring 
Girl is an excellent example, the same cannot be stated of The Witch of Edmonton. 
Granted, in both plays the world is “turned upside down,” the principles regimenting 
patriarchal futurity dismantled: women take on transgressive forms—be it through 
crossdressing or witchcraft—and poor men morally outweigh noblemen.  Of course, The 
Roaring Girl executes effectively the benevolent spirit of “proletarianism,” which in 
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itself is a reversal of social mores.
24
 Moll Cutpurse—a single woman who mysteriously 
also has the financial resources to purchase luxury items at the marketplace—manages 
single-handedly to save the day, uniting the young couple in a lucrative yet loving 
marriage. Moreover, she chastises Laxton‟s deviant sexuality, humbles the money-driven 
Sir Alexander, and shames misogynists at large while endorsing the patriarchally 
determined feminine virtues of obedience and chastity.
25
 Conveniently, the various social 
and economic reversals in the play serve to unite the generic blueprint of comedy to the 
increasingly popular moral purpose of urban culture.   
                                                 
24
 I use the term proletarianism conscious of its ahistoricism in the early modern context. 
However, I am basing the usage on my sense that the play focuses on the everyday 
activities or an everyday people. While Sebastian and Mary Fitzallard may form part of 
the aristocracy and gentry, most of the characters seem entrenched in the growing 
working and middle classes.  
 
25
 It is interesting to note that Laxton, whose name, as several critics note, puns on his 
sexual inadequacy, is aroused not only by Moll‟s masculine attire, but also by her ability 
to physically and verbally assault men. Remarking that her voice “will drown all the city” 
(2.1.189), the pauper-gallant constructs an elaborate fantasy of Moll that is triggered by 
Mistress Gallipot‟s statement of the local gossip regarding the young woman‟s unstable 
gender and sexuality: he imagines greedily how the crossdressed woman “might first 
cuckold the husband and then make him do as much for the wife!” (2.1.211-12). Soon 
after, when Laxton is witness to Moll‟s attack on a nameless but armed “fellow” 
(2.1.248; also see stage direction), he lauds her ability to wield “gallantly” and 
“manfully” the sword (2.1.261). In his readiness to be schooled by Moll, then, Laxton 
displays a sexuality that deviates from the tropes of masculine aggression (which are 
embodied in the rhetorical exchanges between Sir Alexander and Trapdoor). Similarly, 
Laxton‟s refusal to consummate his illicit relationship with Mistress Gallipot may be 
interpreted as a sexual “perversion” or deviance on his part, in that he derives pleasure 
from the act of infinite deference—from inaction—rather than immediate gratification 
through sexual intercourse. Of course, we cannot overlook the economic power that he 
wields over the married woman, which stems directly from his unwillingness to gratify 
her sexual expectations of him.               
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However, in the later play similar reversals do not yield positive results, and 
cannot bring about dramatic resolution. Women—both transgressive and subservient—
from all social orders end up dead, often unjustifiably; love within marriage, though 
idealized from the beginning, amounts only to tragedy; and as the play concludes, there is 
no redistribution of wealth and/or power within the community. In short, at play‟s end the 
dead seem to have died in vain because the living are none the better (or richer) for the 
former‟s sacrifices, their future courses altered but not improved. 
 250 
REFERENCES 
Adelman, Janet. (2003). “Masculine Authority and the Maternal Body in The Winter‟s  
Tale.” Shakespeare‟s Romances: New Casebooks. Ed. Alison Thorne. New York: 
Palgrave. 145-70. 
 
Alwes, Derek B. (2008). “The Secular Morality of Middleton‟s City Comedies.”  
Comparative Drama 42.2, 101-119. 
 
Ames, Russell. (1949). Citizen Thomas More and his Utopia. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press. 
 
Anonymous. The XV Concerns of Rash and Inconsiderate Marriage.  
Archer, Ian. (2000). “Material Londoners?” Material London, ca 1600.  
Ed. Lena Orlin. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, 174-92.   
 
---. (1991). The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan  
London. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Arnold, Jean, Lawrence Buell, et al. (1999). “Forum on Literatures of the  
Environment.” PMLA, 115, 1089-1104.  
 
Bacon, Francis. (1970). “The Masculine Birth of Time.” The Philosophy of  
Francis Bacon: An Essay on its Development from 1603to 1609, with New 
Translations of Fundamental Texts. Trans. Benjamin Farrington.  
 
Balasopoulos, Antonis. (2006). “„Suffer a Sea Change‟: Spatial Crisis,  
Maritime Modernity, and the Politics of Utopia.” Cultural Critique 63 (Spring), 
122-56. 
 
Bartels, Emily. (1996). “Strategies of Submission: Desdemona, The Duchess, and the  
Assertion of Desire” Studies in English Literature 36.2, 417-33. 
 
Benson, Pamela Joseph. (1999). “To Play the Man: Aemilia Lanyer and the  
Acquisition of Patronage.” Opening the Borders: Inclusivity in Early Modern 
Studies. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 243-64.   
 
Bergson, Henri. (1988). Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and  
251 
 
 
 
W. Scott Palmer. New York: Zone Books. 
 
Bergson, Henri. (1946). The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics.  
Trans. Mabelle Andison. New York: Philosophical Library. 
 
Berry, Philippa (2004). “Nomadic Eros: Remapping Knowledge in A Midsummer  
Night‟s Dream.” Forgetting in Early Modern English Literature and Culture: 
Lethe‟s Legacies, ed. by Christopher Ivic and Grant Williams, Routledge Studies 
in Renaissance Literature and Culture. New York: Routledge.137-50 
 
Bhabha, Homi K. (1994). The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. 
 
Bicks, Caroline. (2000). “Midwiving Virility in Early Modern England.”  
Maternal Measures: Figuring Caregiving in the Early Modern Period. Eds. 
Naomi J. Miller and Naomi Yavneh. Burlington: Ashgate. 49-64. 
 
---. (2003). Midwiving Subjects in Early Modern England. Burlington: Ashgate. 
 
Bogue, Ronald. (2003). Deleuze on Literature. London: Routledge. 
 
Boehrer, Bruce. (2001). “Ovid and the Dilemma of the Cuckold in English Renaissance  
Drama.” Ovid and the Renaissance Body. Ed. Goran V. Stanivukovic. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 171-88. 
 
Bloch, Ernst. (1986). The Principle of Hope: Volume Two. “Freedom and Order,  
Survey of Social Utopias.” Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Boundas, Constantin. (1986). “Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual.”  
Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Ed. Paul Patton. Oxford: Blackwell. 81-106.  
 
Braidotti, Rosi. (1994). Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference  
in Contemporary Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Bristol, Michael. (1990). “Charivari and the Comedy of Abjection in Othello”  
Renaissance Drama 21, 3-21. 
 
Brunning, Alizon. (2002). “„In his gold I shine‟: Jacobean Comedy and the Art of the  
Mediating Trickster.” Early Modern Literary Studies 8.2, 25 paragraphs. 
 
Bruster, Douglas. (2003). Shakespeare and the Question of Culture: Early Modern  
Literature and the Cultural Turn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
252 
 
 
 
Buccola, Regina. (2006). Fairies, Fractious Women, and the Old Faith: Fairy Lore  
in Early Modern British Drama and Culture. Susquehanna: Susquehanna 
University Press. 
 
Buchanan Ian and Claire Colebrook. Eds. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory.  
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Burnham, Douglas. (2002). “Language, Time, and Politics in Shakespeare‟s Macbeth.”  
Displaced Persons: Conditions of Exile in European Culture. Ed. Sharon Ouditt.  
London: Ashgate. 21-32.  
 
Caillois, Roger. (1984). Trans. John Sheply. “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia.”  
October 31, 16-32. 
 
Chakravorty, Swapan. (1996). Society and Politics in the Plays of Thomas  
Middleton. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Champion, Larry S. (1986). “„Factions of Distempered Passions‟: The Development of  
John Ford‟s Tragic Vision in The Witch of Edmonton and  
The Lover‟s Melancholy.” Concord in Discord: The Plays of John Ford,  
1586-1986. Ed. Donald K. Anderson. New York: AMS. 109-30. 
 
Clark, Alice. (1992). Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century.  
Third Edition. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Clemen, Wolfgang. (1966). “Past and Future in Shakespeare‟s Drama.”  
Proceedings of the British Academy. LII, 231-52. 
 
Cohen, Walter. (1992). “Prerevolutionary Drama.” The Politics of  
Tragicomedy: Shakespeare and After. Eds. Gordon McMullan and Jonathan 
Hope. London and New York: Routledge. 122-50. 
 
Colebrook, Claire. (2000). “Is Sexual Difference a Problem?” Deleuze and  
Feminist Theory. Eds. Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 110-27. 
 
Cook, Ann Jennalie. (1981). The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare‟s London,  
1576-1642. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Crawford, Patricia. “The Construction and Experience of Maternity in  
Seventeenth-Century England.” Women as Mothers in Pre-Industrial  
England. Ed. Valerie Fildes. London: Routledge, 1990. 3-38. 
253 
 
 
 
 
Crawford, Patricia and Laura Gowing (Eds). (2000). Women‟s Worlds in  
Seventeenth-Century England: A Sourcebook. London and New York:  
Routledge. 
 
Cressy, David. (1999). Birth, Marriage, and Death: Ritual, Religion, and the  
Life-Cycle in Tudor and Stuart England. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press.   
 
---. (2000). Travesties and Transgressions in Tudor and Stuart England: Tales of Discord  
and Dissension. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Culler, Jonathan & Kevin Lamb. Eds. (2003).  Just Being Difficult?: Academic  
Writing in the Public Arena (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Davies, Stevie, The Feminine Reclaimed: The Idea of Woman in Shakespeare,  
Spenser, and Milton (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986)  
 
Deats, Sara. (1998). Sex, Gender, and Desire in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe.  
Delaware: University of Delaware Press. 
 
Dekker, Thomas, John Ford, & William Rowley. (1998). The Witch of Edmonton.  
Ed. Arthur Kinney. London and New York: Norton.   
 
---. The Witch of Edmonton. (1980). Ed. Etta Onat. New York: Garland, 1980. 
 
Dekker, Thomas and Thomas Middleton. (1987). The Roaring Girl.  
Ed. Paul Mulholland. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. (1988). Bergsonism. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Zone Books.   
 
---. (1989). Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and  
Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
---. (1994). Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York:  
Columbia University Press. 
 
---. (1990). The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale.  
Ed. Constantin Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
---. (1995). Negotiations: 1972-1990. Trans. M. Joughin. New York: Columbia  
University Press. 
254 
 
 
 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. (1983). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen Lane. Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
---. (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
---. (1986) Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
---. (1994). What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell.  
New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Ritter von Leopold Sacher-Masoch. (1971). Masochism; An  
Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty: together with the Entire Text of Venus in 
Furs. New York: Braziller. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. (1996). Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Egan, Gabriel. (2006). Green Shakespeare: From Ecopolitics to Ecocriticism.  
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Ehnenn, Jill. (1997). “„An Attractive Dramatic Exhibition‟? Female Friendship,  
Shakespeare‟s Women, and Female Performativity in 19th-Century Britain.” 
Women‟s Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal. 26, 315-41 
  
Elizabeth I. (2000). “The Doubt of Future Foes.” Elizabeth I: Collected Works.  
Eds. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 133-34. 
 
---. (2000). “The Answer of the Queen‟s Highness to the Petitions Proponed Unto her  
by the Lower House Concerning her Marriage.” Queen Elizabeth‟s First Speech 
Before Parliament, February 10, 1559. Elizabeth I: Collected Works. Ed. Leah S. 
Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
56-58. 
 
---. (2000). “Queen Elizabeth‟s Latin Oration at Cambridge University, August 7, 1564.”  
Elizabeth I: Collected Works. Ed. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth 
Rose. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 87-89.   
 
255 
 
 
 
Erickson, Amy Louise. (1993). Women and Property in Early Modern England.  
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Forman, Valerie. (2001). “Marked Angels: Counterfeits, Commodities,  
and The Roaring Girl.” Renaissance Quarterly 54.4, 1531-60. 
 
Frosch, Thomas R. (2007). “The Missing Child in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream.”  
American Imago: Psychoanalysis and the Human Sciences, 64, 485-511. 
 
Frye, Susan and Karen Robertson (eds.) (1999). Maids and Mistresses, Cousins  
and Queens: Women‟s Alliances in Early Modern England. London and New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gill, Roma. (1983). “The World of Middleton.” „Accompaninge the players‟: Essays  
Celebrating Thomas Middleton, 1580-1980. New York: AMS. 15-38. 
 
Girard, René. (20040. A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare. South Bend:  
St. Augustine‟s Press. 
 
Goldberg, Jonathan. (1997). Desiring Women Writing: English Renaissance  
Examples. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Grosz, Elizabeth A. Ed. (1999). Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and  
Futures. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
---. (1999). “Thinking the New: Of Futures Yet Unthought.” Becomings: Explorations  
in Time, Memory, and Futures. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 15-29. 
 
---. (1995). Space, Time, and Perversion. New York: Routledge. 
 
Gurr, Andrew. (1996). Playgoing in Shakespeare‟s London. Second Edition.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Haber, Judith. (2003). “I(t) Could not Choose but Follow: Erotic Logic in  
 The Changeling.” Representations. 81, 79-98. 
 
Hankins, John. (1949). “Hamlet‟s „God Kissing Carrion‟: A Theory of the Generation  
of Life.” PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America. 
64.3, 507-16.  
 
Harkness, Deborah. (2007). The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the  
Scientific Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
256 
 
 
 
 
Healy, Margaret. (2001). Fictions of Disease in Early Modern England: Bodies,  
Plague  and Politics. Houndmills and Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
---. (1999). “Pericles and the Pox” Shakespeare‟s Late Plays: New Readings.  
Eds. James Knowles and Jennifer Richards. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.  
 
Heinemann, Margot. (1992). “„God Help the Poor: The Rich can Shift‟: The World  
Upside-Down and the Popular Tradition in the Theatre.” The Politics  
of Tragicomedy: Shakespeare and After. Eds. Gordon McMullan and  
Jonathan Hope. London and New York: Routledge. 151-65. 
 
Hendricks, Margo. (1996). “„Obscured by Dreams‟: Race, Empire, and Shakespeare‟s  
A Midsummer Night‟s Dream.” Shakespeare Quarterly, 47, 37-60. 
 
Heywood, Thomas. (2002). The Wise Woman of Hogsdon. Ed. Sonia Massai.  
London: Routledge.  
 
Hoeniger, David. F. (1992). Medicine and Shakespeare in the English  
Renaissance. Newark: University of Delaware Press. 
 
Hopkins, Lisa. (2005). Shakespeare on the Edge: Border-Crossing in the  
Tragedies and the Henriad. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Howard, Jean. E. (1994). The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern  
England. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Huet, Marie-Hélène. (1993). Monstrous Imagination. Cambridge: Harvard University  
Press. 
 
Iyengar, Sujata. (2005). Shades of Difference: Mythologies of Skin Color in Early  
Modern England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Jameson, Fredric. (1994). The Seeds of Time. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Jankowski, Theodora A. (1990). “Defining/Confining the Duchess: Negotiating  
the Female Body in John Webster‟s The Duchess of Malfi.” Studies in Philology. 
87.2, 221-45. 
 
Jowett, John. (2002). “Thomas Middleton.” A Companion to Renaissance Drama.  
Ed. Arthur Kinney. Oxford: Blackwell. 507-23. 
257 
 
 
 
 
Kail, Aubrey C. (1986). The Medical Mind of Shakespeare. New South Wales:  
Williams and Wilkins. 
 
Kállay, Géza. (2003). “Was Macbeth Lying?: The „Be-all,‟ the „End-all,‟ and the  
Ethics of Time.” European Journal of English Studies 7.2, 137-149. 
 
Kastan, David Scott. (1999). Shakespeare After Theory. New York: Routledge. 
 
Kingsley-Smith, Janet. (2001). “The Tempest‟s Forgotten Exile.”  
Shakespeare Survey 54, 223-33. 
 
Kott, Jan. (1998). “Titania and the Ass‟s Head.” A Midsummer Night‟s Dream: Critical  
Essays, Ed. Dorothea Kehler. New York: Garland. 107-25 
 
Lacan, Jacques. (1977). Ecrits. A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock. 
 
Lanyer, Aemilia. (1993). The Poems of Aemilia Lanyer: Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum.  
Ed. Susanne Woods. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Leech, Clifford. (1966). “Shakespeare and the Idea of the Future.” University of  
Toronto Quarterly 35, 213-228. 
 
Lefebvre, Henri. (2003). The Urban Revolution. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press. 
 
Leinwand, Theodore. (1986). The City Staged: Jacobean Comedy, 1603-1613.  
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Levitas, Ruth. (1993). “The future of Thinking About the Future.”  
Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Changes. Eds. Job Bird et al. 
London: Routledge, 257-66. 
 
Lewalski, Barbara. (1993). Writing Women in Jacobean England. Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press. 
 
Lindenbaum, Peter. (1972). Time, Sexual Love, and the Uses of Pastoral in  
The Winter‟s Tale. Modern Language Quarterly 33, 3-22. 
 
Loomba, Ania. (1994). “Sexuality and Racial Difference.” Critical Essays  
on Shakespeare‟s Othello. Ed. Anthony Gerard Barthelemy. New York: G. K. Hall. 
162-86. 
258 
 
 
 
 
---. (2000). “The Great Indian Vanishing Trick: Colonialism, Property,  
and the Family in A Midsummer Night‟s Dream.” A Feminist Companion to 
Shakespeare. Ed. Dympna Callaghan. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. 163-87. 
 
Lyly, John. (1939). Mother Bombie. Ed. Kathleen M. Lea. London: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Mansfield, Nick. (1997). Masochism: The Art of Power. Westport: Praeger. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. (1978). The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist  
 Aesthetics. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
---. (1974). “Marxism and Feminism.” Women‟s Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal.  
 2,  279-88. 
 
Marin, Louis. (1984). Utopics: Spatial Play. Trans. Robert A. Vollarth.  
New Jersey: Humanities Press.  
 
 
Marlowe, Christopher. (1995). Christopher Marlowe: Doctor Faustus and Other Plays.  
Eds. David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Marotti, Arthur. (1969). “Fertility and Comic Form in A Chaste Maid in Cheapside.”  
Comparative Drama 3, 65-74. 
 
Martinon, Jean-Paul. (2007). On Futurity: Malabou, Nancy and Derrida. New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Massumi, Brian. (2002). Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect,  
Sensation. Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Maus, Katharine Eisaman. (1987). “Horns of Dilemma: Jealousy, Gender,  
and Spectatorship in English Renaissance Drama.” ELH 54.3, 561-583. 
 
McAlindon, Tom. (2004). Shakespeare Minus Theory. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
McMullun, Gordon and Jonathan Hope. (1992). “Introduction: The Politics of  
Tragicomedy, 1610-50.” The Politics of Tragicomedy:  
Shakespeare and After. Eds. Gordon McMullan and Jonathan Hope.  
London and New York: Routledge. 1-20. 
 
259 
 
 
 
Middleton, Thomas. (2007). A Chaste Maid in Cheapside. Ed. Linda Woodbridge.  
Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works. Eds. Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
 
---. (1994). The Witch. Ed. Elizabeth Schafer. London: New Mermaids. 
 
---. (2007). Women Beware Women. Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works.  
Eds. Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Middleton, Thomas & William Rowley. (2007). The Changeling. Thomas Middleton:  
The Collected Works. Eds. Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
---. (1974). A Fair Quarrel. Ed. R. V. Holdsworth. London: New Mermaids. 
 
Moncrief, Kathryn & Kathryn McPherson. (2007). Performing Maternity in Early  
 Modern England. London: Ashgate.  
 
More, Thomas. (1995). Utopia. Trans. and Ed. Robert M. Adams. New York:  
W. W. Norton.     
 
Neely, Carol. (1994). “Women and Men in Othello.” Critical Essays on  
Shakespeare‟s Othello. Ed. Anthony Gerard Barthelemy. New York: G. K. Hall. 
68-90. 
 
Newman, Karen. (1994). “„And wash the Ethiop White‟: Femininity and the  
Monstrous in Othello.”Critical Essays on Shakespeare‟s Othello. Ed. Anthony 
Gerard Barthelemy. New York: G. K. Hall. 124-143. 
 
Norbrook, David. (1992). “„What Care These Roarers for the Name of King?‟:   
Language and Utopia in The Tempest.” The Politics of Tragicomedy: Shakespeare 
and After. Eds. Gordon McMullan and Jonathan Hope. London: Routledge. 21-
54. 
 
Novy, Marianne. (2006). “Adopted Children and Constructions of Heredity, Nurture,  
and Parenthood in Shakespeare‟s Late Romances.” Childhood and  
Children‟s Books in Early Modern Europe, 1550-1800. New York:  
Routledge. 55-74. 
 
Ovid. (2000). Metamorphoses, Trans. Arthur Golding, Ed. John Frederick  
Nims. Philadelpiha: P. Dry Books. 
 
260 
 
 
 
Paré, Ambroise. (1982). On Monsters and Marvels, Trans. and Ed. Janis Pallister.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Parr, Adrian. (2005). The Deleuze Dictionary. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Paster, Gail Kern. (1993). The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of  
Shame in Early Modern England. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.    
 
---. (1985). The Idea of the City in the Age of Shakespeare. Athens: University of  
Georgia Press.   
 
Paster, Gail Kern, and Skiles Howard. (1999). A Midsummer Night‟s Dream: Texts and  
Contexts. Boston: Bedford. 
 
Pelling, Margaret. (1998). The Common Lot: Sickness, Medical Occupations and  
the Urban Poor in Early Modern England. London and New York: Longman. 
 
---. (2003). Medical Conflicts in Early Modern London: Patronage, Physicians,  
and Irregular Practitioners, 1550-1640. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
---. (1987). “Medical Practice in Early Modern England: Trade or Profession?”  
The Professions in Early Modern England. Ed. Wilfrid Prest. London and New 
York: Croom Helm. 90-128. 
 
---. (2000). “Defensive Tactics: Networking by Female Medical Practitioners in  
Early Modern London.” Communities in Early Modern England: Networks, Place, 
Rhetoric. Eds. Alexandra Shepard and Phil Withington. Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press. 38-53. 
 
Pelling, Margaret and Charles Webster. (1979). “Medical Practitioners.”  
Health, Medicine, and Mortality in the Sixteenth Century. Ed. Charles Webster. 
London and New York: Cambridge University Press. 165-236.  
 
Pollock, Linda A. (1990). “Embarking on a Rough Passage: The Experience  
of Pregnancy in Early Modern Society.” Women as Mothers in Pre-Industrial 
England. Ed. Valerie Fildes. London: Routledge. 39-67. 
 
Puttenham, George. (2007). The Art of English Poesie. Eds. Frank Whigham and  
Wayne A. Rebhorn. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Rackin, Phyllis. (1986). “Temporality, Anachronism and Presence in Shakespeare‟s  
English Histories.” Renaissance Drama 17, 101-23. 
261 
 
 
 
 
Radel, Nicholas F. (2005). “„Your Own for Ever‟: Revealing Masculine Desire  
in Othello.” Approaches to Teaching Shakespeare‟s Othello. Eds. Peter Erickson 
and Maurice Hunt. New York: The Modern Language Association. 62-71. 
 
Rajchman, John. (1999). “Diagram and Diagnosis.” Becomings: Explorations in  
Time, Memory, and Futures. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 42-54.  
 
Reeve, M. D. (1989). “Conceptions.” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological  
Society. 215, 81-112. 
 
Reynolds, Simon. (2003). “Pregnancy and Imagination in The Winter‟s Tale  
and Heliodorus‟ Aithiopika.” English Studies. 84.5, 433-47. 
 
Roberts, Michael. (1990). “Women and Work in Sixteenth-Century English  
Towns.” Work in Towns, 850-1850. Eds. Penelope Corfield and Derek Keene. 
Leicester and London: Leicester University Press. 86-102. 
 
Rose, Gillian. (1993). “Some notes Towards Thinking About the Spaces of the Future.”  
Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change. Eds. John Bird et al. 
London: Routledge, 70-83. 
 
Rowe, Jr. George E. (1979). Thomas Middleton & the New Comedy  
Tradition. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
 
Shakespeare, William. (1997). A Midsummer Night‟s Dream. New York and  
London: Norton. 
 
---. (1994). A Midsummer Night‟s Dream. Ed. Peter Holland  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
---. (2006). As You Like It. Ed. Juliet Dusinberre. London:  
Arden Shakespeare.   
 
---. (1997). Coriolanus. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
---. (2004). Macbeth. Ed. Robert S. Miola. New York: Norton.  
 
---. (1997). The Most Lamentable Tragedy of Titus Andronicus. New York and London:  
Norton. 
 
---. (2006). Othello. Ed. E. A. J. Honigmann. London: Arden Shakespeare. 
262 
 
 
 
 
---. (1997). Pericles, Prince of Tyre. New York and London: Norton. 
 
---. (1997). The Tempest. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
---. (2008). The Tragedy of King Lear. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. New York: Norton. 
 
---. (1997). Troilus and Cressida. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. New York:  
W. W. Norton. 
 
---. (1997). The Winter‟s Tale. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Sharp, Jane. (1999). The Midwifes Book. Ed. Elaine Hobby. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press.  
 
Siena, Kevin. P. (2001). “The „Foul Disease‟ and Privacy: The Effects of  
Venereal Disease and Patient Demand on the Medical Marketplace in Early  
Modern London.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine. 75, 199-224. 
 
Slights, William W. E. (1988). “The Changeling in A Dream.” SEL: Studies in  
English Literature, 1500-1900. 28, 259-72. 
 
Smith, Neil. (1993). “Homeless/Global: Scaling Places.” Mapping the Futures:  
Local Cultures, Global Change. Eds. John Bird et al. London: Routledge. 87-119. 
 
Snyder, Susan. (1999). “Mamillius and Gender Polarization in The Winter‟s Tale.”  
Shakespeare Quarterly 50.1, 1-8. 
 
Sotirin, Patty. (2005). “Becoming-Woman.” Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts. Ed. Charles  
 Stivale. Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press. 
 
Stavreva, Kirilka. (2000). “Fighting Words: Witch-Speak in Late Elizabethan  
Docu-Fiction.” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies. 30: 2, 309-38.  
 
Stott, Andrew. (2004). “„The Fondness, the Filthiness‟: Deformity and Laughter in  
Early-Modern Comedy.” Upstart Crow 24, 15-24. 
 
Stymeist, David. (2001). “„Must I Be … Made a Common Sink?‟ Witchcraft and  
the Theatre. The Witch of Edmonton.” Renaissance and Reformation/Renaissance 
et Réforme 25.2, 33-53. 
 
Sullivan, Garrett A. (2005). Memory and Forgetting in English Renaissance  
263 
 
 
 
Drama: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Webster Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Thoburn, Nicholas. (2003). Deleuze, Marx, and Politics. London: Routledge. 
 
Thompson, Ayanna. Ed. (2006). Colorblind Shakespeare: New Perspectives on  
Race and Performance. New York: Routledge. 
 
Vosskamp, Wilhelm. (2005). “The Narrative Staging of Image and Counter-Image:  
On the Poetics of Literary Utopias.” Thinking Utopia: Steps into Other Worlds. 
Eds.Jörn Rüsen, Michael Fehr, and Thomas W. Reiger. New York: Berghahn 
Books, 263-75. 
 
Wall, Wendy. (1993). The Imprint of Gender: Authorship and Publication in the  
English Renaissance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
Weisner, Merry E. (1987). “Women‟s Work in the Changing City Economy,  
1500-1650.” Connecting Spheres: Women in the Western World, 1500 to the 
Present. Eds. Marilyn J. Boxer and Jean H. Quataert. New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 64-74. 
 
Wells, Susan. (1981). “Jacobean City Comedy and the Ideology of the City.”  
ELH 48, 37-60. 
 
Williams, George W. (2004). “„Time for Such a Word‟: Verbal Echoing in  
Macbeth. Shakespeare and Language. Ed. Catherine Alexander. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 240-50. 
 
Williams, Raymond. (1973). The Country and the City. New York: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Wood, David Houston. (2002). “„He Something Seems Unsettled‟: Melancholy, Jealousy,  
and Subjective Temporality in The Winter‟s Tale.” Renaissance Drama 31, 185-
213. 
 
Wilson, Richard. (2007). Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows  
London: Routledge. 
 
Wrightson, Keith. (1982). English Society, 1580-1680. New Brunswick:  
Rutgers University Press. 
 
Wrigley, Edward. A & Roger Schofield. (1981). The Population History of  
264 
 
 
 
England, 1541-1871: A Reconstruction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
 
Wrightson, Keith. (1982). English Society, 1580-1680. New Brunswick:  
Rutgers University Press. 
 
Zamir, Tzachi. (2000). “Upon One Bank and Shoal of Time: Literature, Nihilism, and  
Moral Philosophy.” New Literary History 31.3, 529-551. 
 
Zizek, Slavoj. (2005). “From Revolutionary to Catastrophic Utopia.”  
Thinking Utopia: Steps into Other Worlds. Eds.Jörn Rüsen, Michael Fehr, and 
Thomas W. Reiger. New York: Berghahn Books, 247-63. 
  
265 
 
VITA 
 
Tripthi Pillai was born and raised in New Delhi, India, where she completed her 
undergraduate education and also received the first of her two Master‟s degrees in 
English. She moved to the United States in 1997 and completed her second Master‟s 
program from Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois. She has been at Loyola University 
Chicago since 2002. Tripthi‟s research and teaching interests include early modern 
studies, post structural theories, and cultural studies.    
 
